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tradition! of! Transcendental! Idealism.! Through! a! critical! involvement! with! both! Kant’s!
Critique2 of2 Pure2 Reason! and! Schopenhauer’s! The2World2 as2Will2 and2 Representation,! the!
study!will!draw!attention!to!the!level!of!Nietzsche’s!involvement!with!key!issues!in!Kantian!
epistemology.! In!doing!so! it!will!put! forward!a!reading!of!Nietzsche’s!early! ‘error! theory’,!
which! rejects! the! idea! that!Nietzsche!endorses! a!metaphysical! correspondence! theory!of!
truth.! It! will! instead! be! argued! that! in! the! early! error! theory! Nietzsche! is! critiquing! the!
discursivity!of!our!understanding.!The!study!will! finish!with!a!consideration!of!Nietzsche’s!
attempted! rejection! of! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself! through! an! epistemology! of!
perspectivism.! It!will!be!argued!that! this! rejection,!much! like!Schopenhauer’s!rejection!of!




































One! of! the! most! distinctive! features! of! Friedrich! Nietzsche’s! work,! and! one! which! any!
reader! is! struck! by! upon! reading! any! one! of! his! books,! is! the! characteristically! loose,!
elusive,!and!philosophically!unorthodox!style!of!his!writing.!As!noted!by!Peter!Poellner,!we!






are! more! some! sort! of! amalgamation! of! ad2 hoc,! ad2 hominem,2 psychoXsociological!
philosophical!reflections!which!would!fail!to!stand!up!to!rigorous!argumentation.!!
Although! I! concede! that! this! assimilation! is! perhaps,! to! some! extent,!
understandable,! it! is,! I! believe,! partly! a! result! of! reading! Nietzsche! and! his! philosophy!



















whole! host! of! philosophical! issues,! and! he! was! never! merely! –! or! perhaps! even!
predominantly!–!an!epistemologist,!he!carried!epistemological!and!metaphysical!concerns!
with! him! for! the!whole! of! his! productive! life.!Moreover,! these! concerns! can! be! seen! as!
descending!and!resulting!from!problems!and!issues!which!Nietzsche!saw!as!inherent!in!the!




The! influence! of! Kant! on! Nietzsche! is,! of! course,! often! noted! in! the! secondary!
literature;!however,! this! is!often!done! through!an!engagement!with!Kant’s!philosophy!as!
found!in!the!writings!of!Arthur!Schopenhauer.!The!reason!for!doing!this!is,!to!some!extent,!
warranted,! given! the! influence! which! Schopenhauer! had! on! Nietzsche,! especially! in! the!
latter’s!early!period.!Unfortunately,!however,!this!engagement!has!often!been!done!at!the!
expense! of! engaging! with! Kant;! thus,! the! overXriding! assumption! has! often! been! that!
Nietzsche’s!epistemology!ought!to!be!analysed!with!respect!to!Schopenhauer’s;!and!in!this!
way!we!may!come!to!gain!a!better!understanding!of! the! former’s! thought.!This! strategy,!
although! partly! useful,! can! also! often! lead! to! confusion,! especially! on! points! where!
Nietzsche!seems!to!diverge!or!disagree!with!Schopenhauer’s!claims.!!It!is!useful!to!bear!in!
mind!that!!Schopenhauer’s!philosophy!was!itself!heavily!influenced!by!that!of!Kant,!and!so!
often!when!Nietzsche!makes! claims! of!which!we! find! no! precedent! in! Schopenhauer,! or!
which! at! times! are! even! antiXSchopenhauerian,! he! is! in! fact,! wittingly! or! not,! making! a!
‘Kantian’!point.! ! !Therefore,! to!merely!consider!Schopenhauer’s!epistemology! in! trying! to!
make! sense! of! Nietzsche,! can! leave! big! holes! in! our! appreciation! of! the! complexity! of!
Nietzsche’s!arguments.!However,!by! the!same!token,! it! is!undoubtedly! true! that!much!of!





effects! for! our! understanding! of! the! former.3! To! understand! and! appreciate! Nietzsche’s!
epistemology,! I! believe,! we! must! consider! the! epistemologies! of! both! Kant! and!
Schopenhauer! to! see! how! Nietzsche’s! own! concerns! grow! out! of! problems! which! he!
locates!in!the!former!theories.!!
The! purpose! of! this! study! is! to! present! precisely! such! a! reading! of! Nietzsche’s!
epistemology.! By! examining! first! Kant’s! and! then! Schopenhauer’s! theories! of! objective!
experience,! I! wish! to! demonstrate! Nietzsche’s! involvement! and! concern! with!
epistemological! issues!arising! from!transcendental! idealism.! In! the!process!of!doing! this! I!
will! also! propose! a! new! reading! of! Nietzsche’s! ‘error! theory’! as! it! is! found! in! his! early!
writings.!This!new!reading!will!demonstrate!how!Nietzsche’s!position!emerges!through!him!
adopting!certain!Kantian!(and!antiXSchopenhauerian)!stances!on!a!number!of!issues!which!
led! to! the!divergence!of!Schopenhauer! from!Kant.!Moreover,! I!wish! to!demonstrate! that!
certain!problems!in!the!Kantian!philosophy,!such!as!the!issue!of!the!problematic!concept!of!
the! thingXinXitself,! followed!Nietzsche! throughout! his! productive! life.! The! problem!of! the!
thingXinXitself,!especially,!is!one!which!Nietzsche!attacks!from!a!whole!host!of!perspectives,!


















Part! One! –! Kant:! I! begin! with! an! account! of! Kant’s! theory! of! cognition! as! found! in! the!
Transcendental!Aesthetic!and!the!Transcendental!Analytic!of! the!Critique2of2Pure2Reason.!
Part!One! is!broken!down! into! three!chapters.! In!Chapter!1,! I! lay!out,! in!exegetical! terms,!
topics!in!the!Introduction!and!arguments!of!the!Transcendental!Aesthetic!in!CPR.!Chapter!2!
turns!to!critically!examine!the!doctrine!of!transcendental!idealism!as!established!by!Kant!in!
the! Aesthetic.! Two! issues! will! be! of! particular! concern! for! our! later! discussions! on!
Schopenhauer! and! Nietzsche.! The! first! is! Kant’s! position! on! the! ideality! vs.! reality! of!
phenomenal! objects;! the! second! is! Kant’s! argument! for! the! ontological! denial! of! spatial!
properties! from! thingsXinXthemselves,! along! with! a! consideration! of! the! ‘neglected!
alternative’.! Chapter! 3! will! explore! key! topics! in! the! Transcendental! Analytic.! Here! our!
concern!lies!with!Kant’s!claim!regarding!the!discursivity!of!our!cognition,!the!restriction!of!
the! categories! to! phenomena,! and! the! distinction! between! the! concepts! of! the! thingXinX
itself! and! that! of! a! noumenon! (which!will! help! highlight! a! further! distinction!which! Kant!
draws!between!two!forms!of!cognition,!namely!one!whose!intuitions!are!receptive/passive!
and!one!whose!intuitions!are!original/intellectual).!!
! We! should! note! at! this! point! that! in! providing! an! account! of! Kant’s! theory! of!
cognition,! I! have! been! forced! to! omit! many! parts! of! CPR! which,! though! they! may! be!
important! for! a! thorough! and! sound! understanding! of! Kant’s! theory! as! a! whole,! were!
judged!to!be!not!as!relevant!to!Schopenhauer’s!and!Nietzsche’s!epistemological!concerns.!
Thus,!when!considering!the!Analytic,!having!looked!at!the!Transcendental!Deduction!of!the!







Nietzsche.!After! all,! the!purpose!of!our! study! is! to!use!Kant! (and!Schopenhauer)! to! shed!
some!new!light!on!Nietzsche’s!thought;!thus!the!guiding!principle!in!choosing!which!parts!




Part! Two!–! Schopenhauer:! In! the! second!Part,! I!move! from!Kant’s! theory!of! cognition! to!
consider! Schopenhauer’s! account.! Chapter! 4! sets! out! the! main! points! of! contention!
between! Kant’s! and! Schopenhauer’s! theories! of! experience.! We! are! interested! in! two!
fundamental!revisions!of!the!Kantian!philosophy!at!the!hands!of!Schopenhauer;!the!first!is!
Schopenhauer’s!criticism!of!Kant’s!alleged!misuse!of! the!category!of!causality! in! inferring!
the! existence! of! thingsXinXthemselves! and!how! Schopenhauer! attempts! to! overcome! this!
problem!in!his!own!theory;!the!second!revision!is!Schopenhauer’s!claim,!pace!Kant,!that!we!
have!a!form!of!experience!of!the!world!which!is,!allegedly,!nonXconceptual.!Chapter!5!turns!
to! critically! examine! Schopenhauer’s! claims! from!a!Kantian!perspective.! I!will! argue!here!
that!both!of!Schopenhauer’s!attempted!revisions!of!Kant!ultimately!fail.!Firstly,!we!will!see!
that!Schopenhauer’s!acceptance!of!the!receptivity!thesis!means!that!he!cannot,!coherently,!
reject!Kant’s! inference! to! the! thingXinXitself!as! the!ground!of!phenomena,!and!yet!be! left!
with! a! viable! and! sound! theory! of! experience.! Secondly,!we!will! find! that! his! attempted!








formulations!of! his! ‘error! theory’! –! namely,! the! claim! that! experience! falsifies! reality.! To!
this! end,! Chapter! 6! begins! by! looking! at! the! classical! reading! of! Nietzsche’s! early! error!
theory! as! revealing! his! commitment! to! a!metaphysical! correspondence! theory! of! truth.! I!
then!consider!passages!from!this!period!where!Nietzsche!seems!to!accept!the!possibility!of!
the! ‘neglected! alternative’.! This! in! turn,! I! shall! argue,!means! that! if! Nietzsche! is! arguing!
from! a!metaphysical! correspondence! criterion! of! truth,! his! arguments! are! aimed! not! at!
undermining!the!truth!of!our!knowledge!claims,!but!rather!their!recognisable!justifiability.!
Thus,! his! ‘error! theory’! cannot! be! contained! in! these! arguments.! However,! even! the!
sceptical! line! of! thought! presupposes! that! Nietzsche! uses! the! thingXinXitself! as! the!
benchmark! for! truth;! that! is,! it! is! the! lack! of! guarantee! of! correspondence! between!
appearances! and! thingsXinXthemselves!which! generates! a! sceptical! attitude! regarding! the!
former.!This!will!take!us!back!to!the!debate!on!the!reality!vs.!ideality!of!appearances,!and!
interestingly!we!find!that!on!this!topic!Nietzsche!is!rather!ambivalent.!Thus,!ultimately!I!will!





impressions.! The! cogency!of! this! criticism!will! depend!on!where!Nietzsche! stands!on! the!
possibility! vs.! impossibility! of! nonXconceptual! experience.! As! we! will! see! in! Chapter! 7,!
Nietzsche! both! subscribes! to! the! discursivity! thesis! and! claims! that! conceptual! thought!
falsifies! reality,! a! position! which! I! will! argue! threatens! to! trivialize! his! error! theory.! In!
Chapter!8,!I!turn!to!criticise!Nietzsche’s!account!of!empirical!concept!formation.!Seeing!as!





I! have! focused! on! Nietzsche’s! error! theory! as! it! is! found! in! the! early! period;! especially,!
when! claims! to! the! effect! that! experience! falsifies! reality! can! be! found! throughout!
Nietzsche’s! oeuvre,! and! that! he,! arguably,! puts! forward! stronger,! and! certainly! a! wider!
range!of,!arguments!in!his! later!writings.!The!reason!for!this! is,!firstly,!that!I!believe!there!
are! several! studies! which! deal! with! Nietzsche’s! epistemology! (and! his! error! theory)! as!
found!in!his!later!writings!in!great!detail,!and!that!they!provide!a!clear!and!comprehensive!
account! of! Nietzsche’s! epistemology.! Two! books! in! particular! which! I! believe! are! worth!
mentioning!are!Peter!Poellner’s!Nietzsche2and2Metaphysics2and!M.S.!Green’s!Nietzsche2and2
the2 Transcendental2 Tradition.! The! former! covers! a! wide! range! of! issues! in! Nietzsche’s!
metaphysical! and! epistemological! thought! and! provides! an! inXdepth! analysis! of! the! said!
issues.! The! latter! looks! specifically! at!Nietzsche’s! relation! to! the!neoXKantian!philosopher!
Afrikan! Spir,! to! locate! the!presence!of! Spirean! influenced!arguments! in!Nietzsche’s! error!
theory.!However,!both!studies!focus!predominantly!on!the!later!Nietzsche;!Poellner,!by!his!
own!admission,!refers!to!Nietzsche’s!early!epistemology!only!to!the!extent!that!these!may!
help!clarify!Nietzsche’s! later!positions,4!whereas!Green! focuses!on! the! ‘middle’!and! ‘late’!
periods!of!Nietzsche!for!the!simple!reason!that!most!of!the!SpirXtype!arguments!are!to!be!
located!in!these!periods.!Moreover,!Green’s!reading!of!the!early!error!theory!still!assumes!
that!Nietzsche! is!wedded! to! the!metaphysical! correspondence! theory! of! truth5! –! a! point!
which! I! shall! question.! Thus,! I! believe! that! the! already! existing! secondary! material! on!









Part! Four! –! Late! Nietzsche:! The! final! part! of! our! study! is! composed! of! a! single! chapter!
which! looks! at! Nietzsche’s! rejection,! as! incoherent,! of! the! concept! of! a! thingXinXitself,!
through!an!epistemology!of!perspectivism.!In!considering!this!line!of!argument!I!will!look!at!
why!Nietzsche!equates!the!thingXinXitself!with!a!nonXperspectival!object,!and!secondly!why!
he!believes! the!concept!of!a!nonXperspectival!object! to!be!a!contradiction! in! terms.! I!will!
finally! turn!to!an!assessment!of!Nietzsche’s!epistemology!of!perspectivism!to!show!why! I!
believe! his! own! claims! to! require! the! thingXinXitself.! Specifically,! I! will! argue! for! why!
Nietzsche’s! equation! of! the! concept! of! a! thingXinXitself! with! that! of! a! nonXperspectival!
object!presupposes!the!receptivity!thesis!with!regard!to!our!intuitions;!and!this!thesis!will!
be! shown! to! presuppose! the! ability! to!make! use! of! the! concept! of! a!mindXindependent!





on!Nietzsche!and!epistemology/metaphysics,! is! the! scarcity!of! aphorisms! to! choose! from!
which!deal!with!these! issues! from!the!published!writings.!One!could,!of!course,!adopt!an!
approach,! as!Maudemarie! Clark! does,! which! choses! to! almost! disregard! the! notebooks,!
tout2 court.6! There! may! be! some! merits! to! this! strategy! in! that! one! avoids! assigning! to!
Nietzsche!claims!which!he!perhaps!contemplated!but!did!not!consider!coherent!or!polished!
enough! to! be! included! in! his! philosophy! proper.! However,! I! believe! that! the! strategy! is!
beset!with! far!more! disadvantages.!Most! seriously,! one! is! denying! oneself! a! plethora! of!
material! which! can! assist! in! making! sense! of! Nietzsche’s! epistemology.! Moreover,! the!
notebooks! can! at! times! contain!more! argumentation! for! positions! which! Nietzsche! puts!





revealing! whether! or! not! the! reasoning! behind! Nietzsche’s! assertions,! in! his! published!
writings,!are!sound.!The!need!for! the!notebooks! is!even!more!evident!when!dealing!with!





one!must!disregard!BT! in!determining!Nietzsche’s!position.! Ironically,! I!believe! that,! from!
this!period,!it!is!through!the!published!writings!that!one!may!wrongly!assign!to!Nietzsche!an!





period.! In! Chapter! 9,! I!will! again! predominantly! use! the! notebooks,! but! passages!will! be!
provided! from! the! published!writings! which! reXiterate! the! claims!made! in! the! notebook!
writings.!!
Overall,!I!hope!this!study!will!shed!some!new!light!on!Nietzsche’s!relation!to!Kant’s!
philosophy! and!especially! to! the! latter’s! theory!of! Transcendental! Idealism.!My!aim! is! to!
emphasise! the! extent! of! Nietzsche’s! involvement! with! Kantian! epistemology,! and! how!









The! first! part! of! our! study! will! focus! on! selected! topics! from! the! Introduction,!
Transcendental!Aesthetic,!and!Transcendental!Analytic!of!CPR.! I!will!attempt,!through!the!
three!chapters!that!make!up!Part!One,!to!lay!out!certain!commitments!by!Kant!in!his!theory!
of!experience!which!will! recur! in!our!discussions!on!Schopenhauer!and!Nietzsche! in!Parts!
Two,!Three,!and!Four.!By!providing!the!backdrop!against!which!the!latter’s!theories!will!be!
evaluated,!the!account!presented!in!this!part!will!serve!as!the!focal!point!for!our!study!as!

































This! chapter!will! look! at! key! issues! in! the! Introduction,! Preface,! and! the! Transcendental!
Aesthetic!of!CPR.!The!purpose!of! the! chapter! is! to! lay!out! certain!basic! commitments!by!
Kant!which!form!cornerstones!of!the!doctrine!of!transcendental!idealism.!The!main!topics!
to! be! considered! are:! Kant’s! understanding! of! the! notion! of! a2 priority,! the! analytic! vs.!
synthetic! distinction,! and! his! arguments! for! the! a2 priori! origin! of! our! representations! of!
space! –! as! contained! in! the! metaphysical! and! transcendental! expositions.! The! present!
chapter!will!be!primarily!exegetical! in!nature,!and! I! shall!postpone!critical!examination!of!
Kant’s! arguments! to! Chapter! 2,! where! I! will! specifically! revisit! Kant’s! argument! from!










how! Kant’s! understanding! of! this! relation! diverged! significantly! from! both! his! empiricist!
and!rationalist!predecessors.!!
! Kant! begins! the! Introduction! to! CPR! by! assuming! what! may! look! like! a! middleX
ground!between!rationalism!and!empiricism!regarding!the!origin!of!knowledge.!He!claims!
that!“no!cognition!in!us!precedes!experience,!and!with!experience!every!cognition!begins”!
(B1).! He! therefore! acknowledges,! along!with! the! empiricists,! the! need! for! experience! to!
possess! knowledge! of! the! world.! Without! experience! of! the! world,! there! can! be! no!
knowledge! of! the! world.! However,! he! then! proceeds! to! claim! that! “although! all! our!




that! it! is! possible! that! knowledge! is! the! result! of! things! being! given! to! us! through! the!
senses! combined! with! some! form! of! activity! on! this! sensory! material! by! our! cognitive!
faculty.!We!must,!therefore,!consider!the!possibility!that!there!is!such!a!thing!as!a!cognition!
independent!of!experience!or!even!sense!impressions!(B2).!Such!a!cognition,!which!would!
precede! all! experience! Kant! calls! a2 priori.! He! contrasts! it! with! empirical! or! a2 posteriori!
cognitions,!that! is,!cognitions!derived!from!experience.!Previous!philosophers!before!Kant!





truths,! known! through!experience.!Hume,! likewise,! created!a!dual!division!of!knowledge.!
On! the!one!hand,! he! considered! a! class! of! knowledge! as! ‘relations!of! ideas’!which! are!a2
priori,!analytic,!and!necessarily!true!(Hume,!An!Inquiry!Concerning!Human!Understanding,!





We! should! note! at! this! stage! that! Kant! is! not! claiming! that!we! can! have!a2 priori!
knowledge!of! the!world,! for! knowledge! requires!affection!of!our! senses!by!outer!objects!





priori.! Importantly! for! Kant,! that! a! cognition! occurs! absolutely! independently9! of! all!
experience! implies!and!entails! the!conditions!of!necessity!and!universality,!which!a2priori!
















any!conceptual!contradiction.!Thus,! it!must!be!a! ‘matter!fact’!–!however,! it! is!a!matter!of!
fact! which! is! taken! by! us! as! indicating! a! necessary! truth,! and! yet! we! know! that! such!
propositions! can! never! afford! us! knowledge! of! necessity.! But! the! causal! proposition!
requires!precisely!such!necessity;!it!states!that!“because!something!is!the!case,!something!
else! necessarily! must! also! be”! (P! 4:257).! For! Hume,! then,! our! putative! experience! of!






experience,! and! having! brought! certain! representations! under! the! law! of! association,!
passes! off! the! resulting! subjective! necessity! (i.e.! habit)! for! an! objective! necessity! (from!
insight)”!(P!4:257X8).!Although!Kant!will!disagree!with!Hume!regarding!the!objective!validity!
of!the!concept!of!causality,!he!wholly!subscribes!to!the!belief!that!experience!can!only!tell!





priori! or! not,! is! true! or! strict! universality.! Once! again,! Kant! refers! to! the! nature! of!
knowledge! acquired! through! experience! and! highlights! that! no! knowledge! derived! from!
experience!can!ever!tell!us!that!something!is!always!the!case.!The!most!we!are!entitled!to!
claim!regarding!a2posteriori!knowledge!is!that!“as!far!as!we!have!yet!perceived,!there!is!no!





such! truths! are! universally! true.! For! if! x2 and! y2 are! combined! in! such! a! way! that! y! is!
necessarily!a!part!of!x,!then!given!x,!we!can!be!sure!of!y!to!hold!universally.!Indeed,!if!there!
were! an! instance! where! x! and! y! were! revealed! to! not! be! combined,! then! clearly! the!
combination!of!x!and!y!was!not!a!necessary,!but!rather!merely!a!contingent,!one.!
Lastly,!the!a2priority!of!a!cognition,!namely!that!we!can!know!it!to!be!true!without!
recourse! to! empirical! testing,! has,! for! Kant,! implications! regarding! the! source! of! that!
cognition;! specifically! he! believes! that! the! source! of! such! a! cognition! must! be! in! us.!
Although!Kant!simply!states,!as!early!as!B2,!that!an!a2priori!cognition!has!its!source!in!us11,!
without! any!obvious! reasoning,! it! seems! that! he! saw! this! as! a! selfXevident! corollary! of!a2
priority.!Kant’s!point!seems!to!be!that! if!we!can!know!something!to!be!true!of! the!world!
prior!to!having!experience!of!the!world,! then!we!must!conclude!that!this! feature! is!not!a!
property!of!the!world!itself!but! is!rather!a!way!in!which!we2must!perceive!the!world,!and!
that! the!property,! therefore,! has! its! source! in2 us! and!not! in! the!world.12!Another!way! in!
which!we!may!think!of!Kant’s!conclusion!is!by!considering!the!notion!of!a2priori!cognition!as!
cognition! of! necessity.! If! we! agree! with! Hume! and! Kant! that! experience! only! gives! us!
contingent!knowledge!of!the!world,!then!our!possession!of!necessary2knowledge!must!be!
because!it!is!not!knowledge!of!the!world!as!such,!but!rather!knowledge!of!what!we!bring!to!





















Another! distinction!which!must! be! dealt!with! at! the! outset! is! that! between! analytic! and!
synthetic!judgments.!Analytic!judgments!are!those!where!the!predicate!is!covertly!implied!
or!contained! in! the! logical! subject!of! the!sentence.!A! judgment!such!as! ‘all!bachelors!are!
unmarried’! is! an! analytic! one! insofar! as! the! predicate! ‘unmarried’! is! contained! in! the!
concept!of!‘bachelor’!and!therefore!adds!nothing!new!to!the!subject!of!the!judgment;!we!
have! not! learnt! anything! new! about! bachelors! after! considering! the! proposition,! for,!
assuming!that!we!knew!the!meaning!of!‘bachelor’!in!the!first!place,!we!already!knew!that!
any! and! therefore! all! bachelors! are,! by! definition,! unmarried.! Since! the! predicate! in! an!
analytic! judgment!does!not!add!anything!to!the!subject!of!the!proposition,!Kant!says!that!
analytic! judgments! do! not! expand! our! knowledge,! but! that! they! rather! “explicate”! our!
concepts! and! are! therefore! considered! ‘judgments! of! clarification’! (B11! and! P! 4:266X7).!
Moreover,! there! is! both! necessity! and! strict! universality! in! analytic! judgments! in! that!
because!the!predicate!adds!nothing!to!the!subject!in!the!judgment,!the!subject!can!for!the!
very! same! reason! not! be! thought! without! the! predicate.! The! reason! why! the! predicate!
















our! case! of! ‘all! bachelors! are! unmarried’,! we! can! know,! through! the! principle! of!
contradiction,!that!if!we!deny!the!predicate!‘unmarried’!of!a!‘bachelor’!(i.e.!claiming!that!a!





analytic! judgment.!Thus,! if!we!take!the!example!of! the!hypothetical!analytic! judgment!“If!
there! is! a! cause,! then! there! will! be! an! effect”,! we! can! once! again! use! the! principle! of!
contradiction! to! determine! whether! the! proposition! is! true.! In! this! case,! we! find! that!
denying! an! ‘effect’! when! we! have! posited! a! ‘cause’! contradicts! the! concept! of! a! cause,!
which!carries!with!it!the!concept!of!effect.14!!
Synthetic! judgments,! on! the! other! hand,! are! those! judgments! whereby! the!




to! the! concept! of! the! subject,! something! which! is! not! inherent! to! the! concept! of! the!








synthetic! judgments,! ‘judgments! of! amplification’! (B11! and! P! 4:266)! in! that! they! expand!
our! knowledge! about! the! world! and! tell! us! something! which! we! could! not! have! known!
through!a!mere!analysis!of!the!concepts!in!the!judgment.15!Thus,!in!a!synthetic!judgment,!






some! “third! thing”! which! can! connect! or! synthesize! the! two! concepts,! since! neither! is!
thought! in! the!other!analytically.!This! ‘third! thing’!which!connects! the!predicate!with! the!
subject!in!a!synthetic!judgment,!and!which!Kant!calls!“the!supreme!principle!of!all!synthetic!
judgments”!is:!“Every!object!stands!under!the!necessary!conditions!of!the!synthetic!unity!of!
the! manifold! of! intuition! in! a! possible! experience”! (A158/B197).! What,! precisely,! Kant!
means! by! this! will! become! clear! in! Chapter! 3! when! we! look! at! the! Transcendental!
Deduction!of!the!categories.!All!we!should!note!for!now!is!that!in!synthetic!judgments!the!




must! be! known! a2 priori.! The! element! of! strict! universality! and! necessity! in! analytic!
judgments!implies!that!they!can!be!known!to!be!true!without!reference!to!experience!and!
that!experience! can!never!provide! the!ground! for! their! truth! insofar! as!experience! could!
never! tell! us! about! necessity! and! universality.! Thus,! all! analytic! judgments! are! a2 priori.!







to! prove! the! truth! of! its! judgment,! whereas! the! latter! contains! its! truth! within! itself.!
Furthermore,! analytic! judgments! are! indicative! of! universality! and! necessity!which! could!
never!be!obtained!from!experience,!and!experience! is!precisely!what! is!required!to!verify!
an! a2 posteriori! judgment.! An! a2 posteriori! judgment! must! therefore! be! one! where! the!
predicate!is!not!contained!in!the!logical!subject!of!the!judgment!meaning!that!its!validation!
can! only! come! from! experience;! thus! all! a2 posteriori! judgments! must! be! synthetic.! This!
leaves! us!with! one! combination!which!we! are! yet! to! consider,! namely! synthetic!a2 priori!
judgments.!!
For!Kant,!such!synthetic!a2priori2 judgments!are!not!merely!possible!but!are!in!fact!
actual;! metaphysical,! mathematical,! and! geometrical! judgments,! Kant! claims,! are! all!
synthetic! a2 priori.! If! we! consider! metaphysical! judgments! for! now,! it! is! clear! that! some!
metaphysical! judgments,! such! as! ‘God! is! a! perfect! being’,! are! analytic!a2priori,! but! these!
judgments!do!not,!by!virtue!of!being!analytic,!expand!our!knowledge,!and!they!are!not,!for!
this! very! reason,! of! any! interest! to! Kant.! It! is! true! that! the! predicate! of! perfection! is!
contained!within! the! concept!of!God,!but! this! is!merely!a! ‘relation!of! ideas’!or! concepts,!




and!yet! it! is!also!synthetic! in!that!the!predicate!‘cause’! is!not!contained!in!the!concept!of!
the! subject! ‘event’.! The! question! is:! how! is! it! that! we! come! to! form! the! belief! that! the!
relation!between!‘event’!and!‘cause’!is!a!necessary!one?!Whence!is!this!necessity!derived?!










Hume! would! have! us! think.! It! will! be! Kant’s! task! in! the! Transcendental2 Analytic! to!
demonstrate!that!the!concept!of!causality!(like!all!the!pure!concepts!of!the!understanding)!
is! derived! a2 priori,! not! from! experience,! and! therefore! to! vindicate! the! belief! in! the!




then!we!can!never!have!a2priori! intuitions!of! them,!and! since!knowledge/experience,! for!
Kant,! is! the! thoroughgoing! activity! of! both! intuitions! and! concepts,! Kant! would,! at! this!
stage,! have! to! admit! that! one! source! of! experience,! namely! the! givenness! of! objects,! is!
wholly!a2posteriori.! If!knowledge!amounts!to!nothing!but!reXpresenting!what!is!outside!of!
us!as!it!is!in!itself,!then!we!can!conclude!that!there!is!no!such!thing!as!a2priori!cognition.!For!


















to! locate! these! conditions! of! the! possibility! of! experience! to! which! all! experience! must!











arise! from!a!common!but! to!us!unknown!root,!namely!sensibility!and! the!understanding,!
through!the!first!of!which!objects!are!given!to!us,!but!through!the!second!of!which!they!are!
thought”! (B29).! Kant! is! highlighting! here! the! minimum! requirement! for! us! to! have!
knowledge!of!objects:! (a)! that! things!be!given! to!us! through! the!senses,!and! (b)! that! this!
sensory! material! be! thought! by! us! through! the! understanding.! In! the! Aesthetic! Kant! is!
dealing! with! the! ways! in! which! objects! must! be! given! to! us! in! sensory! experience.20!
Sensibility! is!defined!as!precisely! “that! faculty!or! capacity!of!mind!by!which!we!passively!
receive! representations! from! things! that! affect! us”! (Shabel,! 2010,! p.! 94).! Sensibility,!
therefore,!requires!something!to!act!upon!it!and!is! in!this!sense!a!receptive!faculty!which!
can! only! have! a! representation! through! givenness,! that! is,! through! being! affected! by!












something.! The! representations! which! we! form! in! sensibility! through! our! senses! being!
affected! by! things,! Kant! calls! empirical! intuitions! (Ibid.).! That! which! these! intuitions! are!
intended! to! represent,!prior! to! the!application!of! concepts,!Kant! calls!an!appearance.!An!
appearance! is,! therefore,! an! empirical! intuition!which! is! as! of! yet! nonXconceptual,! or! as!





and! content.! The! content! of! an! appearance! –! its! matter! –! is! given! to! us! in! sensory!
experience!through!the!receptivity!of!sensibility,!or,!what!is!the!same,!through!something!
acting! on! our! sensibility.! Yet,! appearances! are! not! merely! the! reXpresentation! of! the!
content!of!sensory!data;!they!are!rather!this!data!reXpresented!in!a!certain!form.!This!form!
denotes! the! relations! along! which! these! sensations!must! be! ordered.! The! form,! as! that!
which! is! imposed! on! sensory! data,! Kant! claims! cannot! itself! be! derived! from! sensory!
experience.! It! is! rather! that!which! is! imposed!on! sensory! experience! and!must! therefore!
not! be! derived! a2 posteriori! from! experience! but! must! lie! ready! “in! the! mind! a2 priori”!
(A34).21! The! representations! of! the! forms! of! sensory! experience! Kant! calls! pure!


















posteriori! but! rather! a2 priori.! Kant! calls! this! pure! form! of! sensibility! a! pure! or! a2 priori!
intuition!(B!34X5).!It!will!be!the!task!of!the!Aesthetic!to!locate!these!a2priori!intuitions,!that!
is,! these! pure! forms! to! which! all! empirical! intuitions!must! conform.! Kant! will! ultimately!
claim!that!there!are!two!such!pure!forms!of!intuition,!namely!space!and!time.!The!Aesthetic!



























The!metaphysical! exposition! of! space! is! broken! down! into! four! separate,! though! linked,!
arguments.22The! first! two! attempt! to! demonstrate! that! our! representation! of! space! is!a2
priori,!whilst!the!latter!two!attempt!to!secure!for!our!representation!of!space!the!status!of,!
originally,!being!an!intuition!as!opposed!to!a!concept.!!
The! first! argument! claims! that! in! order! to! have! any! representations! of! outer!
objects23,!there!must!already!be!a!presupposition!of!the!representation!of!space,!and!that!
the! representation! of! space! is! therefore! an! a2 priori! one! (B38).! Let! us! assume! that! the!
representation! of! space! is! not! derived! a2 priori.! In! that! case! it! must! be! an! empirical!
representation,!derived!a2posteriori,!or!what!is!the!same,!derived!from!experience!of!outer!
things.! But! any! representation! of! outer! things! already! presupposes! a! representation! of!
space.!The!implication!of!this!is!that!space!cannot!be!derived!from!our!experience!of!outer!
objects!if!in!order!to!experience!these!objects!as!objects!we!must!already!presuppose!that!
we! have! a! representation! of! space.! And! if! our! representation! of! space! is! not! derived! a2
posteriori,! then! it!must! be!derived!a2priori.! Bird! argues! that! although! this! first! argument!
establishes! the!priority! of! the! representation! of! space! over! any! representations! of! outer!
objects,!it!does!not!establish!space’s!a2priority.!He!gives!the!example!that!the!concept!‘red’!
presupposes! the!concept!of!a! colour,!but! that!we!would!not! conclude! from! this! that! the!
concept!of!a!colour! is!derived!a2priori,!and!neither!would!Kant!(Bird,!2006,!p.!141).!Bird’s!
analogy,! however,! does! not! seem! to! fit! the! example! which! Kant! deals! with.! For! Kant! is!
talking!about!the!whole!of!experience,!and!as!such,!if!something!which!is!required!for!any!
experience!is!not!given!in!experience,!then!it!must!be!accounted!for!in!a!nonXa2posteriori!(a2










that! the! concept! of! ‘colour’! is! derived! a2 posteriori! simply! because! it! grounds! other! a2
posteriori! representations.! But,! in! Kant’s! example! we! are! considering! a! representation!
which!grounds!all!a2posteriori! representations.!Thus,! if! the!representation!of!space! is! the!
ground!for!all!a2posteriori!representations,!then!this!representation!cannot!itself!be!derived!
empirically,!and!must!therefore,!by!elimination,!be!an!a2priori!representation.!!
I! mentioned! above! that! the! term! outer! has! traditionally! been! interpreted! by!
commentators! as! referring! to! ‘other! than’! or! ‘distinct! from’! as! opposed! to! ‘physically!
outside’.!This!reading!of!‘outer’!is!particularly!appealing!in!that!it!overcomes!the!charge!of!
tautology! whereby! Kant! would! be! saying! that! in! order! to! represent! an! object! as! being!
spatially! extended,! one! must! represent! space.! However,! despite! its! appeal,! the!




priority! argument! which! seems! to! capture! Kant’s! intentions! very! well.! On! Warren’s!
account,! Kant’s! argument! is! directed! against! a! Leibnizian! account! of! space! as! “only!
determinations!or!relations!of!things”!(A23/B37).!Leibniz!gives!an!account!of!how!we!come!








space! –! namely! the! space! that! the! objects! occupy.! Warren’s! point! is! that! a! Leibnizian!
26!
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conception! of! spatiality! as! merely! relational! must! presuppose! a! prior! representation! of!




Kant’s! concluding! remark! on! the! argument! where! he! says:! “Thus,! the! representation! of!
space! cannot! be! obtained! from2 the2 relations2 of2 outer2 appearance! through! experience”!
(A23/B38,!my!emphasis).!Importantly!then,!and!in!line!with!his!reading!of!the!first!a2priority!
argument,!Warren!seems!to!deny!that!this!argument!of!Kant’s,!on! its!own,! is! intended!to!
(or!capable!of)!establishing!the!a2priority2of!space,!and!that!Kant!also!requires!the!second!
argument!to!draw!this!conclusion.!
! The! second! argument! proceeds! from! the! claim! that! space! as! a! necessary!
representation!must!be!an!a2priori!one.!“One!can!never!represent!that!there! is!no!space,!
though! one! can! very! well! think! that! there! are! no! objects! to! be! encountered! in! it”!
(A24/B38).! The! fact! that! we! can! represent! space! without! representing! objects! in! space!
reinforces!the!argument!about!the!priority!of!a!representation!of!space!over!outer!objects.!
Additionally,! our! inability! to! represent! the! absence! of! space! implies! that! space! is! an!
absolutely!necessary!representation,!one!which!we!cannot! fail! to!represent! insofar!as!we!
wish! to! represent! anything.! Given! that! our! representation! of! space! is! not! a! contingent!
representation! but! an! absolutely! necessary! one,!we!must! conclude! that! it! is! not! derived!
empirically,! meaning! that! it! must! have! its! source! a2 priori.! The! two! arguments! taken!
together!can!be!seen!as!establishing!that!space!is!an!a2priori!representation.!!
! The!latter!two!arguments!focus!on!space!as!an!intuition!as!opposed!to!a!concept.!!I!
will! provide! a! rough! sketch! of! these! arguments! as! they! are! of! less! significance! for! our!
purposes.! Kant! proceeds! by! showing! us! that! our! representation! of! space! differs!
significantly! from! how! we! think! of! a! concept,! and! seeing! as! how! representations! must!









Parts! of! a! concept,! such! as! ‘human’,! would! be! twoXlegged,! mammal,! etc.! whereas!





with! their!parts,!but! rather!are!composed!of! their!parts.! Space! is! thus!not!a!concept!and!
must!therefore!be!an!intuition.!But!Kant’s!conclusion!that!space!is!an!intuition!is!not!merely!
derived! from! a! process! of! elimination.! Rather,! because! every! instantiation! of! space!
represents!the!same!unique!space24,!the!representation!of!space!is!a!representation!of!an!
individual! object.! In! contrast! to! concepts!which! represent! things! in! general! by!means! of!





being! limitless! or! unbounded.26! Once! again,! the! difference! with! a! concept! lies! in! the!










concept!may! be! said! to! contain! an! infinite! number! of! instantiations! of! itself! but! not! an!
infinite!number!of!parts;!or!as!Allison!puts! it,! concepts!may!extensionally! involve! infinity,!
but!not! intensionally! (Allison,! 2004,!p.! 111).! The!parts!of! a! concept! (its! intension)! are! its!
marks!which!go!together!to!define!that!concept.!If!any!concept!were!to!contain!within!itself!
an!infinite!number!of!marks,!it!would!forever!be!incapable!of!being!defined!and!cognised.!
Our! representation!of! space,! however,! is! very!different! from! this! because,! as!mentioned!






The! four! arguments! of! the! metaphysical! exposition,! together,! are! intended! to! have!
demonstrated! that! our! representation! of! space! is! an! a2 priori! intuition.! But! Kant! also!
provides!a!‘transcendental!exposition’!of!space.!The!transcendental!exposition!is!different!
in!nature! to! the! arguments!of! the!metaphysical! exposition! as!here!Kant! is! attempting! to!
deduce! the! a2 priority! of! space! through! the! existence! of! some! other! body! of! a2 priori!
synthetic! knowledge,! supposing! that! the! only! way! for! the! claims! of! this! latter! body! to!
contain!synthetic!a2priori!truths!is!for!our!representation!of!space!to!be!an!a2priori!intuition.!
The!question!is!how!can!Kant!establish!this!claim?!
! The! body! of! knowledge! which! Kant! deals! with! in! his! discussion! on! space! is!









of! the! concept! of! a! triangle;! the! concept! of! a! triangle! merely! states! that! it! is! a! figure!
enclosed!by!three!straight!lines,!and!through!an!analysis!of!such!a!concept!we!could!never!
arrive!at! the!geometrical! claims!above.!What! is!needed! for! that! is! for!us! to! represent! to!
ourselves! a! triangle! in! intuition! and! through! this!we! can! derive! geometrical! propositions!
from!it.!This!means!that!geometrical!claims!are!synthetic.!However,!the!truths!of!geometry!
are! at! the! same! time!necessarily! true!with! apodictic! certainty.! This!must! also!mean! that!
their! truths,! despite! being! synthetic,! are! also!a2 priori,! and! not! derived!a2 posteriori! from!
experience.!!
! If!we!now!establish!that!geometrical! judgments!are!a2priori! synthetic,!we!are!not!
far!from!establishing!that!our!representation!of!space!must!be!that!of!an!a2priori!intuition.!
Geometry! is! the! science! of! space,! and! its! truths! hold! precisely! of! space;! the! truths! of!
geometry! denote! the! truths! about! spatial! relations.! The! question! then! is!what!must! our!
representation!of!space!be!if!we!can!make!a2priori!synthetic!claims!about!space?!Kant!says!
that! this! representation!must! firstly!be!originally! intuitive! and!not!conceptual! (B40X41).! If!
our!representation!of!space!was!that!of!a!mere!concept,!any!truth!claims!which!we!could!
make! about! space! (in! geometry)! would! have! to! be! contained! in! our! spatial! concepts!
themselves.!That!is,!our!claims!about!space!could!never!be!expansive,!but!rather!only!ever!
clarificatory.!To!put!it!differently,!if!our!representation!of!space!was!that!of!a!concept,!we!
could! only! ever!make! analytic! truth! claims! about! space;! namely! claims! that! are! already!
implicit!in!the!definition!of!our!spatial/geometrical!concept.!However,!in!geometry!we!can!
make!claims!about!space!which!transcend!what!is!contained!in!our!spatial!concept.!As!was!








shortest!distance!between! two!points! (at! least! in! two!dimensions).!As!Kant!puts! it! in! the!
Prolegomena!“my!concept!of!the!straight![line]!contains!nothing!of!magnitude,!but!only!a!








(not! from! without)! then! they! must! have! their! source! within! ourselves.! But,! since! these!
truths!are!truths2about2space,!the!representation!of!space,!namely,!that!about!which!these!
claims! are! true,! can! also! not! be! derived! a2 posteriori! from! experience.! For! if! our!
representation! of! space! was! derived! empirically,! how! could! we! then! possess! necessary!
truths! about! space,! which! by! definition! cannot! be! derived! from! experience?! To! put! it!




necessary! and! “has! its! seat! merely! in! the! subject”! (B! 41).! We! can! now,! again,! see! the!












have,! moreover,! presented! Kant’s! arguments! as! charitably! as! possible! in! order! to!
demonstrate! what! he! wishes! to,! and! believes! his! arguments! to,! establish.! In! the! next!
chapter! we! will! consider! Kant’s! doctrine! of! transcendental! idealism! more! closely! and!




























The! two! expositions! of! space! (and! time)! in! the! Aesthetic! have,! according! to! Kant,!
established!that!space!and!time!are!a2priori!subjective!forms!of!intuition!which!are!derived!
not! from!experience,!but!are! rather!presupposed! for! experience!and,!as! such,!have! their!
source!in!us.!But!the!claim!that!space!and!time!are!subjective!forms!of!intuition!is!only!half!
of! what! Kant’s! doctrine! of! transcendental! idealism! amounts! to.! The! further! claim!which!
constitutes! this! doctrine! is! that! space! and! time! are! nothing2 but! our! subjective! forms! of!
intuition.! This! second! claim,! which! we! may! label! Kant’s! ontological! denial! of! space! and!
33!
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time,! has! historically! been! met! with! suspicion.! Specifically,! it! is! alleged! that! Kant’s!
ontological! denial! overlooks! the! possibility! of! spatioXtemporality! being! both!
transcendentally!ideal!and!real!(the!‘neglected!alternative’).!The!focus!of!this!chapter!is!to!
engage! with! this! debate! to! decide! what! exactly! Kant! is! legitimately! allowed! to! claim!
regarding!the!transcendental!status!of!space!and!time.!In!considering!the!arguments!of!the!
neglected! alternative! and! Kant’s! ontological! denial,! we! shall! also! have! to! familiarize!
ourselves! with! certain! Kantian! terminologies;! specifically! we! will! have! to! explore! the!
transcendental! vs.! empirical! distinction.! What! I! wish! to! demonstrate! is! that! Kant’s!
argument! for! his! ontological! denial! of! space,! which! gets! its! support! from! Kant’s!
transcendental! exposition! (argument! from! geometry),! ultimately! fails! to! establish! his!
intended!conclusion!–!namely! that! space!and! time!can!be!known!not! to!be!properties!of!
thingsXinXthemselves.! I!will!conclude!that!Kant’s!argument!from!geometry!fails!to!rule!out!





to! appreciate! the! strength! of! Nietzsche’s! position,! it! will! be! important! to! consider! the!
neglected! alternative! along! with! Kant’s! ontological! denial! in! some! detail! to! be! able! to!
definitively! determine! what! Nietzsche! is! attacking! in! his! early! writings.! I! will! finish! the!
chapter!by!considering!a!prominent!area!of!debate!in!Kant!studies,!which!has!come!to!be!
known!as!the!oneXword!vs.!twoXworld!debate.!Although!this!debate!is!far!too!wide!ranging!
in!scope!to!be!dealt!with! in!detail! in!this!chapter,!what! I!wish!to!draw!attention!to! is! the!
compatibility!of! the!oneXworld! interpretation!with!Kant’s!claim!that! the!relation!between!











objects!must! conform! in! order! for! them! to! be! objects! of! cognition! for! us.! These! objects!
considered! apart! from! how! they! are! given! to! us! in! sensible! intuition! as! appearances,! or!
what!is!the!same,!considered!apart!from!that!which!makes!them!appearances!(their!spatioX
temporality),!are!thingsXinXthemselves.28!
! It! should! be! clear! from! this! description! that! Kant’s! doctrine! of! transcendental!
idealism!is!not!some!form!of!agnosticism!regarding!the!relation!of!space!and!time!to!thingsX
inXthemselves.! It! is! rather! a! “harshly! dogmatic! insistence! that!we! can2 be2 quite2 sure! that!
thing!as! they!are! in! themselves!cannot2be!as!we!represent! them!to!be”! (Guyer,!Kant!and!
the!Claims!of!Knowledge,!1987,!p.!333).!As!Kant!puts! it!himself! in!the!opening! line!of!the!
Conclusions! to! the! expositions:! “Space! represents! no! property! at! all! of! any! things! in!
themselves! nor! any! relation! of! them! to! each! other,! i.e.,! no! determination! of! them! that!
attaches!to!objects!themselves!and!that!would!remain!even!if!one!were!to!abstract!from!all!
subjective!conditions!of! intuitions”! (A26/B42).!He!continues! to!say! that!“Space! is!nothing!
other! than!merely! the! form!of! all! appearances! of! outer! sense”! (Ibid.,!my! emphasis).! ! An!










and! never! thingsXinXthemselves.! Now,! even! the! negative! claim! regarding! thingsXinX
themselves! lacking! spatioXtemporality! is! still! a! claim! of! knowledge! about! thingsXinX
themselves.! Is! there! not! then! an! inherent! contradiction! involved! in! claiming! nonXspatioX
temporality! for! thingsXinXthemselves?!Guyer!believes! that!Kant! is!not!necessarily!guilty!of!
the! charge! of! contradiction.! His! point! is! that! Kant’s! claim! regarding! the! nonXspatioX
temporality! of! thingsXinXthemselves! “is! philosophical! knowledge! by! means! of! argument,!




what!Guyer!seems!to!be!claiming! is! that! if!Kant!can!establish!that!our!possession!of!an!a2









Before!we! turn! to! Kant’s! arguments! for! his! ontological! denial! –! i.e.! the! denial! of! spatioX
temporality! from! thingsXinXthemselves! –! we! must! familiarise! ourselves! with! certain!






‘transcendental’! and! ‘empirical’! and! how! these! can! each! be! real! (objective)! or! ideal!
(subjective).!!
Immediately! after! the! two! expositions! of! space,! Kant! clarifies!what! he!means! by!
the! transcendental! ideality! of! space! and!how! this! relates! to! empirical! reality.!We! should!
note!that!the!term!‘empirical’!is!no!longer,!or!at!least!at!this!point,!contrasted!with!a2priori!
but! rather! with! transcendental.! The! empirical/transcendental! distinction! is! best!
understood! as! different! modes! of! reflecting! on! the! same! thing! in! consciousness.! To!
consider! an! object! empirically! is! to! consider! it! from! our! human! cognitive! perspective! as!
subject! to!our!epistemic! conditions,! such!as! space!and! time.!Objects! that! are! considered!
from!this!perspective!are!empirically!real.!Thus,!all!objects!of!experience,!that!is!to!say!all!
spatioXtemporal! objects,! and! even! space! and! time! themselves,! are! empirically! real.! The!
empirical! perspective,! therefore,! encompasses! both! a2 priori! and! a2 posteriori!






this! object! is! transcendentally! ideal.! Thus,! when! Kant! says! that! space! and! time! are!
transcendentally!ideal,!he!does!not!mean!by!this!that!they!are!illusory!in!any!sense.!Space,!
time,!and!all!spatioXtemporal!objects!have!empirical!reality!of!which!we!can!be!absolutely!
certain.! In! fact,! it! is! the!very!certainty!of! space!and!time!which!means! that! they!must!be!
transcendentally! ideal.! The! reason! for! this! goes! back! to! the! important! link! noted! earlier!
between!necessity,!universality,!and!a2priority.! It! is!precisely!because!our!representations!
of!space!and!time!are!absolutely!necessary!and!universal,!which!means,!for!Kant,!that!they!
cannot!have!been!derived! from!experience!of! the!world! in!and!of! itself,! but!must! rather!
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have! their! source! in! us;! space! and! time! are,! therefore,! transcendentally! ideal.29! For! this!
very! same! reason,! space! and! time! are! also! empirically! real,! that! is,! they! have! objective!
validity.! The! fact! that! space! and! time! are! necessary! representations,! and! therefore!
conditions!of!the!possibility!of!cognition!and!experience,!means!that!any!object!which!we!
could! possibly! experience!must! always! be! spatioXtemporal,! and! this! is! true! for! all! beings!
with!our!mode!of!cognition.!Thus,!with!regards!to!the!world!of!experience,!the!only!world!
with! which! we! are! ever! confronted! and! can! ever! know,! space! and! time! are! indeed!
objectively!real.!Kant!explains!this!result!as!follows:!!
“Our! expositions! teach! the! reality! (i.e.! objective! validity)! of! space! in! regard! to!
everything! that! can! come! before! us! externally! as! an! object,! but! at! the! same! time! the!
ideality! of! space! in! regard! to! things! when! they! are! considered! in! themselves! through!





We!must! take! care! to!be! absolutely! clear!on! the! type!of! subjectivity!which! is! implied!by!
space!and!time!being!a2priori!subjective!representations,!as!the!subjective!status!of!these!
representations! is!unlike!any!other! representations!which!we!usually!denote! through! the!
concept!subjective.!Indeed,!space!and!time!are!the!only!subjective!intuitive!representations!
which!may!also!be!called!a2priori!objective!(A28/B42).!What!Kant!is!drawing!attention!to!at!
this! point! is! the! difference! between! the! kind! of! subjectivity! pertinent! to! space! and! time!
compared!to!the!subjectivity!of!what!Locke!would!call! secondary!qualities.!Kant!wants! to!
avoid!us!thinking!of!space!and!time’s!subjectivity!the!way!we!consider!secondary!qualities!






that! properties! such! as! the! smell! or! colour! of! a! rose! do! not! pertain! to! the! object,! he! is!
denying! certain! properties! of! an! appearance,! not! of! a! thingGinGitself.! The! primary! and!
secondary! quality! debate! is! one! regarding! that! which! is! subjective! and! that! which! is!
objective! in! an!appearance.! Primary! and! secondary! qualities! are! always! attributed! to! or!
denied! of! objects! of! experience,! which! as! objects! of! experience! are! already! necessarily!
spatioXtemporal!and!therefore!appearances,!not!the!thingsXinXthemselves!(A29X30/B44X45).!!
! The! important! result! of! the! classification! of! space! and! time! as! transcendentally!
ideal! yet! empirically! real! is! that! the! a2 priori! subjective! status! of! space! and! time! is! not!
intended! to! reduce! these! representations! to! anything! like! illusions! (such! as! a! rainbow!
[A45/B62]),!which!in!Kant’s!terminology!would!be!to!consider!them!empirically! ideal,!that!
is,!notXreal!when!considered!from!within! the!human!cognitive!perspective,!or!at! least!not!
having!objective!validity!within! the!empirical! sphere.!The!conclusion! that! space!and! time!
are! transcendentally! ideal! is! not! intended! in! any! sense! to! devalue! or! make! defunct!
scientific!or!empirical!knowledge.!“This![empirical]!reality!of!space!and!time,!further,!leaves!
the!certainty!of!experiential!cognition!untouched”!(A39/B56).!Arguments!to!the!effect!that!
the! doctrine! of! transcendental! idealism! serves! to! undermine! the! certainty! of! our!
knowledge! of! the! objects! of! (empirical)! reality,! are! guided! by! a! basic! misunderstanding!
about! the! status! of! space! and! time! in! Kant’s! philosophy.! As! I! have! attempted! to!
demonstrate,! not! only! does! transcendental! idealism! not! cast! doubt! on! our! certainty! of!
















complete! misunderstanding! of! his! doctrine.! The! issue! we! want! to! now! consider! is! the!






(a)! that! things! only! seem! to! be! spatial,! implying! that! our! consciousness! of! an! extended!
world!is!somehow!illusory,!or!(b)!that!appearances/representations!really!are!spatial!which!
would! imply!that!our! ideas!are!extended!(Allison,!2004,!pp.!5X6).!However,!we!find! in!the!
Fourth! Paralogism,! an! argument! by! Kant! directed! at! precisely! this! concern.! There! Kant!
presents! the! problem!of! the! physical! status! of! outer! objects! as! resulting! from! the! belief!
that!their!existence!can!only!be!inferred!as!the!cause!of!given!perceptions,!rendering!their!
existence!doubtful!(A367).!On!Allison’s!reading!of!Kant,!a!reading!which!seems!in!line!with!
the! text,! the! confusion! whereby! Kant! is! seen! as! an! empirical! idealist! stems! from! a!
misunderstanding!regarding!the!status!of!outer!objects.! It! is!the!belief!that!outer!physical!
objects! are! thingsXinXthemselves!which! leads! to! the! thought! that! all!we! have! immediate!








makes!this!point!explicit:!“If!we! let!outer!objects!count!as!things! in!themselves,! then! it! is!
absolutely! impossible! to! comprehend! how! we! are! to! acquire! cognition! of! their! reality!
outside2 us,! since! we! base! this! merely! on! the! representation,! which! is! in2 us”! (A378,! my!
emphasis).!This!passage!may!seem!as!a!confirmation!of!Berkeley’s!critique!of!materialism!
and!if!so,!Kant!would!be!identifying!what!is!‘real’!with!the!ideas!in!our!mind!(Allison,!2004,!





empirical! idealism)! assumes! that! the! things! which! affect! us! are! objects! with! spatioX
temporal! properties! and! relations;! and! it! proceeds! from! this! to! conclude! that! of! such!
objects! we! only! have! awareness! through! our! awareness! of! our!mind’s! content.! As! Kant!
puts! it:! “transcendental! realism![…]! finds! itself! required! to!give!way! to!empirical! idealism!
because! it! regards! the! objects! of! outer! sense! as! something! different! from! the! senses!
themselves!and!regards!mere!appearances!as!selfXsufficient!beings!that!are!found!external!






mind’s!content.!This! is!precisely!what!Kant! is!drawing!attention!to! in!the!aforementioned!
quote! from!the! fourth!paralogism.!Thus,!we!can!now!see!how!Kant’s!position!can!at!one!
and!the!same!time!maintain!both!that!appearances!really!are!spatial!and!that!appearances!
are! in!us;!appearances!are! in!us,! insofar!as!we!are! referring! to!our!noumenal! selves!–!or!
that! conception! of! our! ‘selves’! which! makes! empirical! experience! possible.! However,!
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empirically! speaking,! spatiality! is! real! and! spatial! appearances! are! indeed! outside! of! us.!
Part!of!the!confusion!seems!to!stem!here!from!the!fact!that!Kant!makes!the!very!feature!
which! we! consider! as! constitutive! of! whether! something! is! mental! or! physical,! namely!
spatiality,! into! a!mental! construct.! But,!when!we! remember! that! the!mentalXness! of! this!
feature!is!assigned!to!a!noumenal,!and!not!an!empirical!self,!we!see!why!Kant!can!maintain!













With! these! distinctions! in!mind,!we!may! now! turn! to! consider! the! arguments! for! Kant’s!
ontological! denial.!We!may!wish! to! consider! two! different! versions! of! Kant’s! doctrine! of!













Although! Kant,! undoubtedly,! has! the! stronger! version! in! mind! in! his! conclusions! of! the!
Aesthetic,!the!weaker!version!is!important!to!consider!given!that,!as!we!shall!see,!it!is!much!
more!defensible.! Let! us! consider! the! arguments! for! Kant’s! belief! in! the! stronger! version;!
how!can!we!know!thingsXinXthemselves!to!lack!spatioXtemporality?!
! At! A26/B42,! as! we! quoted! earlier,! Kant! claims! that! space! and! time! are! not!
properties!of! thingsXinXthemselves!as! things! that!would! remain!were!we!to!abstract! from!
our!“subjective!conditions!of! intuition”.!On!what!grounds!does!Kant!make!this!assertion?!!
“For”,!as!he!continues,! “no!determinations,!whether!absolute!or! relative,! can!be! intuited!
prior! to! the! existence! of! the! things! to! which! they! belong,! and! none,! therefore,! can! be!
intuited!a2priori”!(A26/B42).!Our!a2priori!forms!of!intuition!of!space!and!time,!as!conditions!
of!cognition,!act!as!determinations!of!objects!a2priori.!By!this!we!mean!that!we!can!know!
prior! to!any!experience!of!an!object,! that! the!object!will!possess! spatioXtemporality.!But,!
Kant!asks!us,! if!spatioXtemporality!was!truly!a!determination!of! the!object,!how!could!we!
then! know! that! the! object! possessed! it! prior! to! having! had! any! experience! of! it!
whatsoever?! The! fact! that! we! can! know! space! and! time! to! necessarily! pertain! to! any!
possible! object! of! experience,! therefore,! is! taken! to! imply! that! these! determinations! are!
not! part! of! thingsXinXthemselves,! but! rather! that! they! determine! how!we! will! and!must!
experience!any!objects.! If! they!were! in!objects! in! themselves,! then!we!could!never!know!

















possibility! which! Kant! had! allegedly! overlooked,! what! has! now! come! be! known! as! the!
‘Neglected! Alternative’.! Trendelenburg’s! position! may! be! summarized! as! follows.! The!
trouble!with!Kant’s!ontological!denial!is!that!he!proceeds!on!a!strictly!dualistic!conception!
of!the!options!regarding!space!and!time;!either!space!and!time!are!‘in!us’,!or!they!are!in!the!






of!a! real! thing,!or!else! it!attaches!only! to! the!subjective!character!of!our!mind:!The! third!
possibility,! that! it! is! both! subjective! and! belongs! to! things! is! not! considered”!
(Trendelenburg! quoted! in! Bird,! 2006,! p.! 173).! Fischer! responded! to! Trendelenburg! by!
appealing!to!the!objective!reality!of!space!and!time!in!the!empirical!realm.!He!claimed!that,!
pace! Trendelenburg,! space! and! time!are! indeed!objective,! but! that! objectivity! should! be!
understood! within! the! empirical! realm.! It! is! only! from! an! unattainable! and! unknowable!
perspective!that!space!and!time!are!subjective.!Trendelenburg!rejected!the!argument!as!it!








scope! of! transcendental! ideality”!meaning! that! space! and! time! are! still! subjective! (Bird,!
2006,! p.! 174).! Trendelenburg! seems! to! be! correct! in! one! sense;! claiming! that! space! and!
time! are! empirically! real! (objective),! is! not! to! show! that! Kant! addressed! the! neglected!
alternative.!Indeed,!some!may!say!that!it!does!not!even!address!the!issue!at!stake.!Saying!
that! space! and! time! are! objectively! valid,! if! considered! empirically,! is! not! the! same! as!
accounting!for!why!space!and!time!cannot!be!both!in!the!mind!and!in!the!object!in!and!of!
itself.! Kant’s! argument! thus! far! has! only! established! that! our! derivation! of! the!
representations! of! space! and! time! are! made! from! ‘within’;! it! has! not! thereby! excluded!
space!and!time!from!coincidentally!also!being!part!of!thingsXinXthemselves.!!
! Trendelenburg!does,!however,!seem!to!be!mistaken!in!one!respect,!and!this!is!that!
he! takes! Kant’s! result! as! indicating! a! return! to! classic! idealism! and! skepticism,! whereby!
appearance! is!equivalent! to! illusion.!Now! if!Trendelenburg!means!by! this,!which! it! seems!
he!does,! that! space!and! time!are! in! some!sense! illusory,! then!Fischer! is! indeed!right.!Yet!
Trendelenburg!is!now!overlooking!a!much!stronger!version!which!his!own!argument!could!
be!implying,!namely!that!space!and!time!are!both!subjective!determinations!(not!illusions)!
and! that! they!belong! to! thingsXinXthemselves.!Trendelenburg!could!circumvent! the!whole!
issue!of!transcendental!versus!empirical!reality!by!granting!Kant!this!distinction.!He!could!





‘transcendentally! subjective! (ideal)’! to! ‘not! transcendentally! objective! (real)’! is! accepted,!
but! the! inference! from! ‘transcendentally! subjective! (ideal)’! to! ‘not! empirically! objective!
(real)’! is! rejected”! (Bird,! 2006,!p.! 176).!But,! the!obvious!problem!with! this! formulation! is!




admission,! Kant! regards! as! valid.! The! stronger! version! of! the! neglected! alternative!
questions!whether!the!status!of!something!as!transcendentally!ideal!necessarily!excludes!it!
from!also! being! transcendentally! real.! Bird! continues! to! claim! that! Kant! “recognized! and!
accepted! that! they! [space! and! time]! may! be! both! transcendentally! subjective! and!
empirically! objective;! he! recognized! but! denied! that! they! are! both! transcendentally!
subjective!and!transcendentally!objective”!(Ibid.).!Thus,!according!to!Bird,!Kant!did!exclude!
the! stronger! version! of! the! neglected! alternative! but! Bird! provides! no! argument! for! this!
conclusion.!Again,!in!his!conclusion,!Bird!states!that!“What!the!advocates!of!the!neglected!
alternative!overlooked,!or!misrepresented,!was!that!Kant!allows!an!empirical!as!well!as!a!
transcendental! level.! Space! and! time! are! empirically! real,! not! empirical! ideas,! and! that!
reality!is!genuine!compared!with!a!spurious!reality!of!the!supersensible!world”!(Bird,!2006,!




address! the! right! issue.! The! stronger! version!of! the!neglected! alternative! does! not! claim!















If!we!turn!to!Kant’s!general! remarks! in! the!Aesthetic,!however,!we! find!that!Kant!himself!
has! specifically! dealt! with! the! stronger! version! of! the! neglected! alternative.! Despite!
Fischer’s! arguments! for! the! objectivity! of! space! and! time! from! an! empirical! perspective,!
which! seem! to! miss! the!mark,! Kant! himself! addresses! the! possibility! of! space! and! time!
being!both!subjective!a2priori!forms!and!belonging!to!thingsXinXthemselves,!and!concludes!
that! the! two! are! incompatible.! How! exactly! Kant! arrives! at! this! conclusion! has! been! the!
subject!of!dispute!amongst!scholars.!
Some!commentators,!such!as!Henry!Allison,!argue!that!Kant!moves!from!the!claim!
that! space! and! time! are! subjective! representations! to! the! conclusion! that! they! are!
therefore!not!properties!of!things!in!themselves!(Allison,!2004,!pp.!116X8).!Allison!believes!
that!the!fact!of!the!subjective!status!of!space!grounds!Kant’s!ontological!denial.!Paul!Guyer,!
on! the! other! hand,! argues! that! the! reason!why! space! and! time! are!merely! subjective! is!
precisely! because! they! cannot! be! part! of! thingsXinXthemselves! (Ibid.);! thus! he! sees! the!
ontological!denial!as!the!ground!for!the!mere!subjective!status!of!space!and!time.!To!see!
which!interpretation!is!closer!to!Kant’s!intentions!it!is!important!to!consider!the!functions!
and!objectives!of! the! two!expositions.! !We! should!note! that! the!metaphysical!exposition!




be,! Kant! was! able! to! conclude! that! our! representation! of! space! is! derived! not! from!
experience,!but!a2priori!from!within.!However,!at!this!point,!the!work!of!the!metaphysical!
exposition! is! done! and! all! this! exposition! has! been! able! to! establish! is! that! the!





spatioXtemporal! as! well.! ! In! our! earlier! account! of! the! transcendental! exposition,! the!
exposition!was!presented!as!attempting!yet!again!to!secure!the!subjective!status!of!space!
and!time.!Although!it!does!perform!this!function,!implicit!in!the!arguments!we!outlined!was!
the! greater! function! of! the! transcendental! exposition,! namely,! that! of! arguing! for! the!
merely! subjective! status! of! space! and! time! (Kant’s! ontological! denial).! But! how! can! Kant!
move! from! the! conclusion! of! the! metaphysical! exposition! to! that! of! the! transcendental!
one;! how! can! Kant!move! from! the! claim! that! space! and! time! are!a2 priori! conditions! for!
cognition!to!the!claim!that!they!are!not!part!of!things!in!themselves,!and!therefore!merely!




very!possession!of!an!a2priori! truth!about! space!and! time,!excludes! space!and! time! from!
being! properties! of! thingsXinXthemselves.! It! is! from! this! claim! that! Kant! will! deduce! the!
further! inference! that!space!and!time!are!merely! subjective! representations.!Thus,!Kant’s!
argument!is!not!that!space!and!time!are!subjective!representations!and!can!therefore!not!
be!part!of!things!in!themselves.!He!instead!argues!that!the!fact!of!our!possession!of!certain!
a2 priori! truths! about! space! and! time! in! geometry! and! kinematics,! is! incompatible! with!
spatioXtemporality!pertaining!to!things!in!themselves.!We!can!see!how!in!this!sense!Guyer’s!
reading! is!more! in! line!with!Kant’s!thought!than!Allison’s.!Guyer! is!correct! in!pointing!out!
that!Kant!does!not!believe!that!space!and!time!being!transcendentally!subjective!excludes!
them! from! also! being! transcendentally! objective;! that! is,! Kant! does! not! believe! that! the!





We! are! still! to! consider! the! incompatibility! between! our! possession! of! a2 priori!
knowledge! about! space,! and! space! being! transcendentally! real.! To! see!what! Kant! has! in!
mind,! let!us!assume!that!space! is!both!an!a2priori! subjective! form!of! intuition!and! that! it!
pertains! to! the! nature! of! the! world! in! and! of! itself.! But! regardless! of! whether! space! is!
transcendentally! real! or! not,! our! intuition! of! space! is! not! derived! empirically;! this! was!
established! in! the!metaphysical!exposition.!Thus,! regardless!of!whether!space!pertains! to!
thingsXinXthemselves! or! not,! our! representation! of! space! is! not! derived! from!experience.!
Regarding!geometry,!we!know!that!its!truths!are!necessarily!true!of!spatial!relations.!Their!
necessary!truth!is!implied!in!the!fact!that!we!do!not!need!experience!to!verify!its!claims.34!
Now,! if! space! were! in! fact! a! property! of! thingsXinXthemselves,! then! the! propositions! of!
geometry! would! not! only! also! be! true! of! thingsXinXthemselves,! but! they! would! be!
necessarily! true! of! thingsXinXthemselves.! This! is! precisely! what! Kant! seems! to! preclude,!
namely! that!we! can! have!a2 priori2 (i.e.! necessary)! knowledge! of! something! that! is!wholly!
extraneous!to!us.!This!is!what!Kant!means!when!he!says!that!“no!determinations,!whether!
absolute! or! relative,! can! be! intuited! prior! to! the! existence! of! the! things! to! which! they!








claim! to! truths! about! things!which! are!wholly! extraneous! to! us,!without! having! had! any!
experience!of!them;!that!is,!we!could!lay!claim!to!necessary!truths!about!the!world!which!













this! truth! about! space! to! necessarily! be! true,! when! knowing! ‘necessarily’,! by! definition,!
implies!knowing!without!experience!(a2priori)?!To!reXphrase!the!question,!if!this!fact!is!true!










objects! for! you,! […]! then! you! could! make! out! absolutely! nothing! synthetic! and! a2 priori!
about! outer! objects.! It! is! therefore! indubitably2 certain! and! not2 merely2 possible! or! even2
probable! that! space! and! time,! as! the! necessary! conditions! of! all! (outer! and! inner)!
experience,!are!merely!subjective!conditions!of!all!our!intuition”!(A48/B66,!my!emphases).!
The! first! statement! highlights! the! incompatibility! of! our! possession! of! synthetic! a2 priori!
truths!about! space! in!geometry!with! space!being!part!of! the!constitution!of! the!world! in!
and!of! itself.! The! second! sentence!makes!explicit! that! the! full! force!of!Kant’s!doctrine!of!
50!
!
transcendental! idealism,! is! not! some! form! of! agnosticism! regarding! whether! space! is! a!






We! will! now! turn! to! consider! two! objections! to! Kant’s! argument! from! geometry! which!
support!the!possibility!of!Trendelenburg’s!neglected!alternative.!!








or!misrepresent,! space! in! some! fundamental! respects,!a!potentially!devastating!blow!will!
have! been! dealt! to! Kant’s! argument! for! ontological! denial.! Strawson! considers! precisely!
such!a!charge!against!Kant!which!he! labels!the!“positivist!view”!(Strawson,!1966,!p.!278).!
On!this!account,!the!problem!with!which!Kant!concerns!himself,!namely!that!of!explaining!
the!possibility! of! geometrical! propositions! being! synthetic! and! yet! necessary! (a2priori)! at!
the!same!time,!is!not,!in!fact,!a!real!problem.!!The!propositions!of!geometry,!insofar!as!they!
are! necessary,! are! deduced! logically! from! a! previous! set! of! axioms.! The! truth! of! these!
axioms,!however,!is!not!a!necessary!or!a2priori!matter!but!rather!something!which!must!be!
tested!and!verified!empirically!(Strawson,!1966,!pp.!278X9).!The!trouble!for!Kant!is!that!the!












despite! his! use! of,! and! reliance! on,! Euclidian! geometry,! his! argument! is! not! wholly!
dependent! on! its! truth.! The! trouble! for! Kant! is! not! so!much! that! he! set! out! to! rely! on!
Euclidian!geometry,!as!it!is!his!belief!that!whatever!kind!of!geometry!we!can!imagine!must!
necessarily! hold! of! physical! space.! Strawson,! in! giving! an! uncharacteristically! charitable!
account! of! Kant’s! argument,! tries! to! see!whether! there! is! something! in! Kant’s! argument!
from! geometry! worth! preserving.! Strawson’s! strategy! for! this! seems! to! be! to! separate!
physical! geometry! from!what! he! calls! ‘phenomenal! geometry’! (Strawson,! 1966,! p.! 282).!
Phenomenal!geometry!is!the!geometry!not!of!physical!objects!but!of!spatial!objects.!What!
Strawson! is! drawing! attention! to! is! the! geometry! of! shapes! which! we! may! consider! in!
imagination.!When,! for!example,! I! consider!a! triangle! in! imagination! I! am!not,!of! course,!
considering! a! physical! triangle! but! rather! the! look! itself! which! physical! triangles! exhibit!
(Ibid.).! The! representation! of! the! ‘looks’! of! physical! objects! is! what! Strawson!means! by!
‘phenomenal!geometry’.35!On!Strawson’s!reading,!then,!Kant!is!correct!insofar!as!whatever!
we!may!conceive!as!being! impossible!of! space! in! imagination,!e.g.! that! two!straight! lines!









perceptual!experience.!Thus,! it!may!be!the!case!that! in!astrophysics,! for!particularly! large!
distances,! we! must! assume! the! abandonment! of! certain! propositions! of! Euclidian!
geometry,!or! the!way! in!which!we! intuitively! represent! space,! in!order! to!make! sense!of!
our!findings.!But!this!does!not!mean!that!we!can!ever!represent!a!geometry!which!does!not!
fit! the! description! of! our! phenomenal! geometry;! even! if! we! are! forced! to! assume! that!
under!certain!circumstances,!the!spatial!relations!to!which!our!imagination!is!constrained,!
must! be! suspended.36! Thus,! there! seems! to! be! something! left! over! for! Kant,! despite!
developments! in! geometry! since! his! time.! However,! and! as! Strawson! recognizes! too,! it!
certainly! does! not! seem! as! if! this! revised! account! can! provide! Kant! with! the! kind! of!
argument! which! he! demands! of! it! –! namely! to! justify! the! transcendental! subjectivity! of!
space! (Strawson,! 1966,! p.! 292).! The!problem! for! Kant,! as! should!be! clear,! is! that! on! this!
reading!we!have!still!not!ruled!out!the!possibility,!or!even!the!actuality,!of!a!physical!object!
not! conforming! to! the! determinations! of! space! which! we!must! represent,! and! it! is! this!
conclusion!which!Kant!must!be!able!to!establish!if!he!wants!to!secure!the!mere!subjective!
status! of! space;! that! is! Kant!must! be! able! to! establish! that! physical! geometry! cannot! be!




the! truth! of! geometrical! propositions! were! knowable! a2 priori.! When! arguing! for! the!
impossibility! of! that! which! is! true! of! necessity! of! our! a2 priori! representations! to! be!
necessarily! true!of! thingsXinXthemselves,!Kant!asks!us!that! if! the!spatial!properties,!or! the!
truths! of! geometry,! pertained! to! things! in! themselves! as! well! as! being! conditions! of!








subjective! conditions! for! the!construction!of! the! triangle!must!of!necessity!belong! to! the!
triangle! itself?”! (A48/B65).! But,! Kant’s! formulation! of! this! problem! seems! to! rest! on! a!
conflation!of!truth!and!knowledge.!For,!even!if!it!were!the!case!that!spatiality!pertained!to!
things! as! they! are! in! themselves,! though! this!would!be! a! truth,! it! could!never! constitute!
knowledge.!That!is,!even!if!space!were!a!property!of!the!world!as!abstracted!from!our!form!
of! sensibility,!we!would!still!never!be! in!a!position! to,!as!Kant!assumes,!“know! that!what!
necessarily!exists!in!you!as!subjective!conditions!for!the!construction!of!the!triangle!must!of!
necessity!belong!to!the!triangle!itself”!(Ibid,!my!emphasis).!Thus,!the!incompatibility!which!
Kant! highlights,! namely! that! if! spatiality! pertained! to! thingsXinXthemselves,! our! a2 priori!
knowledge!of!geometry!would!imply!us!possessing!a2priori!knowledge!of!something!that!is!
wholly!independent!of!us,!only!seems!applicable!regarding!our!inability!to!attain!knowledge!
of!things! in!themselves,!not!that!something!which! is!true!for!us!cannot! just!so!happen!to!
likewise!be!true!of!the!world!in!and!of!itself.!If!space!were!a!property!of!the!world!in!and!of!
itself,! our! subjective! and! necessary! knowledge! of! geometry! would! only! be! knowledge!
within!the!phenomenal!realm;!beyond!this!it!would!merely!be!a!truth!forever!in!need!of!a!
justification!which!we! could! never! attain! –! and! thus! it!would! always! remain! outside! the!
purview!of!knowledge.38!
We! should,! however,! note! that! although! Kant! may! have! failed! to! secure! his!
ontological!denial,!he!has!still!established!the!epistemological!claim!that!our!representation!
of!space!is!an!a2priori!one,!meaning!that!space!and!time!are!necessary!epistemic!conditions!
for! subjects!with! our! form!of! cognition.!We! should! further! note! that! the! transcendental!
reality!of!space!and!time!has!not!been!proven!by!Trendelenburg;!it!has!rather!failed!to!be!












to! Kant’s! Copernican! Revolution,! for! unlike! Kant’s! ontological! denial,! the! neglected!
alternative! remains! silent! and! agnostic! regarding! the! ascription! or! denial! of! spatioX
temporality!to!thingsXinXthemselves.!As!Gardner!points!out!“it!may!even!be!argued!that!the!
weaker!version![of!transcendental!idealism]!is!the!more!consistently!Critical,!since!it!makes!






within! Kant! studies! and! concerns! the! relation! between! thingsXinXthemselves! and!
appearances.!At!certain!points! in!the!Critique,!Kant!presents!the!relation!between!thingsX





the! bounds! of! experience”! (BxviiXxix! [n]).! Likewise,! in! the!Aesthetic,! Kant! claims! that! the!
“object! as! appearance! is! to! be! distinguished! from! itself! as! object! in! itself”! (B69).!What!




of! our! cognitive! faculties,! we! are! considering! the! object! as! an! appearance.! If! we! now!
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proceed! to! think! about! this! same! object! as! it! is! abstracted! from! these! relations! to! our!
cognition,! we! are! considering! the! object! as! thingXinXitself! (Wood,! 2005,! p.! 65).! As! Kant!
explains:! “If! the! senses! represent! to! us! something! merely! as! it! appears,! this! something!







they!constitute! two!different! sets!of!objects.!The! twoXworld!view! is!not!derived!so!much!
from! any! assertions! by! Kant! that! appearances! and! thingsXinXthemselves!must! constitute!
two!separate!objects,!as!it!is!from!Kant’s!claims!that!thingsXinXthemselves!cause!or!ground!
appearances.! Wood! believes! that! the! relation! of! ground! and! consequent! is! implied! at!
A43/B60!where! Kant! says! that! “what! objects!may! be! in! themselves!would! still! never! be!
known!through!the!most!enlightened!cognition!of!their!appearance,!which!alone!is!given!to!
us”! (A43/B60).!He!believes!the!position! is!also! implicit! in!Kant’s!assertion!that!“objects! in!
themselves! are! not! known! to! us! at! all,! and! that!what!we! call! outer! objects! are! nothing!
other! than!mere! representations!of! our! sensibility,!whose! form! is! space,! but!whose! true!
correlate,!i.e.!the!thing!in!itself,!is!not!and!cannot!be!cognized!through!them”!(A30/B45).39!
But!perhaps!Kant’s!most!emphatic!claim!which!may!be!taken!to!indicate!that!he!views!the!
relation! between! thingsXinXthemselves! and! appearances! as! that! between! a! ground! and!
consequent! is! provided! us! at! A19/B33! in! the! Aesthetic! where! Kant! explains! to! us! how!
sensibility,!one!of!the!two!faculties!required!for!cognition,!is!what!we!may!call!a!‘receptive’!
faculty! whose! content! is! given! to! it! from! without.! In! sensibility,! Kant! believes,! objects!






how!we! come! to! have! experience! of! empirical! objects! (appearances),! that!which! affects!
sensibility! at! this! stage! cannot! itself! be! empirical! (i.e.! an! appearance).! The! Aesthetic!
provides! us! with! an! account! of! one! component! of! knowledge,! namely! intuitions,! and! it!
furthermore! details! certain! specific! forms! to! which! our! intuitions! must! conform.! The!
objects!which!we!are! left!with!at!the!end!of!the!Aesthetic,!which!–!as!the!Aesthetic! takes!
itself! to! have! demonstrated! –!must! be! spatioXtemporal,!we!may! label! appearances.! This!
implies! that! those! objects!which! provide! us!with! the! content! or!matter! for! appearances!
(remembering! that! an! appearance! is! a! combination! of! content! and! form)! cannot!
themselves! be! appearances.! If! they! are! not! appearances,! then! these! objects! must! be!
thingsXinXthemselves.! Kant! reXiterates! the! point! later,! this! time! in! the! Analytic,! that! “all!
intuitions,!as! sensible,! rest!on!affections”! (A68/B93).!The!very!notion!of!affection! implies!
the! relation! of! that! between! a! ground! and! consequent;! here! Kant’s! argument! would!
suggest! that! thingsXinXthemselves! act! as! the! grounds! for! our! appearances! by! providing!
sensibility!with!the!content!which!sensibility!requires!in!order!for!us!to!have!experience!of!
an!object!or!appearance.!Thus,! thingsXinXthemselves,!are!essentially!viewed!as!the!causes!
of! appearances.40! Some! commentators! argue! that! if! Kant! does! indeed! take! the! relation!
between! thingsXinXthemselves! and! appearances! to! be! a! causal! one,! then! he! must! be!




itself.! Thus,! if! Kant! is! committed! to! the! idea! of! thingsXinXthemselves! as! grounds! of!






thingsXinXthemselves! and! appearances! is!merely! one! of! two! different! conceptions! of! the!
same!thing.!!




“There! are! things! given! to! us! as! objects! of! our! senses! existing! outside! us,! yet! we! know!












it! seems! to! maintain! a! contradictory! position.! How! can! thingsXinXthemselves! be! the!
grounds,!and!therefore!causes,!of!appearances,!and!yet!for!them!to!constitute!one!realm!of!









We! know! that! our! object! of! knowledge/experience! is! an! appearance.42! We! are!
furthermore! led! to! stipulate! that! this! appearance! must! also! possess! a! constitution!
independently! of! how! it! appears! to! us;! namely,! its! constitution! as! it! is! in! itself,! or! its!
constitution!as!thingXinXitself.!Moreover,!the!reason!why!we!have!the!representation!of!an!
appearance,! that! is,! the! reason!why!we!experience!a!phenomenal!object,! is! because! the!






object!as! it! is! in! itself!combined!with!our!a2priori2determinations.43!Thus,!our!appearance!
being!the!result!of!the!thingXinXitself’s!affection!highlights!that!there!is!a!causal!relation,!or!
at!least!one!of!necessary!grounding,!between!the!two.!The!key!to!understanding!where!the!
confusion! stems! from! in! the! incompatibilist! position! is! the! different! uses! of! the! term!
‘object’! in! the!oneXworld!and!twoXworld!views.!When! it! is!claimed,!according! to! the!oneX
world!view,!that!an!appearance!and!the!thingXinXitself!constitute!one!and!the!same!object,!
the! term! ‘object’! is!being!used! to! refer! to!an!ontological!object.!Our!appearance!may!be!
qualitatively!different!from!the!thingXinXitself! (or!from!itself!as! it! is! in! itself),!but!this!does!
not!mean!that!the!appearance!is!a!different!ontological!entity!than!the!thingXinXitself.!The!
belief! that! an! object! cannot! be! the! cause! of! itself! is! only! true! in! the! sense! that! our!














relation! between! them! to! be! that! of! ground! and! consequent.! For! how! else! could! we!
account! for! our! appearance?!What! could! ground! the! thingXinXitself! being! presented! in! a!
different! way! other! than! the! thingXinXitself! (combined! with! the! subject’s! a2 priori!
determinations)?! Certainly,! we! could! not! say! that! some! other! ontological! entity! is! that!
which!grounds!our!appearance,! if! this! is!merely! the! thingXinXitself!manifested! in!a!certain!
way.!!
Thus,!we!see!that! there! is!a!case!to!be!made!for!Kant’s!position!that! the!relation!
between!thingsXinXthemselves!and!appearances! is!one!of!ground!and!consequent!and!yet!
also! that! they! constitute!one!and! the! same!object.! In! fact,!we!can! see! that! the!very! fact!
that! an! appearance! is! a! thingXinXitself! with! the! forms! of! our! sensibility! is! precisely!why!
thingsXinXthemselves!must! ground! appearances.! The! belief! that! an! object! cannot! be! the!



























This! chapter! brings! to! a! conclusion! our! exegesis! of! Kant’s! doctrine! of! transcendental!
idealism! and! his! account! of! sensibility! as! found! in! the! Transcendental! Aesthetic.!What! I!
wish!to!have!demonstrated! is!the!full! import!of!Kant’s!Transcendental! Idealism!–!namely,!
that! space! and! time! are!mere2 subjective! forms! of! intuition.! Moreover,! I! demonstrated!
Kant’s! rationale! behind! his! ontological! denial! along!with! reasons! for!why! his! ontological!
denial! is! ultimately! an! unjustified! position.! Our! analysis! of! Kant’s! claims! along! with! the!
neglected! alternative! will! allow! us! a! deeper! appreciation! of! Nietzsche’s! early!
epistemological!position,!as!we!will!see!in!Chapter!6.!!
! Lastly,! I! attempted! to! reconcile! the! oneXworld! and! twoXworld! interpretations! on!
the! issue! of! causality! between! thingsXinXthemselves! and! appearances.! My! intended! aim!
here! was! to! demonstrate! that,! whatever! reasons! which! exist! for! a! twoXworld! reading,!
Kant’s! derivation! of! thingsXinXthemselves! as! the! grounds! of! phenomena! does! not!



























The!Aesthetic! attempted! to! establish! the! sensible! conditions! of! experience,! namely,! that!
our! representations! of! space! and! time! are! merely! subjective! conditions! of! knowledge!
which!do!not!pertain!to!thingsXinXthemselves.!The!success!of!the!Aesthetic!was,!however,!
more!modest! and! all! that! could! securely! be! established!was! that! spatioXtemporality! is! a!
subjective! condition! of! cognition.! Whether! space! and! time! are! properties! of! thingsXinX
themselves! remained! unclear.! More! importantly! we! found! that! this! agnostic! conclusion!
was,! in! some! senses,! more! in! agreement! with! Kant’s! more! general! stance! on! the!
unknowability!of!thingsXinXthemselves.!!
! In! this!chapter! I!wish! to!consider!Kant’s!account!of! the! role!of! (pure)!concepts! in!









he! believes! that! conceptual! experience! is! necessary! both! for! experience! of! an! objective!
world! and! for! experience! of! a! unified! self.! This! will! leave! us! in! a! position! to! evaluate!
Schopenhauer!and!Nietzsche’s!positions!on!these!issues.!!
! In! the! last! two! sections! of! the! chapter! I! will! turn! to! consider,! firstly,! Kant’s!
restriction! of! the! categories! to! the! phenomenal! realm;! i.e.! the! claim! that! the! categories!
cannot! be! used! for! cognition! of! objects! beyond! the! realm! of! possible! experience! (or!
abstracted! from!sensible! content).! This! conclusion,! as!we!will! see,! is!one!which!although!
Schopenhauer!agrees!with,!he!also!views!as!contradicting!Kant’s!inference!to!the!thingXinX
itself!–!a!topic!for!Chapter!4.!Secondly,!I!will!consider!the!difference!between!the!concept!
of! a! thingXinXitself! and! that! of! a! noumenon.! This! distinction! will! bring! to! light! a! further!




(Chapter! 9),! is! that! insofar! as! they! both! subscribe! to! the! receptivity! thesis,! they! both,!











cognition,! namely! sensibility! and! its! representations! (intuitions).! Sensibility! is,! as!
mentioned,!a!receptive!faculty!which!can!only!yield!intuitions!insofar!as!things!are!given!to!
it,!or!insofar!as!something!affects!us.!But,!in!addition!to!sensibility,!cognition!also!requires!a!
“faculty! for! cognizing! an! object”! (A50/B74);! that! is,! a! faculty! for! uniting! intuitions! under!
concepts,! for! although! an! object! is! given452 to! us! through! sensibility,! we! still! require! the!
understanding! to!be! able! to! think2 these!objects!under! concepts! (A50/B75).!What!Kant! is!
highlighting! is! that! experience! is! not! only! conditioned! and! constrained! by! what! can! be!
given,!but!also!by!what!can!be!thought.!Now,!whereas!sensibility!is!receptive!in!nature,!the!
understanding! is! spontaneous! in! that!concepts!are!not!given!to! it! from!without;! they!are!








would! be! thought.! Thoughts!without! content! are! empty,! intuitions!without! concepts! are!
blind”! (A51/B75).!Cognition!requires!both! that!our!concept!correspond!to!some!object! in!
the!world,!for!otherwise!it!would!merely!be!an!empty!thought,!and2that!the!content!of!an!












Without! such! an! ability! we! would!merely! be! confronted! with! a! chaos! of! sensation,! not!
knowledge! or! experience! proper.! This! bifurcation! of! requirements! for! cognition,! insisted!








We! saw! in! the! Aesthetic! that! intuitions! can! be! either! pure! (a2 priori)! or! empirical! (a2
posteriori).! An! empirical! intuition! is! that! which! is! given! to! us! in! experience! from! outer!
objects!through!sensations,!whereas!a!pure!intuition!is!“the!form!under!which!something!is!
intuited”!(A50/B75)!or!the!form!which!the!empirical!intuition!must!assume.!Like!intuitions,!
Kant!believes! that! concepts! can!also!be!either!empirical!or!pure.!An!empirical! concept! is!
one!whose!content!is!derived!or!acquired!from!experience,!whose!content!is!sensory,!and!
whose!application!can!only!be!justified!through!experience.46!A!pure!concept,!on!the!other!











its! object”! (A58/B83),! but! notes! that! a! general! yet! sufficient!mark! of! truth! is! impossible!
(A59/B83).!The!general!mark!of!truth!is!that!which!belongs!to!any!and!every!object.!A!true!
cognition,! regardless!of! its! content,!must! assume!a! certain! form,!meaning! that!whatever!
the! specific! content! of! a! cognition,! in! order! for! it! to! be! true,! this! content!must! first! and!
foremost!be!in!accordance!with!the!general!mark!of!truth!–!that!is,!in!accordance!with!the!
form! of! an! object! in! general.! But! the! question! of! whether! a! judgment! is! true! is! also!
concerned! with! the! specific! content,! and! not! merely! the! form! which! this! content! must!
assume.! Thus,! the! general!mark! of! truth! does! not! suffice! to! give! us! true! cognition! “For!
although!a!cognition!may!be! in!complete!accord!with! the! logical! form,! i.e.!not!contradict!




himself! not!with! the! specific! but!with! the! general!marks! of! truth.! Thus,!what!we!will! be!
considering!is!the!need!for!appearances!(of!intuitions),!regardless!of!their!specific!content,!
to!be!unified!according! to! certain!determinations,! or!what!Kant!will! call! categories! (pure!
concepts!of!the!understanding).!The!categories,!then,!will!constitute!the!necessary!but!not!
sufficient!conditions!of!truth.!!
! Kant! then!divides! the!deduction!of! the! categories! into! a!Metaphysical!Deduction!












Kant! deals! with! general! logic! which! assumes! the! existence! of! concepts! which! are! then!
related! to! one! another! through! the! logical! functions! of! judgment.! Taken! together,! these!
exhaust!the!ways!in!which!we!may!think!of!the!relations!between!concepts!–!that!is,!they!
exhaust! the!ways!we!can! think!of!and!unite!concepts.!Transcendental! logic,!on! the!other!
hand!(the!topic!of!the!‘Deduction’!proper),!is!concerned!with!the!way!in!which!the!manifold!
of!intuition!is!“taken!up,!and!combined!in!a!certain!way!in!order!for!a!cognition!to!be!made!
out!of! it”! (A77/B102).!Kant! calls! this! action! “synthesis”! (Ibid.).! Transcendental! logic!deals!
not!with!the!way!in!which!one!concept!is!related!to!another!concept!–!the!task!of!general!
logic! –! but! rather! with! how! the! different! (nonXconceptual)! intuitions! come! to! be!
synthesised! or! united! together! according! to! pure! concepts.! Kant’s! contention! is! that! the!
same!functions!through!which!concepts!are!united!in!a!judgment!in!general! logic!are!also!
the!functions!through!which!different!nonXconceptual! intuitive!representations!are!united!
in! a! manifold.! As! Kant! says:! “The! same! function! that! gives! unity! to! the! different!





then! is! that! the! forms! of! judgment! will! also! determine! the! general! way! in! which! our!
intuitions!must!be!united!or! synthesised49! regardless!of! their!content!–!meaning! that! the!

















chapter! to! consider! the! nuances! of! the! three! versions,! and! thus! following! most!





us;! that! is,! although! we! can! be! given! intuitions! through! sensibility,! in! order! for! us! to!
combine!our!representations!there!must!be!an!activity!by!the!understanding.50!51!As!Kant!
says,! “we! can! represent! nothing! as! combined! in! the! object! without! having! previously!
combined! it! ourselves”! (B130).! The! important! point! for! Kant! is! that! representing! a!

























either! be! impossible! or! else! at! least! would! be! nothing! for! me”! (B131X132).! Now,! this!
attachment! of! the! ‘I! think’! to! my! representations! cannot! be! something! receptive,! or!
something! that! is! given! to! me,! but! must! rather! be! an! act! of! spontaneity! by! the!
understanding.!That!is,!the!sensations!that!are!given!to!me!from!without!do!not!include!the!
‘mineXness’! of! these! sensations! –! the! mineXness! is! something! that! is! added! to! these!
representations! by! me.! Kant! calls! this! form! of! selfXconsciousness! pure! or! original!
apperception! (B132).! Thus,! in! order! for! me! to! have! experience! of! an! object! as! a! unity!
represented!by!my!various!sensations,!of!all!of!my!representations!(of!appearances)!I!must!
at!the!very!least!be2able!to!think!that!this!representation!is!mine.56!But,!Kant!continues,!this!



















form! of! apperception! is! not! enough! for! me! to! be! able! to! represent! the! identity! of! the!






‘I’! as! did! R1;! I! must! represent! the! identity! of! the! ‘I’! which! is! confronted! with!
representations.!Without!this!ability,!Kant!claims,!“I!would!have!as!multicolored,!diverse!a!
self!as!I!have!representations!of!which!I!am!conscious”!(B134).!
Now,! the! awareness! of! this! identity! must! happen! by! “my! adding! one!
representation! to! the!other!and!being!conscious!of! their! synthesis”! (B133),!meaning! that!
the! only! way! that! I! can! represent! the! identity! of! the! consciousness! throughout! all! the!




of! them! as! belonging! to!me.! The! synthetic! unity! of! apperception! is! the! unity! which!my!
representations!have!through!my!being!aware!of!their!synthesis.57!Now,!the!most!minimal!
way! in!which! I!may! synthesise! or! combine!my! representations! is! in! terms! of! them! each!
















any! of! their! properties,! I!must! first! of! all! have! combined! them!as! representations!which!
each!belong!to!the!same!persisting!‘I’!(viz.!me).!Thus,!what!Kant!means!by!claiming!that!the!








analytic! and! synthetic! unities! of! apperception.! In! thinking! my! representations! as! each!
belonging!to!the!same! ‘I’,! I!am!thereby!bringing!them!into!a!synthetic!unity;!or!as!Allison!
claims:!“Indeed,!I!cannot!ascribe!them!to!my!identical!self!without!in2the2very2same2act!also!




of! the! reciprocal! relationship! between! the! two! unities! of! apperception.! What! we! must!
determine!is!how!we!are!to!understand!the!reciprocity!between!the!analytic!and!synthetic!
unities! of! apperception.! First! of! all,! we! may! agree! that! each! unity! of! apperception!
necessarily! depends! on! the! other,! by! which! we! mean! that! each! unity! of! apperception!
necessarily!implies!the!other.!But,!if!this!is!so,!then!this!must!imply!that!each!cannot!be!the!












also! unmarried,! and! vice! versa.! Thus,! A! can! only! imply! B! and! B! imply! A! –! i.e.! logical!
reciprocity!only!obtains!–! in!a! judgment!where!A!and!B!are! implicitly!“contained”! in!each!
other.! But,! this! means! that! nothing! new! is! added! in! making! something! explicit! in! a!
reciprocally! (symmetrically)! analytic! judgment.60! If! A! implies! B,! and! B! implies! A,! there!
cannot!be!anything!outside!of!the!judgment!which!acts!as!the!necessity!with!which!A!and!B!
are! related.!What! is! required! for! something! to! be! the! ground! of! something! else! is! that!
there! is! something! which! is! not2 implicit! within! the! definitions! of! the! concepts! in! the!
judgment,! or! between! the! judgments,! which! acts! as! that! which! makes! the! judgment!
possible.! This! implies! that! if! a! judgment! is! a! symmetrical! analytic! one,! or! if! the! relation2
between2 two2 judgments! is! a! symmetrical! analytic! one,! neither! judgment! can! act! as! the!
ground!for!being!of!the!other;!that!is,!neither!judgment!makes!the!other!one!possible,!but!
rather!that!whenever!one!is!actual!the!other! is!necessary,!and!vice!versa.!To!claim!that!A!
and!B!are!mutuallyXimplying!and!yet! that!A!becomes!possible! through!B,! is!equivalent! to!
claiming!that!A!becomes!possible!through!itself,!or!that!A!is!the!ground!for!its!own!being.!















Bringing! these! points! back! to! Kant’s! distinction! between! a! synthetic! and! analytic!
unity!of! apperception!we! see! that! I! cannot!unite!different! representations!as!each!being!
mine!(effecting!a!synthetic!unity)!without!being!able!to!think!the!identity!of!the!‘I’!in!each!
of! the! representations! in! respect!of!which! I!am!able! to!posit! the! ‘I! think’! (analytic!unity).!
Likewise,! I! cannot! think! the! identity! of! the! ‘I’! in! my! different! representations! without!
uniting!them!as!each!being!mine.!Kant!is!then!making!explicit!what!is!implicit!in!the!act!of!
thinking!the!identity!of!the!‘I’! in!each!of!my!representations.!This!means!that!Kant!cannot!




possible).! Likewise,! it! is! not! because! we! know! of! the! identity! of! the! ‘I’! in! different!
representations! that!we!can!combine! these! representations! (because!being!aware!of! the!
identity! of! the! ‘I’! amongst! my! different! representations! is! to! combine! representations).!
Rather,!the!two!refer!to!one!and!the!same!act,!and!no!priority!can!be!given!to!either!one,!
for!if!it!were!then!the!relation!would!lose!its!reciprocity.!Thus,!neither!formulation,!that!is,!
neither! the!analytic!nor!synthetic!unity!of!apperception! is! the! ‘why’!of! the!other.!Rather,!
given! that! one! is! the! case,! then! so! must! the! other! be! (and! vice! versa).! The! ‘why’! is!
essentially! not! answered! by! Kant! but! is! simply! that! which! must! obtain! for! there! to! be!
experience.!!
! After! the! reciprocity! thesis,! through! which! Kant! believes! to! have! explained! how!
apperception! is! possible! (something! with! which! we! have! disagreed),! he! compares! the!





apperception! (B! 136X7).! Kant! then! gives! us! the! definition! of! an! object! as! “that! in! the!
concept!of!which!the!manifold!of!an!intuition!is!united”!(B137).!Thus,! in!order!to!have!an!
object! we! need! to! unite! intuitions! in! a! concept,! and! the! way! in! which! we! unite!
representations!most2minimally!must!serve!as!the!basis!for!any!object!–!that!is,!an!object!in!
general,!or!what!Kant!will!call!a!transcendental!object!(the!general!mark!of!truth).!Now,!we!
know! that! this!most!minimal! form!of! unification! is! the! synthetic! unity! of! apperception!–!
that! is,!combining!my!representations!as!all!belonging!to!the!same!I.!This!means!that!the!
synthetic!unity!of!apperception! is!what! is!required!for!us!to!effect!any! form!of!unity;! it! is!
the!form!of!unification/synthesis!most!minimally,!and!therefore!it!is!that!which!constitutes!
the! relation! of! representations! to! objects! –! that! is,! it! is! the! spontaneous! form! through!





Though! we! will! not! consider! this! in! detail,! we! will! provide! a! brief! overview! of! Kant’s!
argument.!Kant!claims!at!B143!that!“The!action!of!the!understanding![…]!through!which!the!
manifold! of! given! representations! (whether! they! be! intuitions! or! concepts)! is! brought!
under!an!apperception!in!general,!is!the!logical!functions!of!judgment”!(B143).!His!claim!is!
















ways! in! which! representations! of! appearances!must! be! combined! in! order! to! become!
objects!of!experience,!regardless!of!the!object.!Whereas!the!table!of!judgments!at!A70/B95!
exhausts! the! ways! in! which! concepts! can! be! combined! in! general! logic,! the! table! of!
categories!at!A80/B106!exhausts!the!ways!in!which!intuitions!(or!their!appearances)!can!be!
combined!in!transcendental!logic!(B!143).64!!
It! should! be! noted! that! many! question! marks! can! be! raised! regarding! Kant’s!





further! questions! regarding!what! Kant! is! attempting! to! achieve! in! the! ‘beginning’! to! the!



























thought.! But,! until! the! ‘Deduction’,! Kant! had! not! offered! any! proof! for! why! we! need!
concepts! in! order! to! have! objective! experience.! What! he! then! proceeded! to! do! in! the!
‘Deduction’! was! to! establish! why! certain! pure! concepts! must! govern! the! unification! or!
combination! of! whatever! appearances! we! have! insofar! as! these! appearances! are! to!
become!objects! of! experience! for! us,! and!he! furthermore! linked! this! requirement! to! the!
requirements!of!selfXconsciousness.!This!is,!I!believe,!what!Kant!is!trying!to!bring!attention!
to!in!his!formulation!of!the!mutually! implying!relation!between!the!synthetic!and!analytic!
unities!of! apperception.!What!Kant! attempts! to!demonstrate! there! is! that! assuming! that!
combination!of!representations! is!a!necessary!activity! in!order!for!us!to!have!cognition!of!
an! objective! world,! then! the! awareness! of! the! identity! of! the! ‘I’! between! different!
representations! is!paramount!for!us!to!be!able!to!effect!any!combination;!which! is!to!say!
that! selfXconsciousness! (albeit! in! a! transcendental! sense)! is! required! for! cognition! of!
objects.!But,! likewise,!Kant!argues!that! the!only!way! in!which! I!can!become!aware!of! the!
identity!of!the!‘I’!between!different!representations!(i.e.!the!only!way!that!transcendental!
selfXconsciousness! is! possible)! is! through! my! being! able! to! combine! my! different!
representations,! through! judgmental! selfXascription.! Thus,! each! is! required! for! the!other,!
and! each! is! implied! by! the! other.! What! Kant! argues! for,! then,! is! not! only! that! without!
concepts!we!cannot!have!experience!of!objects,!but!also!that!without!these!pure!concepts!










One! of! the! significant! conclusions! of! the! Analytic,2which! has! a! great! bearing! on! Kant’s!
critical!philosophy!as!a!whole,! is! the! lesson!drawn! regarding! the! scope!of! the!categories.!
The!categories!turn!out!to!be!the!“source!of!all!truth![…]!in!virtue!of!containing!the!ground!
of! the! possibility! of! experience”! (A237).! The! categories,! in! being! a2 priori! conditions! of!
cognition,! are! indiscriminate! in! that! we! can! know,! prior! to! experience! of! any! sensible!
content,! that! the! content!must!be! synthesized,! and! therefore! thought,! in! terms!of! these!
categories.! This! criterion! for! the! truth! of! cognitions! should!make! clear! the! scope! of! the!
application!of!the!categories!in!yielding!knowledge!of!the!world.!In!order!for!a!cognition!to!
be!true!(or!even!possible),!the!content!must!be!thought!in!terms!of!the!categories.!But!in!
order! for! this! to! be! the! case,! there! must! be! some! content! to! begin! with;! that! is,! the!





the! forms2 of2 intuitions.! Furthermore,! a! pure,! and! therefore,!a2 priori,! intuition! combined!
with!an!a2priori!form!of!thought!could!never!provide!us!with!synthetic!knowledge,!that!is,!
knowledge! of! outer! objects.! Since! the!a2 priority! of! a! cognition! implies,! for! Kant,! that! its!
source! is! in! the! subject,!we! could!never! attain! to! knowledge!of! the!world! purely! from!a2




to!a2priori2 intuitions! (as! in!mathematics),! provide! cognition!only! insofar! as! these!a2priori2
intuitions,!and!by!means!of!them!also!the!concepts!of!the!understanding,!can!be!applied!to!
empirical! intuitions.! Consequently! the! categories! do! not! afford! us! cognition! of! things! by!
means! of! intuition! except! through! their! possible! application! to! empirical! intuition,! i.e.,!
they!serve!only!for!the!possibility!of!empirical!cognition.!The!categories!consequently!have!
no! other! use! for! the! cognition! of! things! except! insofar! as! these! are! taken! as! objects! of!
possible! experience”! (B147X148).! This! means! that! the! content! which! must! be! thought!
according! to! the! categories! must! be! provided! us,! or! given! to! us,! in! empirical! intuitions!
through!sensibility.!Thus,!the!categories!fundamentally!rely!on!empirical!intuitions!in!order!
for! them! to! yield! knowledge.! Moreover,! we! cannot! even! define! the! categories! without!
appeal!to!experience!(B300)!because!their!real!sense!is!how!they!are!applied!through!the!
schemata.!Kant!even!goes!through!several!of!the!categories!and!shows!how!and!why!the!
concept!necessarily!depends!on! intuitive! content! in!order! for! it! to!be! capable!of! yielding!
cognition.66! From! this,! he! concludes! that! “the! pure! concepts! of! the! understanding! can!
never!be! of! transcendental,! but! always! only! of!empirical!use,! and! that! the! principles! of!
pure!understanding!can!be!related!to!objects!of!the!senses!only!in!relation!to!the!general!
conditions!of!a!possible!experience,!but!never!to!things!in!general!(without!taking!regard!of!
the! way! in! which! we! might! intuit! them)”! (A246/B303).! The! categories,! therefore,!
fundamentally!rely!on!empirical!intuitions!in!order!to!have!any!applicability;!devoid!of!such!
empirical! content! they!are! rendered! incapable!of!yielding!cognition!of! the!world.67!Given!
this! dependence! of! the! categories! on! sensibility! (specifically! empirical! intuitions),! the!
















Kant!asks!us! to!attempt! to!apply!a!category! to!any!synthetic!proposition!about! thingsXinX
themselves.! Let! us! take! the! proposition! “Everything! contingent! exists! as! the! effect! of!
another! thing,! namely! its! cause”! (B315).! We! know! of! synthetic! propositions! that! the!
concepts!therein!“have!no!logical!(analytical)!affinity”!(B315),!meaning!that!the!connection!
between!the!concepts! in! the! judgment!must!be!established!either! through!experience!or!
must!lie!a2priori! in!the!mind.!In!the!case!of!thingsXinXthemselves,!the!connection!between!
subject! and! predicate! cannot! come! from! experience,! since! thingsXinXthemselves! are!
precisely!the!objects!as!abstracted!from!experience,!that!is,!they!are!the!things!not!as!they!









we! are! dealing! with! objects! as! they! are! abstracted! from! how! they! are! given! to! us! in!











I!now!wish! to! turn!attention! to!a!distinction!which!Kant!draws!between!a! ‘phenomenon’!
and!a!‘noumenon’,!and!furthermore!how!the!latter!concept!differs!from!that!of!a!thingXinX
itself.! These! distinctions!will! help! clarify! and! bring! to! light! another! important! distinction!
which!Kant!draws,!namely,!that!between!a!sensible!vs.!intellectual/original!intuition.!
!Phenomena,!for!Kant,!are!“beings!of!sense”!(B306).69!A!phenomenon!is!essentially!




clear! that! the! understanding! cannot! mediate! by! itself;! it! can! only! apply! categories! to!
content!given!to!it!through!sensibility,!which,!according!to!the!form!of!sensibility,!is!spatioX
temporal,!and!therefore!an!appearance!and!already!mediated.!Thus,!the!mediation!which!
makes! an!object! a! phenomenon!has! its! source,! originally,! in! sensibility.! Kant! then! claims!






requires,! both,! intuitions! and! concepts,! sensibility! and! understanding,! receptivity! and!
spontaneity.!The!type!of!cognition!that!Kant!has!in!mind,!when!speaking!of!a!noumenon,!is!
what!he!brings!attention!to!towards!the!end!of!the!Aesthetic.70!In!contrast!to!our!form!of!














object! of! intuition! is! itself! given”! (B72)! to! the! subject! by! himself,!meaning! that! he! gives!
himself! objects! for! intuition.! A! noumenon! is! thus! what! an! object! for! a! subject! with! an!
intellectual! intuition!would!be! like.!We!are! led!to!the!thought!of!a!noumenon!through!an!




BXedition! Kant! calls! this! the! conception! of! “noumenon! in! the! positive! sense”! (B307).!
Importantly!then,!when!Kant!says!that!a!noumenon! is!an!object!of!the! intellect!alone,!he!
does!not!mean!by!this!that!we!can!come!to!know!a!noumenon!through!the!application!of!
the! categories! void! of! sensibility;! this! is,! as! mentioned! earlier,! impossible! for! us.! A!
noumenon! is! rather! what! we! could! know! if! we! could! apply! the! categories! void! of!
sensibility,!or!what!is!the!same,!a!noumenon!is!what!an!object!would!be!like!for!a!subject!
who2could!have!objects!without!sensibility.!!
! The! concept! of! a! noumenon!must! now! be! distinguished! from! that! of! a! thingXinX
itself.! ThingsXinXthemselves! were! defined! in! the! Aesthetic! as! “things! when! they! are!
considered!in!themselves!through!reason,!i.e.,!without!taking!account!of!the!constitution!of!
our!sensibility”! (A28/B44).!This! formulation!makes! it!seem!as! if! the!concept!of!a!thingXinX
itself! and! that! of! a! noumenon! mean! the! same! thing.! To! be! sure,! there! is! certainly! a!
similarity!between!the!two!concepts!but!there!is!a!significant!difference!in!the!function!that!
each! concept! has! within! Kant’s! system.! The! concept! of! a! thingXinXitself! serves! as! an!
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ontological! concept!which!denotes! “the!concept!of!an!object!as! it! is! constituted! in! itself,!
without!reference!to!our!(or!any!other!subject’s)!knowledge!of!it”!(Gardner,!1999,!p.!200).71!
When!considering!the!concept!of!a!thingXinXitself,!we!must!abstract! from!our!appearance!













some!way.! But! it! should! be! clear! that! for! such! a! subject,! the! object!would! no! longer! be!
mediated! by! certain! subjective! forms! of! sensibility,! as! is! the! case! with! our! cognition! of!
objects.!The!object!for!a!subject!with!intellectual!intuition!would!in!itself!contain!the!same!

















awareness! (intellectual! intuition),! it! is!entitled! ‘noumenon’”! (Strawson,!1966,!p.!239).! !To!
know!a!noumenon,!therefore,!is!to!know!a!thing!as!it!is!in!and!of!itself,!but!in!order!to!know!
a!noumenon!one!must!possess!an!intellectual!or!original!intuition.!The!upshot!of!all!this!is!
that!we! can! never! use! our! categories,! which! are! merely! rules! for! the! synthesis! of! the!




I! have! attempted! in! this! chapter! to! provide! a! critical! reading! of! selected! parts! of! the!
Transcendental!Analytic!of! the!CPR.!My!aim! is! to!have!demonstrated!Kant’s! rationale! for!
arguing!for!the!discursivity!of!cognition,!that!is,!the!thesis!that!a!spontaneous,!judgmental,!
unification!of!sensory!content! is!necessary!for!experience!of!both!a!unified!self!and!of!an!
objective! world.! I! then! considered! Kant’s! restriction! of! the! categories! to! the! realm! of!
appearances;!that!is,!the!reliance!of!the!pure!concepts!on!sensible!intuition!insofar!as!the!
former!can!provide!us!with!knowledge!of!objects.!Lastly,! I!set!out!the!difference!between!
the! concept! of! a! noumenon! and! that! of! a! thingXinXitself! to! bring! to! light! the! distinction!
between!two!different!forms!of!intellect.!!
This! chapter! also! concludes! Part! One! of! our! study,! which! has! focused! on! key!
commitments!made!by!Kant!in!the!Aesthetic!and!Analytic!of!CPR!which!form!cornerstones!
of!his!theory!of!cognition.!I!have,!moreover,!focused!on!selective!topics!within!these!areas!


































the!Kantian!philosophy!made!by!Schopenhauer!and!how!these! led!to!a!divergence! in! the!
philosophies! of! the! two.! Most! importantly,! however,! this! part! will! serve! as! a! bridge!




to!Kant’s!writings!themselves,! there! is!a! fairly!strong!case!to!be!made!that!much!of!what!




many! respects! and!quite! critical! of! Schopenhauer! in! others,! a! prior! task! is! to! provide! an!



























Schopenhauer’s! accounts! of! the! origin! of! experience,! which! influenced! the! early!
Nietzsche’s!position!on!epistemology.!Specifically,!I!will!consider!two!issues!which,!though!
they!will!be!–!somewhat!artificially!–!separated!in!this!paper,!are!closely! intertwined.!The!
first! issue! to! be! considered! is! the! criticism,! first! raised! by! F.H.! Jacobi,! regarding! Kant’s!
alleged! illegitimate! use! of! the! category! of! causality.! I! will! consider! how! Schopenhauer!
believes!his!account!of!experience!to!overcome!this!problem.!This!will!require!a!treatment!
of! Schopenhauer’s! own! theory! of! cognition! and! experience,! which! will! in! turn! reveal!










Schopenhauer’s! criticism! of! Kant’s! alleged! misapplication! of! the! category! of! causality!
focuses!on! the! latter’s!derivation!of! the!notion!of! thingsXinXthemselves!–!a!notion!which,!




why!we! cannot! have! cognition! of! things! as! they!may! be! in! themselves”! (Schopenhauer,!
WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 444).! Schopenhauer! lauds! Kant’s! Copernican! revolution! in! philosophy!
whereby!it!was!no!longer!assumed!that!cognition!of!an!object!amounted!to!an!as!accurate!
as!possible!of!a!reXpresentation!of!the!object!as!it!independently!is.!Kant’s!insight!into!the!a2
priori! determinations! of! our! cognitive! makeXup! in! determining! an! object! of! experience!
transformed! both! the! disciplines! of! epistemology! and! metaphysics! and! Schopenhauer’s!
own!philosophy!takes!much!of!what!Kant!established!in!CPR!both!as!a!starting!point!and!for!
granted.!!
Schopenhauer’s! criticism! of! Kant,! however,! springs! from! what! he! sees! as! an!
erroneous!derivation!of!the!notion!of!thingsXinXthemselves.!For!Schopenhauer,!the!truth!of!
idealism!(or! the!mindXdependence!of!objects)! is!guaranteed!by! the!simple!statement!“no!
object! without! subject”! (Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 461).! To! be! an! object,! for!
Schopenhauer,! implies! being! an! object! for2 a2 subject;! that! is,! when! we! reflect! on! the!
concept! of! an! object! we! find! that! it! can! only! coherently! imply! that! it! is! an! object! for! a!
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subject! of! cognition.! What! is! rather! puzzling! in! this! formulation,! however,! is! that!
Schopenhauer’s! conception! of! what! constitutes! ‘subject’! and! ‘object’! is,! at! times,! quite!
different!from!Kant’s!conception!of!these!concepts.!Schopenhauer!takes!the!words!‘object’!
and!‘representation’!as!being!interchangeable.!Any!object!which!we!can!become!aware!of!
is,! by! virtue! of! our2 awareness2 of2 it2 always! an! object! for2 a2 subject;! which! is! to! say! a!
representation!in!the!subject.!As!he!writes!in!a!letter:!“For!to!be!Subject!means,!to!know;!
and! to! know!means,! to! have! representation.!Object! and! representation! are! one! and! the!
same!thing”!(Schopenhauer,!Two!Essays,!1989,!p.!xxiv).!For!Schopenhauer!“To!be!an!object!
is! to! be! a! representation! […]! ‘object’! cannot! refer! to! anything! existing! outside! what! is!
present! in! the! subject’s! consciousness”! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's!
Philosophy,!1989,!p.! 143).! This! simple! claim,! Schopenhauer!believes! captures!and!proves!
the!truth!of!the!mindXdependence!of!objects!of!experience!–!that!is,!it!proves!the!truth!of!
idealism!(Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,!2010,!pp.!35X6).73!But! the!claim!that! the!world! is!mindX
dependent!was,!at!the!time!of!Schopenhauer,!neither!a!novel!nor!particularly!controversial!
claim;!both!Berkeley!and!Kant!had!averred!similar! claims!prior! to!Schopenhauer.!What! is!
interesting,! is! Schopenhauer’s! claim! that! the! subject! is! that!which! knows!everything,!but!
which! is! itself! known! by! none! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's! Philosophy,!
1989,! p.! 118).! He,! at! one! point,! even! compares! the! subject! to! the! eye,! which! can! see!
everything!except!itself.74!The!obvious!question!this!raises!is:!how!about!when!I!see,!hear,!
touch,! etc.!myself! or!when! I! see! other! people! in! the!world! (or! vice! versa)?! Surely! these!
would! count! as! instances! where! the! subject! is! being! known! in! one! way! or! another?!
Schopenhauer’s!response!to!this!is!a!dual!conception!of!the!subject.!When!I!am!empirically!












objects.! The! point! is! that! even! when! we! know! ourselves! as! an! empirical! object,! this!
empirical!object!is!once!again!presented!for2a2consciousness!or!for2a2subject.!Thus,!that!for!
which! I!become!an!empirical!object!cannot! itself!be!known,! for! it!would! then!have! to!be!
known!through!something!else,!ad2infinitum.!As!we!find!in!Schopenhauer’s!notebooks!(as!




1989,! p.! 120).! But! according! to! this! formulation,! we! find! a! striking! similarity! between!
Schopenhauer! and! Kant;! for,! it! was! the! latter! who,! in! the! AXedition! of! the! fourth!
paralogism,! stated! that! “Now! it! is! indeed! very! illuminating! that! I! cannot! cognize! as! an!
object! itself! that!which! I!must! presuppose! in! order! to! cognize! an! object! at! all”! (A402)75.!





distinguishes! between! original! apperception! and! my! empirical! self! which! we! may!
characterise!as!the!“collection!of!my!mental!states!appearing!in!inner!sense”!(Janaway,!Self!
and! World! in! Schopenhauer's! Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 102).! Thus,! Kant! here! takes! quite! a!
Humean! position! whereby! my! empirical! self! is! made! up! of! my! various! mental! states.!
However,! as! we! know! from! our! discussion! on! the! Transcendental! Deduction,! this!













he! recognises! that! the! Humean! view! of! the! empirical! self! requires,! or! presupposes,! a!
further! conception! of! the! self! as! that! which! unites! the! various! representations.!When! I!
introspect!through!inner!sense!all!I!find!are!my!various!perceptions,!none!of!which!include!
a! perception! of! a! pure! self.! Now,! for! someone! like! Hume,! the! self! would! be! exhausted!
through! these! characterisations,! or! these! bundles! or! heaps! of! perception! (Janaway,! Self!







of! all! perceptions! that! I! am! conscious! of! them”! (A122).! Importantly! for! Kant,! however,!
through!apperception!(and!later!the!synthetic!unity!of!apperception)!we!are!not!afforded!
any! knowledge! of! our! ‘selves’.! “In! the! synthetic! original! unity! of! apperception,! I! am!
conscious!not!as!I!appear!to!myself,!nor!as!I!am!in!myself,!but!only!that!I!am”!(B157).!Thus,!
original! apperception! is! not! a! conception! of! the! self! through!which! I! can! come! to! know!
myself,!but!it!is!rather!that!conception!of!a!self!which!must!obtain!in!order!for!there!to!be!
the! possibility! of! ordinary! experience! and! an! empirical! self.! We! can! now! see! the!
resemblance! between! this! conception! of! the! self! and! Schopenhauer’s! conception! of! the!
subject!as!that!which!knows!all!but!is!known!by!none.!!
With!these!conceptions!and!clarifications!of!what!the!terms!“subject”!and!“object”!
mean! for! Schopenhauer,! we! may! turn! to! his! criticism! of! Kant’s! alleged! misuse! of! the!
category!of!causality.!Following!the!latter,!Schopenhauer!subscribes!to!the!belief!that!our!
intellect! has! certain! forms! which! we! can! know! a2 priori! and! which! therefore! have! their!
90!
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source! in! us! and! we! bring! to! experience.76! But! whereas! Kant! would! argue! that! these!
determinations!are!space!and!time!as!the!forms!of!intuition,!and!the!twelve!categories!as!
the! forms! of! thought,! Schopenhauer! believes! that! there! are! only! three! such! a2 priori!
determinations.!He!retains!space!and!time!from!Kant;!in!fact,!the!absence!of!any!argument!
for!the!a2priori!nature!of!space!and!time!suggests!that!Schopenhauer!accepted!the!claims!
established! in! the! Aesthetic! as! evidently! true.77! Regarding! the! categories,! however,! he!
believed! that! Kant! was! too! concerned! with! the! architectonic! of! his! system! and! that!
consequently! eleven! of! the! twelve! categories!were! superfluous! and! could! be! jettisoned.!
The!only!one!which!had! to!be! retained!was! the! category!of! causality! (Gardiner,! 1963,! p.!
102)78.! The! divergence! between! these! views! is! not! as! important! for! Schopenhauer’s!
criticism!of!Kant,!as!is!their!mutual!agreement!over!the!category!of!causality!as!an!a2priori!
determination! of! experience.! But! precisely! because! it! is! an!a2 priori! category,! causality! is!
also! precluded! from! being! applied! to! the! realm! between! the! subject! and! the! object.!
Schopenhauer!gave!the!role!and!function!of!causality!in!experience!–!its!range!and!validity!
–!a!detailed!treatment!in!his!inaugural!dissertation!On2the2Fourfold2Root2of2the2Principle2of2
Sufficient2 Reason! (Fourfold2 Root).! There! he! distinguished! both! the! different! forms!which!






















objects,!which! in! turn! all! possess! this! property! as!well.79! But!we! also! know! that! another!
condition!of!something!being!known,!that!is,!a!condition!of!being!an!object,!is!that!there!be!
a!subject.! In!fact,!PSR!being!an!a2priori!determination!of!the!subject,!means!that! in!order!
for! it! to!have!applicability,!we!must! first!posit!a! subject;! this! subject!being! the!necessary!
presupposition! in! order! for! PSR! to! have! applicability.! To! phrase! it! differently,! PSR! is! a!
principle! which! is! applicable! to! objects,! and! any! object! already! assumes! that! there! is! a!
subject! who! is! cognizing! it.! But! this! should! suffice! to! demonstrate! why! PSR! cannot! be!





cannot! assign! causal! relations! to! that! (subject)! which! is! a! prerequisite! and! which! is!
presupposed! in! order! for! the! law! of! causality! to! have! applicability.! As! Schopenhauer!
phrases!it!in!WWR,!the!content!of!PSR!is!“something!that!belongs!to!the!object!as!such.!But!
the!object!as!such!always!presupposes!the!subject!as!its!necessary!correlate:!so!the!subject!




subject.!Once!again,! it! is! true! that!objects! can!affect! the! subject! insofar!as! the! subject! is!
considered!as!object.!Indeed,!the!subject!as!body!is!an!object!amongst!objects!and!just!as!it!








PSR! (it! is! in! fact! because2 it! cannot! be! known! [! i.e.! become! an! object]! that! it! cannot! be!
bound! by! PSR,! and! vice! versa).! ! It! is! noteworthy! that! Kant! had! argued! for! a! similar!
restriction!of!causality!(indeed!of!all!the!categories)!to!the!phenomenal!realm,!and!yet!their!
methods!for!achieving!this!diverged!significantly.!!
Kant’s! derivation! of! thingsXinXthemselves,! Schopenhauer! believes,! was! in! glaring!
opposition! to! this! truth! regarding! the! principle! of! sufficient! reason.! After! Jacobi! first!
highlighted! the! problem,!many! others,! including! Fichte,! J.S.! Beck,! and! Schulze,! criticized!
Kant!on!this!point!(Janaway,!Self!and!World!in!Schopenhauer's!Philosophy,!1989,!p.!71).!As!
Schopenhauer!puts!it:!!
“This!defect,!as!everyone!knows,! is! the!way!he!chose!to! introduce!the!thingXinXitself!–!an!
unacceptable!way,!as!was!demonstrated!extensively!by!G.!E.!Schulze!in!Aenesidemus,!and!
was! soon! acknowledged! as! the! untenable! point! of! his! system.! The! issue! can! be! clarified!
quite!briefly.!Although! the! fact!was!hidden!under!many! twists! and! turns,! Kant! grounded!
the!presupposition!of! the! thingXinXitself! in!an! inference!according! to! the! law!of! causality,!




The! problem! which! Schopenhauer! notes! is! perhaps! the! most! obstinate! and! potentially!
damaging!criticism!made!of!the!Kantian!philosophy.!Henry!Allison’s!assessment!of!it!is!that!
“Of!all! the!criticisms!that!have!been!raised!against!Kant’s!philosophy,!the!most!persistent!
concern! the! thingXinXitself,! particularly! the! notorious! claim! that! it,! or! the! transcendental!
object,! somehow! ‘affects’! the!mind”! (Allison,!2004,!p.!50).!The!most!blatant!assertion!by!
Kant!to!this!effect!is!found!at!the!start!of!the!Aesthetic2when!he!says:!“In!whatever!way!and!




This,! however,! takes! place! only! insofar! as! the! object! is! given2 to! us;! but! this! in! turn,! is!
possible!only!if!it!affect2the2mind!in!a!certain!way”!(A19/B33,!emphases!mine).80!!
! Jacobi! was! the! first! to! have! noticed! this! problem! with! Kant’s! derivation! of! the!
thingXinXitself.!But!more! than!merely!highlighting!an! inconsistency,! Jacobi!had!noted!how!
fundamental! this! inconsistency! was! for! the! whole! of! Kant’s! philosophy.! As! he! writes!
regarding! the! inference! to! thingsXinXthemselves! from! our! bodily! sensations! (via! an!
application!of! causality):! “‘Without! this! presupposition! I! could!not! enter! the! system,! and!
with!this!presupposition!I!could!not!remain!in!it’”!(Jacobi!quoted!in!Janaway,!1989,!p.!70).!





rather! that! it!grounds! or! has! some! form!of!affection! on! the! subject.! The! reason! for! this!
must!be! that! for!Kant! the!categories!govern! the!synthesis!of! sensible!data,!which! in! turn!
must!always!be!spatioXtemporal.!In!fact,!for!the!categories!to!have!a!real,!as!opposed!to!a!




















are! nonXspatioXtemporal! things! in! themselves! (A372),! thus! the! relation! cannot! be! a!
straightforward!causal!one.!!
However,! if! we! grant! that! Kant! is! not! illegitimately! extending! the! category! of!
causality! in! deriving! thingsXinXthemselves,! then! the! question! remains! what! exactly! he!
means!when!he! says! that! ‘something’,! in! itself,! grounds! appearances.! Simply! reXphrasing!
the! problem! as! one! about! affection! as! opposed! to! causality,! does! not! seem! enough! to!
defend! Kant.! In! fact,! Schopenhauer! is! fully! aware! that! Kant! does! not! claim! a! “causal”!
relation! between! thingsXinXthemselves! and! the! subject! but! sees! this,! rather,! as! an!
admission!of!guilt!by!Kant.!He!criticizes!Kant!for!implicitly!having!recognized!the!trespassing!
of! his! own! strictures! but! having! turned! a! blind! eye! to! it! and! attempted! to! hide! the!
illegitimacy!of!the!argument.!He!charges!Kant!with!dissimulating!the!error!in!his!argument!
by! “creep[ing]! around! the! issue”! (Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,! 2010,! p.! 475)! by! not! explicitly!
saying!that!thingsXinXthemselves!cause2appearances!but!rather!talking!about!the!“grounds!
of! appearances”! (Ibid.)! 82.! Thus,! the! question! is! how! we! are! to! think! this! nonXspatioX
temporal! ‘something’!which!is!supposed!to!be!the!ground!of!appearances.83!We!must!ask!
ourselves:!Does!it!make!any!sense!to!take!an!ordinary!empirical!object,!abstract!from!it!its!
colour,! hardness,! matter! (substance),! shape! (spatiality)! and! temporality! and! claim! that!
whatever!we!are!left!with,!somehow!‘affects’!us?!Regardless!of!how!we!are!to!think!of!this!
notion!of!‘affection’,!it!seems!as!though!that!which!we!are!meant!to!apply!it!to!is!a!vacuous!
nothing.! Allison,! not! uncharacteristically,! attempts! to! defend! Kant! against! the! charge! of!
incoherence! regarding! thingsXinXthemselves! by! saying! that! “the! cognitive! vacuity! of! a!














“one! bare! assurance! is! worth! just! as! much! as! another”! (Hegel,! 1977,! §76,! p.! 49).! But!
instead!of!leaving!our!position!as!a!bare!assertion!we!may!draw!attention!to!Kant’s!second!
argument! for! the! a2 priority! of! space.! There! Kant! claimed! that! insofar! as! one! wishes! to!
represent!any!outer!object,!“One!can!never!represent!that!there! is!no!space,! though!one!
can!very!well! think! that! there!are!no!objects! to!be!encountered! in! it”! (A25/B38X9).!Now,!






we! cannot! think! of! thingsXinXthemselves! as! the! grounds! of! appearances! since! the! term!
‘affection’!or!‘ground’,!however!these!are!to!be!understood,!could!never!be!applied!to!the!
vacuity! which! would! constitute! the! thingXinXitself.! Thus,! in! thinking! of! the! ground! of!
appearances,! we! in! fact! think! of! a! something! in! general! =! X,! which! is! to! say! the!
transcendental!object.85!But,! the!transcendental!object,!as! the!general!mark!of! truth,! is!a!











! We! may,! thus,! summarise! the! problem! as! follows:! If! in! thinking! the! ground! of!
appearances!we! think! of! the! transcendental! object,! Schopenhauer! is! certainly! correct! in!
that!this!involves!an!illegitimate!extension!of!the!category!of!causality!between!subject!and!
object! in! itself.! If,!on! the!other!hand,!Kant!wishes! to! stick!with! the!notion!of! ‘ground’!or!
‘affection’!because!the!thingXinXitself!is!meant!to!be!nonXspatioXtemporal,!we!may!question!
the! coherence! of! assigning! the! concept! of! ‘grounding’! to! a! vacuous! concept! such! as! the!
thingXinXitself.!!





from!the! first! to! the!second!edition! in!such!a!way! that!made!him!an! inconsistent! idealist!








































Schopenhauer! attempts! to! overcome! the! “overall! problem! of! the! relation! between!
phenomena! and! thingsXinXthemselves! which! haunts! Kant’s! philosophy! like! an! uneasy!
ghost”!through!an!analysis!of!the!two!ways!!in!which!we!can!know!our!own!bodies;!namely!
indirectly! as! representation! (object)! or!directly! as!Will! (thingXinXitself)! (Gardiner,! 1963,! p.!
58)88.!It!is!our!possession!of!this!twoXfold!knowledge!which!allows!us!to!know!ourselves!as!
thingXinXitself! and! yet! avoids! positing! any! causal! relation! between! ourselves! as!




















themselves.! What! we! are! interested! in,! and! what! matters! insofar! as! whether!
Schopenhauer! can! overcome! Jacobi’s! problem,! is! whether! he! can! account! for! the!
emergence!of! phenomena!without!positing! thingsXinXthemselves! as! the! grounds!of! these!
phenomena.!This!is!what!is!required!for!his!account!to!overcome!the!problem!at!stake,!and!
for!this!reason!we!must!consider!not!Schopenhauer’s!account!of!the!world!as!Will!but!his!




core! of! their! respective! philosophies,! then! at! least! to! the! foundation! upon! which! each!
builds!his!theory.! In!order!to!overcome!this!problem,!which!seems!both! inseparable!from!




lack! thereof! in! Schopenhauer’s! eyes,! between! intuitive! and! abstract! cognition.! “In! the!
Critique2of2Pure2Reason!we!are!constantly!confronted!with!Kant’s!major!and!fundamental!
mistake![…],! the!failure!to!distinguish!between!abstract,!discursive!cognition!and! intuitive!
cognition”! (Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 503).! It! is! in! his! account! of! the! difference!










intellect.! With! regards! to! intuitions,! and! the! corresponding! faculty! which! receives!
intuitions,! namely! sensibility,! Schopenhauer! is! more! or! less! in! agreement! with! Kant.90!




under! (pure! or! empirical)! concepts! through! the! act! of! making! judgments.! Furthermore,!
reason! is! the! faculty! of! drawing! inferences! (A131/B169).! On! Schopenhauer’s! account,!
however,! reason! is! the! faculty! which! deals! with! concepts,! and! the! understanding! has!
merely!one!function:!to!apply!the!law!of!causality!to!sensations!our!bodies!have!in!order!to!
infer!from!these!the!existence!of!an!object!outside!of!us.!“To!have!cognition!of!causality!is!
the!understanding’s! only! function,! its! single! capability”! (Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,! 2010,! p.!
32).!As!pointed!out!by!Janaway,!Schopenhauer!“retains!for!the!understanding!a!(conceptX
free)!role!in!empirical!intuition.!So!by!the!same!move,!empirical!cognition!is!purified!of!any!
taint! of! strictly! conceptual! thought”! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's!
Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 51).! Thus,! Schopenhauer! agrees!with! Kant! that!what! is! required! for!
experience! or! cognition! of! objects! is! both! sensibility! and! understanding,! but! his! revised!
roles!and!functions!of!the!understanding!mean!that!the!actual!requirements!for!experience!
to!emerge!vary!greatly! in! their! two!accounts.!What! Schopenhauer!wants! to! show! is! that!
there! is! a! level! of! consciousness,! which! he! calls! perception,! through! which! we! have! an!
awareness! and! consciousness! of! objects! which! is! nonXconceptual,! and! “although! his!









is! Schopenhauer’s! belief! in! the! possibility! and! actuality! of! this! minimal! form! of!
consciousness,!and!the!role!which!PSR!plays!therein,!which!creates!a!large!gulf!between!his!
account!of!experience!and!that!of!Kant.!!
Though!he! is! largely! silent!on! the! issue,! Schopenhauer! seems! to!agree!with!Kant!
that!our!intuitions!are!sensible!as!opposed!to!intellectual.!Perception!must!therefore!begin!
with! some! sensations! which! we! have! in! our! bodies.! From! this! sensation,! “the!
Understanding!grasps!the!given!sensation!of!the!body!as!an!effect!(a!word!comprehended!
only! by! the! understanding),! and! this! effect! as! such! must! necessarily! have! a! cause”!
(Schopenhauer,!On! the! Fourfold!Root! of! the!Principle! of! Sufficient!Reason,! 1974,! §21,! p.!




sufficient! reason! to! the! intuitive! sensations! to! infer! the! cause! of! the! sensation,! which!
leaves! the! subject!with! the! object! or! representation.! In! Schopenhauer’s! story,! then,! the!
inference! to! a! cause! of! our! sensations! is! precisely! the!mechanism!by!which!we! come! to!
experience!an!object.!The!inference!to!a!cause!of!our!sensations!is!not,!for!him,!intended!to!
imply!some!noumenal!origin!of!our!sensations!–!it!is!rather!an!inference!performed!by!the!
understanding,! on! its! way! to! giving! rise! to! objective! experience.! Schopenhauer! even!
charges! Kant! with! inconsistency! in! claiming! (a)! that! the! understanding! must! subsume!
intuitions!under!concepts!in!order!to!give!us!cognition!of!objects,!and!(b)!that!we!are!given!
an!object! in! intuition;!both!claims!made!by!Kant!at!A50/B74.!What!Kant!says!at!A50/B74!
makes! it!seem!as! if!he! is!both!affirming!and!denying!that!we!need!concepts!for!objective!
experience.!!




treatment! of! cognition! by! Kant! –! especially! the! latter’s! apparent! preference! for! abstract!
thought! over! intuitions.! Schopenhauer!was! concerned!with! trying! to! arrive! at! a! form! of!
cognition!and!experience!which!is!immediate!in!that!it!is!not!mediated!by!concepts.!He!saw!
concepts! as! derived! from! intuitions,! and! so! whereas! concepts! are! nothing! without!
intuitions,! intuitions! without! concepts! are! still! something! –! even! more,! Schopenhauer!
believes! they!amount! to! cognition!of!objects.!Against! this,! Schopenhauer!points!out! that!
Kant’s!account! favoured!abstract! thought!to!such!an!extent!that! it! reversed!this!arrow!of!
dependence! to! the! point! where! Kant! claimed! (at! B309)! that! though! intuitions! without!
concepts!are!empty,!concepts!without!intuitions!are!still!something!(Schopenhauer,!WWR!
1,!2010,!p.!503).91!Schopenhauer!proceeds! to!separate! intuitive! from!abstract!conceptual!
knowledge,! labeling! the! former! Erkenntnis,! which! we! may! call! ‘cognition’,! whereas! the!
latter! he! denotes! by! the! word! Wissen! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's!
Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 161).! However,! Schopenhauer’s! notion! of! Erkenntnis,! which! is!
supposed! to! be! a! form! of! immediate! nonXconceptual! knowledge,! is,! in! the! aftermath! of!
Kant’s!CPR,!in!serious!need!of!justification.!How!can!he!demonstrate!that!we!possess!such!a!
mode!of!cognition!of!objects?!Schopenhauer!believes!that!all!of!us!possess!such!cognition!
of! objects! in! our! everyday! dealings!with! the!world.! He! gives! the! example! of! a! practiced!
billiards! player! and! the! familiarity! which! he! possesses! of! “the! laws! concerning! the!
reciprocal! impact! of! elastic! bodies”! (Schopenhauer,!WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 80).! This! person’s!
cognition!of!the!impact!of!bodies!is!wholly!different!from!the!knowledge!which!the!scientist!











amount!of! force!etc.! in!order! to!pot! the!desired!ball.! If! the! scientist!was!given! the! same!
situation,!and!was!provided!with!the!relevant!data!(weight!of!the!billiard!balls,!angles,!etc.)!
he! could! calculate! the! proper! application! of! force! at! the! correct! angles,! etc.! required! in!
order!to!pot!the!ball!in!question.!However,!if!the!same!scientist!was!asked!to!attempt!the!
pot! he! would! undoubtedly! have! less! success! than! the! experienced! billiards! player.!
Furthermore,! Schopenhauer! believes! that! in! these! instances! abstract! theoretical!







tasks! and! the! way! in! which! we! know! certain! things! theoretically,! abstractly,! and!
conceptually.! This,! Schopenhauer! believes,! can! also! be! extended! to! our! experience! of!
causality,!whereby!we!can!draw!a!distinction!between!causality!as!a!concept!and!the!nonX
conceptual! role! which! causality! plays! in! perception! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in!
Schopenhauer's!Philosophy,!1989,!p.!163).!Kant!would!claim!that!experiencing!causality! is!







necessity! of! explicit! causal! judgments”! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's!
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Philosophy,! 1989,! pp.! 163X4).! However,! such! criticisms! seem! to!miss! the!mark!when!we!
consider!that!the!level!at!which!such!causal! judgments!are!required!by!Kant’s!theory!is! in!
transcendental! and! not! general! logic.! Kant’s! argument! would! not! be! susceptible! to! the!
claim!that!simply!because!I!do!not!make!an!explicit!causal!judgment!at!the!general!level,!I!
do! not! experience! the! world! as! being! causally! structured.! It! is! rather! that! whenever! I!
experience! causality,! my! nonGconceptual! intuitions! have! been! united! and! ordered!
judgmentally.92! What! Schopenhauer! is! referring! to! is! putting! concepts2 into! causal!
propositions,!which! is!what!we!may! say! science! does! or!what!we! do! in! determining! the!
specific! cause!of! this!or! that!event.! It! is!perhaps! true,!as! Janaway! says,! that! “for!all!Kant!
says,! an! explicit! judgment!must! occur! every! time! anyone!perceives! a! causal! connection”!
(Janaway,! Self! and!World! in! Schopenhauer's! Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 164),! but! this! is! not! a!
judgment! of! the! kind!we! find! in! general! logic;! it! is! not! something! of!which!we! are! ever!
conscious!and!it!must!not!be!equated!with!the!kind!of!causal!judgments!we!make!when!we!
discern!that!the!cause!of,!say,!the!red!billiard!ball!moving!was!the!cue!ball!striking!it;!these!
are!all!causal! judgments!made! in!a!world!already!constituted!and!organized!causally.! It! is!
rather! the! judgments! made! in! the! synthesis! of! our! nonGconceptual2 representations2
(intuitions)!of!which!we!have!no!empirical!awareness.!But,!it!should!also!be!noted!that!this!
counter!argument!only!has!force!against!the!claim!that!we2(i.e.!humans)!need!to!be!making!
explicit! causal! judgments! to! experience! causality.! The! same! argument! regarding! unifying!
appearances! judgmentally! at! the! transcendental! level! cannot! be! made! for! the! case! of!
animals.!The!reason!for!this!is!that!Kant!derived!the!categories!(which!govern!unification!of!
appearances)! from! the! logical! functions! of! judgment! (which! govern! unification! of!
concepts).!Thus,!although!to!experience!causality!one!does!not!need!to!be!making!explicit!








(hypothetical)! judgments! is! a! precondition! for! being! able! to! synthesise! nonXconceptual!




I! have! attempted! in! this! chapter! to! demonstrate! two! central! issues! on! which!
Schopenhauer’s!account!of!cognition!of!objects!diverges!from!that!of!Kant’s.!To!this!end,!I!
first! explored! Schopenhauer’s! criticism! of! Kant’s! derivation! of! thingsXinXthemselves,!








we! found!a!much!more!glaring!divergence!between! the! two!philosophers!–!namely,! that!
Schopenhauer! thought! what! many! would! consider! Kant’s! most! important! discovery! in!



























respective! epistemologies.! I! will! now! turn! to! assess! the! coherence! of! Schopenhauer’s!
theory! as! presented! in! Chapter! 4.! Two! specific! issues! will! be! addressed:! firstly! whether!
Schopenhauer’s! account! of! the! role! of! causality! in! experience! overcomes! the! problem!
which! Jacobi! noted! in! the! Kantian! system,! and,! secondly,! whether! his! theory! of! the!
possibility! of! nonXconceptual! knowledge! is! sound.! I! will! take! each! issue! in! turn! and! will!
attempt! to! show! how! on! both! points! Schopenhauer! fails! in! securely! grounding! his!
arguments.!Finally,!I!will!turn!to!consider!the!difference!between!Schopenhauer!and!Kant’s!
accounts!of!the!veridical!status!of!the!empirical!world.!Whereas!we!found,!in!Part!One,!that!
Kant’s! position! is! relatively! straight! forward,! Schopenhauer! seems! to! be! indecisive! as! to!
what! kind! of! reality! can! be! assigned! to! the! empirical!world.! For! our! purposes,! it!will! be!








between! subject! and! object?! This! is! a! question! which! Schopenhauer! considers! in! §5! of!
WWR!and!to!which!he!believes!he!has!an!answer.!He!responds!to!the!possible!objection!by!
claiming!that!any!such!inference!from!sensations!of!changes!in!our!bodies!to!the!positing!of!
causality!between!subject!and!object! is! invalid! (Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,!2010,!p.!34).! It! is!
furthermore! the!assumption!of! the! validity!of! such!positing!which!has! led! to! the!dispute!
over! the!existence!of! the!external!world.!Schopenhauer!presents! the! issue!as!one!whose!
two! camps! have! been! dogmatism! and! skepticism.! Dogmatism! assumes! a! causal! relation!
between! object! and! subject;! it! first! appears! as! realism! which! assumes! that! the! object!
affects! the! subject! and! later! as! idealism! (Schopenhauer! has! Fichte! in! mind! here)! which!
assumes!that!the!subject!affects!the!object,!or!that!the!object! is!derived!from!the!subject!
(Ibid.).!Opposed!to!this!camp!there!is!skepticism!which!attempts!to!bring!the!reality!of!the!
whole! of! the! external! world! under! question! by! claiming! that! if! the! law! of! causality! is!
derived! from! experience,! its! application! to! account! for! the! emergence! of! experience! is!
illegitimate!(Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,!2010,!p.!35).!Schopenhauer’s!answer!to!this!problem!is!
that! all! previous! philosophies! have! started! out! either!with! the! object! or! the! subject! and!
have! tried! to! derive! one! from! the! other! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's!
Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 153).! Any! such! derivation! must! furthermore! be! according! to! PSR!
meaning! that!both! sides! rely!on!a!principle!which!has!no!applicability!within! the!domain!
which!it!is!being!applied.!Schopenhauer!instead!claims!that!“the!object!always!presupposes!








subject,!that! it!can!be!anything!at!all,! let!alone!that! it!can!be!something!which!has!causal!
powers! over! the! subject.! The! problem! with! dogmatism! is! that! it! separates! object! from!
representation! and! assumes! that! the! object! somehow! exists! beyond,! behind,! or!
independently! of! the! representation! and,! as! such,! causes! the! representation.!
Schopenhauer’s! view,! on! the! other! hand,! is! that! to! be! an! object! means! to! be! a!
representation!and!that!there!is!only!an!object!insofar!as!it!is!someone’s!representation.!!
Despite!his! treatment!of! the! issue,! there!still! lurks!a! feeling! that!Schopenhauer! is!
not!quite!addressing!the!problem!at!stake.! If!we!go!back!to!Kant,!we!find!that!one!of!the!
ways! in!which!he!arrived!at!the!thought!of!thingsXinXthemselves!was!through!the!thought!
of! a! something! which! must! ground! our! intuitions! or! that! which! is! given! to! us.!
Schopenhauer!raises!this!exact!point!(Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,!2010,!p.!463)!and!claims!that!
Kant!did!this!in!order!to!avoid!being!assimilated!to!Berkeley.!But!the!demand!for!a!ground!
of! appearances! is! a! direct! result! of! the! fact! that! sensibility! is! receptive! rather! than!





intellectual! seems! fairly! uncontroversial! because! of! the! separation! between! the! acts! of!
thinking!and!perceiving,!and!how!we!cannot!force!or!bring!about!a!perception!through!our!
mere! thinking! of! an! object.!Moreover,! if! we! indeed! did! have! intellectual! intuition! there!
would! be! nothing! unknowable! about! thingsXinXthemselves,! for! there! would! be! no!
mediation! between! things! as! they! are! in! themselves! and! how! they! are! determined!
according! to! the! a2 priori! determinations! of! our! intellect.! If! our! intuition! then! is! indeed!
sensible! and! receptive,! we! are! left! with! the! thought! that! something! must! affect! our!
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sensibility! which! causes! us! to! have! intuitions.! The! questions! to! be! considered! then! are:!





alone! does! not! suffice! to! give! us! objective! experience! (which! is! basically! equivalent! to!
denying! that! we! have! intellectual! intuition)! he! claims! that! the! understanding! cannot! be!
applied! “without! some!other! thing! as! a! starting! point”! (Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,! 2010,! p.!
41).!This!other!thing,!he!calls,!pure!sensation,!which!is!the!immediate!awareness!we!have!
of! changes! in! our! bodies! –! namely! the! raw!material! or! data! to!which! the! understanding!
applies!PSR!and!gives!rise!to!experience!of!an!object.!Thus,!the!precondition!for!there!to!be!
any! intuition!and! therefore!experience!of!objects,! is! the!“ability!of!bodies! to!act!on!each!
other! and! bring! about! alterations! in! each! other”! (Ibid.).! As! Janaway! says,! Schopenhauer!
indeed! “equates! sensation! with! our! organs! being! affected”! (Janaway,! Self! and!World! in!
Schopenhauer's!Philosophy,!1989,!p.!157).!Regarding!intuitions,!Schopenhauer!writes!that!
they!would! never! be! possible! “if!we!were! not! immediately! acquainted!with! some! effect!
that!could!serve!as!a!starting!point:!but!there!are!in!fact!such!effects!on!the!animal!body”!
(Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 32).! This! statement! puts! beyond! all! doubt! that!
Schopenhauer! took! our! intuitions! to! be! sensible.! It! is! true! that! in! the! same! passage! he!
claims!“all!intuition!is!intellectual”!(Ibid.).!However,!what!Schopenhauer!has!in!mind!here!is!
something! wholly! different! from! what! Kant! means! by! intellectual! intuition.! What!
Schopenhauer! is! pointing! out! here! is! that! according! to! his! theory! all! that! is! needed! for!
experience!of!objects! is! intuition!and!the! law!of!causality!applied!to!these! intuitions;!that!
we!do!not!need! concepts! for!experience!and! that! the! combination!of! intuitions!with! the!
understanding’s!application!of!PSR!gives!us!a!state!of!consciousness!of!objects.!This!state!of!
consciousness! of! objects! is! what! Schopenhauer! calls! perception! and! he! calls! intuitions!
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intellectual! because! the! understanding! is! already! involved! in! our! intuitive! cognition!
(Erkenntnis)!of! the!world.!He!does!not!mean!by!this! that!we!have! intellectual! intuition! in!
the! sense! that! Kant! spoke! about! it.! This! probably! also! explains! why! immediately! after!
saying! that! ‘all! intuition! is! intellectual’! he! continues! with! the! quote! provided! above,!
regarding! the! necessity! of! effects! on! animal! bodies.! Thus,! we! can! safely! conclude! that!
Schopenhauer’s! account! of! our! intuitions! is! that! they! are! sensible! in! nature! and! not!
intellectual.! Now,! we! must! turn! to! see! whether! his! commitment! to! our! possession! of!
sensible!intuition!can!be!maintained!without!the!reliance!on!thingsXinXthemselves?!
An! immediate! question!which! arises!when!we! consider! Schopenhauer’s! quote! about!
the! effect! on! animal! bodies! is:! “what! causes! that! ‘effect! on! animal! bodies’! which!
Schopenhauer! equates! with! sensation! [?]”! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's!









cannot! account! for! that! which! gave! rise! to! the! sensations! (which! in! turn! give! us! an!
empirical! object)! through! the! positing! of! an! empirical! object! as! the! cause! of! these!
sensations?! Schopenhauer! seems! to!be! assuming! the! existence!of! an! empirical! object! as!











out! of! this! circularity! by! drawing! a! distinction! between! empirical! object! and! objective!
representation!(Janaway,!Self!and!World!in!Schopenhauer's!Philosophy,!1989,!p.!159).!This!
way,! he! could! claim! that! empirical! objects! which! exist! in! space! and! time! prior! to! all!
experience! cause! sensations! in! us! (Ibid.).! The! problem! with! this,! of! course,! is! that!




organs”! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's! Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 166).!





be! illegitimate.! But! he! seems! to! forget! how! dependent! his! own! philosophy! is! on! the!
possibility! of! something! being! an! ‘object’,! ‘entity’,! ! or! ‘thing’,! without! or! before! it! is! an!
object! of! cognition;! this! is! precisely! a! result! of! his! commitment! to! our! intuitions! being!
sensible.! He! seems! caught! in! the! inevitable,! and! seemingly! insurmountable,! difficulty! of!
claiming! that! we! need! intuitions! in! order! to! have! an! object,! that! our! intuitions! require!











solipsist! position! consists! in! “its! denial! that! appearances! are! appearances! of! something!
existing!in!itself”!(Janaway,!Self!and!World!in!Schopenhauer's!Philosophy,!1989,!p.!150).!But!
if!Schopenhauer!is!genuinely!wedded!to!this!claim,!it!puts!him!in!a!very!difficult!position!for!










account! of! the! conditions! of! the! possibility! of! experience.! Unlike! Kant,! Schopenhauer!
believes! that! minimal! experience! is! possible! without! the! use! of! concepts! and! that! in!
ordinary! cognition! (Erkenntnis)! of! the! world! we! in! fact! operate! nonXconceptually.! In!
Chapter!4!we!considered!the!roles!and!functions!of! the!different! faculties!of! the! intellect!










and! that! his! examples! rest! on! a! conflation! of! theoretical/scientific! knowledge! and! nonX
conceptual! knowledge.! However,! I! shall! also! argue! that! there! is! a! sense! in! which!
Schopenhauer’s!claim!regarding!the!possibility!of!nonXconceptual!cognition!may!have!some!
validity,!though!its!scope!is!more!limited!than!he!suggests.!








that! the! latter,! therefore,! have! more! independent! reality! than! the! former! is! found!
throughout!WWR.!We!find!quite!early!in!Book!1,!for!example,!that!Schopenhauer!describes!




64).! Schopenhauer! does,! however,! acknowledge! that! the! cognitive! ground! for! a! concept!
may!be!another!concept,!but!that!this!regression!cannot!go!on!indefinitely;!at!some!point!
the! concept!must!be! related! to! an! intuition! from!which! it! derives! its! content.!Of! course,!
nothing!which!has!been!said!so!far!contradicts!Kant.!Kant!would!also!agree!that!concepts!
must!at!some!point!relate!to!intuitions;!the!question!then!is!what!we!are!to!make!of!Kant’s!











kind! is!possible,!which,!however,!we!are!by!no!means! justified! in!doing”!(B309).! It!should!
first! be! noted! that! in! WWR,! Schopenhauer! presents! Kant’s! statement! as! being! about!
empirical,! not! pure,! concepts.! This! is! clear! from!when!he! says! that! concepts! are! derived!
and!abstracted!from!empirical! intuitions!by!omitting!all! that! is! inessential! to!the! intuition!




be! used! by! itself! to! cognize! any! objects.! Kant! does! claim! that! pure! concepts! without!
intuitions! are! something,! but,! that! they! merely! constitute! contentless! form! which,! by!
themselves,! can! never! determine! an! object.! The! form! of! thought! exists! regardless! of!
whether!content!fills!the!form!or!not.!It!is!true!that!form!must!have!content!in!order!for!us!
to! have! cognition! of! an! object,! but! what! Kant! seems! to! be! saying! is! that! the! forms! of!
thought! which! order! any! content! must! be! present! in! the! understanding! prior! to! the!
content!being!added.!A!second!point! to!be!raised!against!Schopenhauer! in!this! respect! is!
that! in!the!same!section!of!CPR! (Phenomena!and!Noumena)!as!that!which!Schopenhauer!
quotes,!Kant!in!fact!goes!so!far!as!to!say!that!the!categories!have!less!significance!than!the!






! Let!us!now!consider! Schopenhauer’s! account!of! the!possibility!of!nonXconceptual!
cognition.! The! problem!with! Schopenhauer’s! account,! I! believe,! is! a! conflation! between!
nonXconceptual! knowledge! and! theoretical/scientific! knowledge.! Schopenhauer! seems! to!
assume!that!not!possessing!theoretical/scientific!knowledge!of!something!implies!knowing!
something!nonXconceptually!–!a!conflation!which!I!believe!is!both!unfounded!and!accounts!
for! Schopenhauer’s! use! of! somewhat! odd! examples! in! support! of! his! arguments.! As!
Janaway! claims,! Schopenhauer! believes! that! perception! is! “nonXconceptual,! nonX
propositional,!nonXjudgmental,!nonXlanguageXdependent,!non!theoretical”!but!that!there!is!
no! reason! to! treat! all! these! as! entailing! one! another! (Janaway,! Self! and! World! in!
Schopenhauer's!Philosophy,!1989,!p.!163).!This!conflation!by!Schopenhauer!is!visible!in!the!
two!examples!we!considered!earlier! regarding!a!practiced!billiards!player’s! knowledge!of!
elastic! bodies! compared! to! that! of! a! scientist,! or! again! my! own! lack! of! theoretical!
knowledge!about!the!angle!at!which!I!need!to!press!my!razor!against!my!face,!despite!the!
relative! ease! with! which! I! do! this! intuitively.! It! is! true! that! we! possess! theoretical!
knowledge!of! things! through! concepts,! and! that! such!knowledge! is! a!product!of!drawing!




presented.! Furthermore,! this! unification! of! the! manifold! of! intuition! under! conceptual!
forms!must! occur! judgmentally;! I! must,! for! example,! be! able! to! think! of! whatever! I! am!
being!presented!with!as!a!substance!in!which!accidents!inhere!(at!the!transcendental!level).!
This!does!not,!however,!imply!that!I!possess!theoretical!knowledge!of!my!object.!Rather,!it!
means! that!without! such! concept!application,! I!would!merely!be! confronted!with!a!wide!







array! of! sensations! wholly! incapable! of! being! delineated! and! classified! into! separate!




able! to!posit! the!book!as! the! cause!of! the! sensations!of! red,! squareness,! etc.,! and! judge!
that!the!sensations!of!dark!brown!next!to!the!red!(say!the!spine!of!the!book)!are!included!
in! the!object!whereas! the! light!brown!colour! (the! table)!engulfing!both! the! red!and!dark!
brown! is! part! of! another2 object! which! is! causing! sensations! in! me?! How! could! such!
delineation! be! possible! unless! we! subsumed! intuitions! under! concepts! in! our! ordinary!
experience?! We! may! turn! this! reflection! to! Schopenhauer’s! example! of! the! practiced!
billiards! player.! Just! because! the! billiards! player! does! not! know! the! laws! of! mechanics!
governing! the!movement!of!bodies!does!not!mean! that!he! is!operating!nonXconceptually!
when! he! plays! a! game! of! billiards.! For! example,! if! the! billiards! player! was! genuinely!
operating! nonXconceptually,! how! could! he! know! which! ball! was! the! cue! ball! and! which!
ones! the! balk! colours.! Even! more! minimally,! he! would! not! even! know! where! the! ball!
finished!and!where!the!table!or!cloth!began.!Implicit!in!Schopenhauer’s!position!seems!to!
be! the!assumption! that! the!world!present! itself!as!already!delineated!and!separated! into!
individuated!objects;!a!position!which!seems!more!of!a!retreat!to!an!empiricist!account!of!
experience!than!a!transcendental!one.!Likewise,!the!billiard!player’s!acquaintance!with!the!
movement! of! bodies! seems! more! like! knowledge! through! acquaintance! than! nonX
conceptual!knowledge.!In!order!to!have!this!intuitive!knowledge,!as!Schopenhauer!calls!it,!
it!would!seem!the!player!must!still! function!with!concepts!(such!as!that!of!ball,!hardness,!
elasticity,! straight! line,!etc.)!but! that!he!has! learnt! the!behaviour!of!what! these!concepts!
apply! to! through! repeated! practice! and! never! formally! deduced! the! quantitative! laws!





! The! disagreement! between! Kant! and! Schopenhauer! on! the! role! of! concepts! in!




we! are! presented!with! an! object.! Schopenhauer! says:! “What! the! eye,! the! ear,! the! hand!
senses! is!not!an! intuition:! it! is!merely!data.!Only!when! the!understanding!proceeds! from!
the! effect! back! to! the! cause! is! the! world! present! in! intuition”! (Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,!
2010,! p.! 33).! That! Schopenhauer! says! that! the! world! is! present! in! intuition! is! highly!
supportive!of!Guyer’s!claim!for!it!indicates!that!Schopenhauer!thought!that!we!are,!at!the!
level! of! intuitions,! conscious! of! a! world! of! objects.! This! goes! back! to! Schopenhauer’s!





!“Our! cognition! arises! from! two! logical! sources! in! the! mind,! the! first! of! which! is! the!
reception!of!representations![…]!the!second!the!faculty!for!cognizing!an!object!by!means!of!
these!representations![…];!through!the!former!an!object!is!given!to!us,!through!the!latter!it!






!Admittedly,! this! passage!may!make! it! seem!as! if! Schopenhauer’s! criticism! is! correct! and!
that!Kant!is!assuming!that!at!the!level!of!intuitions!we!have!a!certain!form!of!consciousness!
of! objects!which! then! through! being! subsumed!under! concepts! gives! rise! to! some!other!
form! of! consciousness! of! objects!which! Kant! calls! cognition! (Guyer,! 1999,! p.! 116).! Thus,!
Schopenhauer!seems!to!equate!intuitions!having!PSR!applied!to!them!with!perceptions!and!
takes!perception!to!be!a!state!in!which!we!have!some!form!of!consciousness!of!objects.!We!
must! admit! that! Kant’s! wording! in! this! passage! is! rather! unfortunate! and! potentially!
confusing,!but!when!Kant!says!that!through!intuitions!an!object!is!given!to!us,!he!does!not!
mean!that!we!have!consciousness!of!it!as!an!object.!His!point!is!in!fact!far!simpler!and!all!it!
amounts! to! is! the! claim! that! the! raw!material! required! for! us! to! experience! an!object! is!
provided!us!from!without!in!intuitions!(through!the!affection!of!our!sensibility)!–!a!position!
which! we! have! shown! that! Schopenhauer! himself! must! wholly! agree! with.! We! do! not,!
according! to!Kant,! have!any! form!of! consciousness!of! an!object! through!mere! intuitions.!
Rather,! any! form! of! consciousness,! experience,! or! cognition!which!we! have! of! an!object!
already! presupposes! the! unification!of! intuitions! under! concepts;! or! to! put! it! differently,!
“our! conscious! recognition! of! any! object! already! involves! a! synthesis! of! intuitions! in!
accordance!with!concepts”!(Guyer,!1999,!p.!115).!!!
! Despite!the!preceding!counterXcriticism!of!Schopenhauer,!I!believe!there!still!seems!
to!be!something!both!valid!and!highly! interesting!about!what!he! is!drawing!attention! to.!
However,! it! is! my! contention! that! the! alleged! nonXconceptual! knowledge! which,! for!
example,!the!billiards!player!possesses!is!not!regarding!outer!objects,!but!rather!regarding!
his!own!body.!Thus,!I!believe!that!it!is!in!Schopenhauer’s!account!of!the!world!as!Will,!that!
is,! his! account! of! our! acquaintance!with!our! own!bodies,!where! Schopenhauer! seems! to!
have!a!very!strong!case!for!a!nonXconceptual!element2being!present!in!ordinary!experience!
–! ordinary! experience! itself! being! predominantly! conceptual.!We!may,! for! example,! ask:!
why!is!it!that!the!scientist,!despite!possessing!all!the!relevant!theoretical!knowledge!about!






amount!of! force!to! the!cue!ball!unless! I!know!what!n2amounts! to! in! terms!of!how!hard! I!
actually!hit! the!cue!ball.!Thus,! it!seems!that! it! is! the!acquaintance!we!have!with!our!own!
bodies,!or!more!specifically,!the!acquaintance!we!have!with!‘force’!through!the!movements!
of! our! own! bodies! which! appears! to! elude! the! traditional! classification! of! conceptual!
experience.97! Importantly,! however,! I! believe! that! such! experience! of! our! own! bodies,!
which! we! may! be! tempted! to! label! nonXconceptual,! is! not! in! some! sense! primary! to!
conceptual! experience;! it! rather!presupposes,2and! is!premised2 on,! a!world! of! conceptual!
outer!objects.!The!billiards!player!who!is!deciding!on!how!hard!to!strike!the!cue!ball,!and!
how!much! force! to! apply! to! his! bridging! hand! to!maintain! it! steady,!makes! his! decision!
based!on!being!presented!with!a!billiards! table,! a! cloth!of! a! certain! texture,!billiard!balls!
that! have! a! certain! shape! and! weight,! etc.! Thus,! he! finds! himself! in! a! conceptually!
determined!world!wherein!an!aspect!of!his!acquaintance!with!his!own!body! is,! arguably,!
nonXconceptual.! It! is! not,! however,! the! case,! as! Schopenhauer! claims,! that! the! world! is!
most!minimally,!or!originally,!presented!to!us!as!being!nonXconceptual.!!
To! summarize,!we! find! that! Schopenhauer’s! attempted! revision!of! Kant! has! failed! to!
engender!a!viable!coherent!alternative! theory! to! that!of! the! former.!Even!commentators!
sympathetic! to! Schopenhauer’s! enterprise! seem! to! disagree! with! Schopenhauer! on! his!
criticism!of!Kant! regarding! the!possibility!of!nonXconceptual!knowledge.!As! Janaway!says:!
“according!to!Schopenhauer,!there!can!be!entirely!conceptXfree!presentation!to!the!mind!
of! a! particular! or! collection! of! particulars! –! a! view! that! is! open! to! the! objection! that!










(Janaway,! Self! and! World! in! Schopenhauer's! Philosophy,! 1989,! p.! 165).! The! idea! that!
without!concepts!we!can!never!have!cognition!of!any!particular!is!also!found!in!the!writings!
of!Schopenhauer’s!contemporary!and!philosophical!archXrival,!Hegel.!In!the!first!chapter!to!
his!Phenomenology2of2 Spirit,!Hegel! attempts! to! show!how!nonXconceptual! cognition!of! a!
particular!inevitably!and!invariably!leads!to!cognition!of!a!universal!–!a!position!much!more!
in! line!with! Kant’s! than! Schopenhauer’s.98! However,! we! also! found! that! Schopenhauer’s!
position! did! seem! to! have! some! plausibility! with! regards! to! our! knowledge! of! our! own!
bodies,! and! that! he!may!be! viewed!here! as! a! forerunner! for! later! debates! in! philosophy!
regarding! the! possibility! of! nonXconceptual! experience.99!One! person,! in! particular,! upon!
whom! Schopenhauer’s! analysis! of! nonXconceptual! cognition! is! thought! to! have! made! a!
significant! influence,! is! Nietzsche.! However,! as! we! consider! Nietzsche’s! early! notebook!
writings,!we!will! see! that! on! this! very! issue!Nietzsche! seems! to! hold! a! far!more! Kantian!








The! last! issue! to! consider! is! the! difference! between! Kant! and! Schopenhauer’s! views! on!
empirical!reality.!The!question!which!I!wish!to!consider!is:!what!exactly!are!Schopenhauer’s!
views!regarding!the!reality!of!the!world!as!appearance,!or,!what!is!the!same,!the!empirical!







if!we! recollect,!was! that!empirical! reality,! though!a! reality!which! consists!wholly! in!being!
phenomenal,! that! is! appearance,! is! not! on! that! account! illusory! in! any! sense.! Empirical!
reality!is!simply!necessarily!the!way!objects!must!be!if!they!are!to!be!objects!for!us!at!all.!
Kant!did!not!wish!to!devalue!our!empirical!knowledge!of!the!world!in!any!way;!in!fact,!the!
CPR! is,! along! with! other! purposes,! intended! to! vindicate! the! certainty! of! scientific!
knowledge! –! not! undermine! it.! We! must! now! turn! to! Schopenhauer! to! see! what! he!
believes!are!the!consequences!of!transcendental!idealism.!What!is!interesting!in!the!case!of!
Schopenhauer!is!that!we!find!him!both!endorsing!and!objecting!to!Kant’s!view!of!the!reality!
of! the! empirical! world! and! it! leaves! Schopenhauer! with! a! rather! ambivalent! attitude!
towards!the!type!of!reality!assigned!to!the!world!of!appearance.!
! We!may!begin!by!considering!passages!where!Schopenhauer!seems!to!very!much!





of! causality.! This! is! its! empirical! reality”! (Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 36).!
Schopenhauer! is!highlighting!here! that! the!world,!or,!what! is! the!same,!objects,! can!only!




and! simply! the!way! that! objects!must2 be! if! they! are! to! be! objects! for! us.! Thus,! it!would!
make!little!sense!from!this!perspective!to!claim!that!these!objects!are!illusory,!if!their!‘true’!
being!is,!through!the!very!requirements!of!cognition,!unknowable.!“On!the!purely!objective!
path,!we!never!attain! to! the! inner!nature!of! things,!but! if!we!attempt! to! find! their! inner!
nature! from! outside! and! empirically,! this! inner! always! becomes! an! outer! in! our! hands”!
121!
!
(Schopenhauer,! WWR! 2,! 1958,! pp.! 273X4).! It! should! first! be! noted! that! given!
Schopenhauer’s! disagreement! with! Kant! regarding! the! latter’s! way! of! arriving! at! the!
thought! of! thingsXinXthemselves! as! the! grounds! of! appearances,! this! seems! a! rather! odd!
position! for! Schopenhauer! to! hold.! The! quote! indicates! that! he! believes! appearances! to!
have!an!‘inside’!which!would!constitute!their!essence!as!thingsXinXthemselves.!Regardless,!
it! is! straightforward! enough! to! discern!what! he! intends.!What! Schopenhauer! is! drawing!
attention! to! is! that! as! soon!as!we!wish! to! know,!or! even! think,! thingsXinXthemselves,!we!
inevitably! end! up! doing! so! through! our! cognition! which! separates! us! from! what! things!
would! be! like! in! and! of! themselves.! Thus,! he! says! that! as! soon! as!we!wish! to! know! the!
inside!of!things,!this!inside!turns!under!our!hands,!into!an!outside!again!(Ibid.)!implying!that!




which,! I! believe,! are!worth!mentioning.! Firstly,! we! should! note! that! once! Schopenhauer!
locates!the!Will!as!the!essence!of!the!world,!he!argues!that!because!in!the!noumenal!realm!





the! noumenal! realm! (Guyer,! 1999,! p.! 106)! –! a! position! which! is! marred! by! difficulty.!
Secondly,! the!knowledge!we!have!of!ourselves!as!Will! is!always!governed!by! inner! sense!
and!therefore!mediated!by!time,!which!means!that!it!is!still!knowledge!within!the!realm!of!





“the! thinnest! of! veils”! (Janaway,! Self! and!World! in! Schopenhauer's! Philosophy,! 1989,! p.!
196)100;!a!position!which!is!susceptible!to!far!more!objections.!!
If!we!return!to!our!original!quote!from!WWR!section!5,!we!may!however!see!why!
Schopenhauer! adheres! to! the! Kantian! claim! that! the! world! is! necessarily! appearance.!
Further!down!on!the!same!page!he!continues:!“The!entire!world!of!objects!is,!and!remains,!
representation;! and! precisely! because! of! this,! it! is! and! will! always! be! thoroughly!




he! seems! to! take! up! a! completely! contrary! position.! Unlike! Kant,! who! maintained! that!





now!withdraw!his! other! statement!which! says! that! the!world! “presents! itself! completely!
and! without2 reserve! as! representation”! (Ibid.,! my! emphases).! For! clearly,! we! have! a!
situation! where! the! world,! putatively,! presents! itself! as! thingXinXitself! (or! at! least! so!
Schopenhauer! seems! to! claim).! Schopenhauer! could! be! ridded! of! this! seeming!




this! knowledge! is! knowledge! which! the! subject! has! of! himself! as! subject,! then!





world! but! rather! its! necessary! correlate.! There! are! even! times! when! he! seems! close! to!
adopting!this!position!but!stops!short.101!Three!problems!arise!with!this!position.!The!first!is!
that!it!is!quite!unclear!what!it!would!mean!for!the!subject!to!know!itself!as2subject.!At!least!
within! Schopenhauer’s! definitions! of! subject,! object,! cognition,! etc.! one! could! perhaps!





will! is! nonetheless! mediated! by! time! meaning! that! it! is! still! knowledge! of! the! world! of!
appearance.!Taking!these!points!together,!it!seems!that!Schopenhauer!cannot!consistently!
maintain!that!the!world!is!always!representation!and!that!there!is!a!way!through!which!we!
can! access! the! thingXinXitself.! However,! consistent! or! not,! Schopenhauer! does! maintain!
both!positions,!and!he!claims!that,!because!of!the!possibility!of!knowledge!of!the!thingXinX
itself,! our! ordinary! experience! (whether! ordinary! cognition! or! abstract! knowledge)! is! in!
some!sense! illusory.! In! fact,!he!opens!his!discussion!on!Kant! in! the!Appendix! to!WWR!by!
comparing!what! Kant! discovered! to! the! teachings! of! Plato,! namely! that! “this!world! that!
appears!to!the!senses!does!not!have!true!being,!but!is!instead!only!an!incessant!becoming,!
it! is! and! is! not,! and! apprehending! it! does! not! involve! cognition! so! much! as! delusion”!
(Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,! 2010,! p.! 445).!He! goes!on! to! locate! the!presence!of! this! line!of!
thought!in!eastern!philosophy!as!well,!such!as!the!Vedas!and!the!Puranas!where!the!world!











that! covers! the! eyes! of!mortals! and! lets! them! see! a! world! that! cannot! be! described! as!
either!being!or!not!being:!for!it!is!like!a!dream;!like!sunlight!reflected!off!sand!that!a!distant!
traveler! mistakes! for! water,! or! like! a! discarded! rope! that! the! traveler! thinks! is! a! snake!
(Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 28).! What! is! interesting! about! this! passage! is! that!
Schopenhauer! is! describing! empirical! reality! in! exactly! the! kind! of! vocabulary! that! Kant!
would! use! to! describe! empirical! illusion.! He! compares! the! status! of! our! knowledge! of!
empirical!objects!to!that!of!a!mirage.!What!is!more!is!that!he!even!seems!to!claim!that!this!
is!the!lesson!of!the!Kantian!philosophy!and!its!greatest!value.!Back!in!the!Appendix!he!says!
that! “This! sort! of! knowledge! and! calm,! levelXheaded! presentation! of! the! dreamXlike!
constitution!of!the!whole!world!is!really!the!basis!for!the!whole!of!Kant’s!philosophy,!it!is!its!
soul! and! its! very! greatest! merit”! (Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,! 2010,! p.! 446).! Kant! would!
undoubtedly!protest!against!this!characterization!of!his!philosophy,!and!rightly!so.!Despite!
his! thorough! acquaintance! with! Kant,! Schopenhauer’s! quote! seems! rather! similar! to!
Garve’s! review! of! CPR! whereby! Kant’s! transcendental! idealism! was! assimilated! to! the!
common!conception!of!Berkeley’s! idealism.!But!Schopenhauer!was!extremely!well!versed!
in!Kant’s!philosophy!and!his!claims!regarding!the!illusory!status!of!empirical!reality!cannot!
have! been! down! to! lack! of! insight! or! knowledge! of! Kant,! as! becomes! evident!when! one!
compares!these!statements!to!those!at!WWR!1,!§5,!p.!36!where!he!seemingly!affirms!the!
reality!of!the!empirical!world!(quoted!above).!It!seems!that!Schopenhauer’s!talk!about!the!





the! will! as! thingXinXitself! in! the! realm! of! ethics! and! morality! which! guides! him! to! such!





speculative! and! remains! outside! the! scope! and! intentions! of! the! present! work.!What! is!
clear,!however,!is!that!Schopenhauer!does!not!succeed!in!reaching!this!position!through!a!
systematic! and! coherent! criticism! of! certain! deficiencies! in! Kant’s! philosophy.!Whatever!





in! certain! fundamental! respects.! Specifically,! Schopenhauer! presents! an! account! of!
experience! which! attempts! to! overcome! Kant’s! problematic! inference! to! thingsXinX
themselves! via! the! PSR.! He,! furthermore,! argued! for! a! conception! of! experience! which,!
most!minimally,!is!allegedly!nonXconceptual.!!
As! I! have! wished! to! demonstrate,! Schopenhauer’s! arguments! for! both! of! these!
claims! fail! to! stand! up! to! criticisms! which!may! be! levelled! against! them! from! a! Kantian!





shares! his! general! suspicion! of! the! very! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself! with! his! selfX
proclaimed!philosophical!rivals!–!namely,!the!German!Idealists.!More! importantly,! for!the!
purposes!of!our!study,!his!arguments!made!a!lasting!impression!on!Nietzsche!who!until!his!
late! period! grappled! with! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself! (Chapter! 9).! Furthermore,!























notebook! writings! from! the! early! 1870s.! What! is! remarkable! about! Nietzsche’s!
epistemological!concerns!during!his!early!period!is!that!they!are!almost!solely!restricted!to!
his! notebooks.! The! most! important! piece! of! writing! from! this! early! period! containing! a!
range!of!thoughts!on!metaphysics!and!epistemology!is!On2Truth2and2Lie2in2an2ExtraGmoral2
Sense.!The!paper!has!received! its!fair!share!of!scholarly!attention,!but! it! is!my!contention!
that!the!depth!of!Nietzsche’s!assertion!to!the!effect!that!experience!falsifies!reality!has!not!
quite! been! appreciated! by! commentators.! I! believe! that! too! much! emphasis! has! been!
attached!to!Nietzsche’s!claims!which!seem!to!endorse!a!metaphysical!correspondence!view!
of!truth!–!much!like!Schopenhauer!does!at!times!in!WWR.!This!has!furthermore!been!done!
at! the! expense! of! engaging!with! his! criticism! of! the! role! of! the! concept! in! experience.! I!
believe! that! although! Nietzsche! seems! to! put! forward! arguments! of! both! kinds! in! TL,!







and! undermines! other! basic! tenets;! that! is,! his! concerns! grow2 out2 of2 problems! that! he!









I! will! argue! that! Nietzsche’s! critique! of! knowledge! tackles! the! ‘justification’! and!
‘truth’! components! of! knowledge! as! classically! conceived.! The! first! strand! of! criticism,!
dealing! with! the! problem! of! justification,! broadly! addresses! issues! arising! from! Kant’s!
Transcendental!Aesthetic!in!CPR.!These!include!Kant’s!ontological!denial!of!space,!Jacobi’s!
criticism!of!Kant,!and!the!transcendental!vs!empirical!ideality!debate.!This!line!of!thought,!
whereby! Nietzsche! adopts! a! metaphysical! correspondence! view! of! truth,! has! also! been!
predominant! in! exegeses! and! analyses! of! TL.! After! considering! the! arguments! from!
justification,!I!wish,!through!crossXreferencing!Nietzsche’s!notebooks,!to!demonstrate!why!I!
believe!that!it!is!unclear!whether!he!subscribes!to!a!metaphysical!correspondence!view!of!
truth.! The! key! to! understanding! this! will! be! to! consider! Nietzsche’s! views! on! what! the!




knowledge.! Nietzsche! is! now! concerned! with! showing! that! our! ‘truths’104! actually! falsify!
reality.!This!line!of!thought!focuses!on!problems!resulting!from!the!application!of!concepts!
to! intuitions! (or! primary! impressions! as! Nietzsche! calls! them).! But! given! our! previous!
argument!that!Nietzsche!does!not!use!metaphysical!truth!as!the!benchmark!for!truth,!we!









critique! of! the! concept! in! experience,! I! will! look! at! the! obstacles! he! faces! in!wanting! to!
jettison! the! concept.! This! will! be! done! through! a! discussion! of! Kant’s! Transcendental!






in!a!sense! ‘trivial’! insofar!as!he!must!adopt!an! inaccessible!benchmark!as! the!criterion!of!
truth.!!
! Taking! all! these! different! lines! of! thought! into! account,! I! hope! to! show! not! only!
that!Nietzsche’s!attack!is!more!multiXfaceted!than!has!previously!been!suggested,!but!also!
that!his!arguments!are!susceptible!to!criticisms!which!have!hitherto!been!overlooked.!I!will!
finish!Part!Three!with! just! such!a!consideration!whereby! I! shall!argue!that!both!Kant!and!


























these! texts! as! revealing! a! commitment! on! Nietzsche’s! part! to! a! metaphysical!
correspondence! view!of! truth.! I!wish! to!demonstrate! that,! insofar! as!Nietzsche!proposes!
such!arguments,!his!acceptance!of!the!neglected!alternative!indicates!that!these!are!meant!
to!undermine!the!recognisable! justifiability!of!empirical!knowledge.! I!will! then!reXvisit!the!











it! fails! to! correspond! to! metaphysical! truth,! or! that! we! simply! cannot! be! justified! in!
believing!that!it!corresponds!to!the!latter.!This!view!is!traditionally!and!originally!ascribed!
to!Arthur!Danto’s! influential!1965!book!Nietzsche2as2Philosopher.!But! it!has!been!brought!
to! attention! by! scholars! like! Wilcox! that! the! term! ‘correspondence’! has! assumed! many!
variegated!meanings!throughout!the!history!of!philosophy,!or!that!at!least!there!are!many!
different! versions! of! the! ‘correspondence! theory’! of! truth,! and! that! as! such,! any! talk! of!
Nietzsche! endorsing! a! correspondence! view! of! truth! ought! to! explicitly! make! clear! and!
define!the!term!‘correspondence’.105!Donald!Davidson!states!the!correspondence!theory,!in!
summary,! as! the! theory! that! “the!property!of!being! true! is! to!be!explained!by!a! relation!
between!a!statement!and!something!else”!(Davidson,!1969,!p.!748).!This!‘something!else’!is!
then! to! be! explained! somehow! in! terms! of! ‘facts’,! ‘state! of! affairs! in! the!world’,! etc.! In!
Nietzsche! scholarship,! the! correspondence! view! is! often! taken! as! the! relation! of!
resemblance! between!my! perception! and! some! objective! world! order.! But,! as!Wilcox! is!
quick! to!point!out,!what!does! it!mean!to!say! that!my!perception!resembles! the!objective!
order?! For! example,!my! perception! that! ‘snow! is! white’! does! not! resemble! snow! in! the!








meant! to!capture!and! look! for! similarities!and!dissimilarities.!However,! in! the!case!of!my!
perception,! there! is! nothing! to! which! I! may! compare! my! perception,! except! to! my!
perception!at! a!different! time.!But,! in! trying! to!make! sense!of!how!Danto!uses! the! term!
correspondence! in! explaining! Nietzsche’s! theory,! Wilcox! gives! a! formulation! of! the!
correspondence!theory!as! it! is!attributed!to!Nietzsche!which!I!believe!essentially!captures!
the! predominant! view! within! the! literature! about! what! relation! it! is! that! Nietzsche! is!
drawing! attention! to.! Wilcox! says! that! if! we! take! truth! to! refer! to! transcendent! or!
metaphysical!truth,!or,!to!speak!in!the!language!of!transcendental!idealism,!as!the!grounds!
of! our! empirical! knowledge,! and! if! we! furthermore! hold! that! these! grounds! are! in!
themselves! unknowable,! then!Nietzsche’s! correspondence! theory! is! something! along! the!
lines! that!we!“have!no!knowledge!or! truth!about! the!causes!of!our!perceptions”! (Wilcox,!
1986,! p.! 344).! This! is,! crudely,! the! version! of! correspondence! which! I! shall! consider! as!
relating! to! Nietzsche’s! claims.! I! shall! argue! below! that! to! the! extent! that! Nietzsche!
proposes!such!arguments,!these!are!concerned!not!with!the!truth!of!our!knowledge!claims,!
but! rather! with! their! justifiability.! However,! ultimately! I! believe! that! Nietzsche,! in! his!
notebooks,! displays! a! reticence! towards! adopting!metaphysical! truth! as! the! benchmark,!
meaning!that!not!only!is!he!not!attempting!through!his!arguments!to!demonstrate!that!our!
truths!are!illusory,!but!he!is!not!even!claiming!that!they!may2be!illusory;!that!is,!Nietzsche!is!
neither! arguing! for! the! falsification! of! empirical! truth! resulting! from! a! lack! of!















seems! to! be! whether! our! words! capture,! or! carry! some! form! of! resemblance! or!
correspondence! to,! thingsXinXthemselves.! The! question! is! whether! the! conventional!
predications!we!make!about!things!–!the! initial!meaning!of! truth!–!relate!to!truths! in!the!
metaphysical! sense.!Nietzsche!believes! that!people!ordinarily!do! take!words! to!designate!
things!in!the!world!in!and!of!itself,!so!a!related!question!that!emerges!is!how2humans!have!
come! to! adopt! this! view.! For! Nietzsche,! such! a! posture!must! be! the! result! of! a! form! of!
forgetfulness!on!the!part!of!man!regarding!how!words!came!into!being.!Only!by!forgetting!




we! receive! some!nerve! stimuli!which! produce! an! image! in! us.106! This!Nietzsche! calls! the!
first!metaphor.!To!the! image!we!then!prescribe!a!name!(a!word)!–!the!second!metaphor.!
Nietzsche!calls!these!metaphors!because!at!each!step!what!we!are!actually!confronted!with!







the! image.107!But! this!means! that!between!our! representations! (whether! it! is! a!word,! an!
image,!or!even!the!nerve!stimuli)!and!the! thingXinXitself! (the!ground!of! the!nerve!stimuli)!
there! seems! to!be!an!epistemic!gap!over!which!we!cannot! leap.!Nietzsche!compares! the!
status! of! our2 truths! to! the! knowledge! the! deaf! person! has! of! sound! from! observing!
Chladni’s! sand! figures! (Nietzsche,! TL,! 1979,! p.! 82).! The! deaf! person,! upon! seeing! the!
patterns! in! the! sand!caused!by! the! string!vibrations,! “will! now!swear! that!he!must! know!
what! men!mean! by! ‘sound’”! (Ibid.).! Much! like! the! sand! figures,! our! representation! is! a!
mere!remnant!of!the!thingXinXitself!and!only!captures!its!effects!and!not!the!original!entity.!
“In!the!same!way!that!the!sound!appears!as!a!sand!figure,!so!the!mysterious!X!of!the!thing!
in! itself! first! appears! as! a! nerve! stimulus,! then! as! an! image,! and! finally! as! a! sound”!
(Nietzsche,!TL,!1979,!p.!83)!
According! to! Clark,! Nietzsche’s! argument! above! is! the! result! of! his! criterion! of!
metaphysical! correspondence! as! constitutive! of! truth! coupled! with! a! representational!
theory! of! perception! (Clark,! 1990,! p.! 77).! In! this! respect! Nietzsche! follows! the!
transcendental! tradition! of! Kant! and! Schopenhauer! insofar! as! both! of! them! endorsed! a!
form! of! representationalism! whereby! what! we! are! aware! of! cannot! be! qualitatively!
identical!with!the!nature!of!things!as!they!are! in!themselves.!Of!course,!as!we!saw!in!the!
previous! two! chapters,! Kant! and! Schopenhauer! disagreed! over! what! exactly! we! are!
permitted!to!say!about!the!nature!of!the!world!in!and!of!itself,!or!if!we!are!allowed!to!even!
posit!such!a!nature!as!the!ground!of!our!sensations,!and!about!whether!our!knowledge!of!
phenomena! implies! illusoriness.! A! recap! of! the! conclusions! of! Kant! and! Schopenhauer’s!
theories!will!help!illuminate!Nietzsche’s!position!in!TL.!!
We!saw!in!Part!One!that!Kant!draws!the!distinction!between!things!as!they!are!in!
themselves,! and! these! very! same! things! as! they! make! their! appearances! for! us! in!







former.108! Furthermore,! in! the!Aesthetic,! Kant! believed! to! have! established! the! sensible!
conditions! of! experience,! that! is,! the!a2 priori! forms! of! intuition! to!which! an! object!must!






subjective! conditions! of! intuitions”! (A26/B42).! Thus,! Kant! is! specifically! excluding! space!
(and!time)! from!the!properties!of! thingsXinXthemselves!meaning!that!he!believes!there!to!
be! a! definitive! difference! between! things! as! they! are! in! and! of! themselves! and! as! they!
appear!to!us!as!phenomena.!His!reasoning!for!this,!as!was!argued!for!in!Chapter!2:!3.2,!was!
contained! in!the!transcendental!exposition!of!space,!whereby!our!possession!of!certain!a2




provided,!because!as!we!saw! the!argument! from!geometry!does! take! this!possibility! into!





As!we!saw! in!Part!Two,!Schopenhauer’s! theory,! though! it!diverges! from!Kant’s! in!





















transcendentally! idealist! line! of! thought! whereby! he! subscribes! to! a! representationalist!
theory! of! perception.! However,! as! we! shall! see! in! the! next! section,! Nietzsche! draws! an!
epistemologically! more! modest! conclusion! from! his! representationalist! theory! of!
perception! than! did! Kant! and! Schopenhauer.! We! find! in! Nietzsche’s! early! notebooks,!



















his!notebooks.!“As!soon!one!wishes!to!gain2knowledge2of! the!thing! in! itself,! it2 is2precisely2
this2 world! –”! which! one! comes! to! know! (Nietzsche,! 1995,! §19! [146],! pp.! 47X8).!
“Knowledge”,! he! continues,! “is! only! possible! as! a! reflection! and! by! measuring! oneself!
according! to!one! standard! (sensation)”! (Ibid.).! The! reasoning! behind! this! is! that! knowing!
must!be!done!through!a!subject.!Indeed,!we!cannot!think!of!knowing!something!unless!the!














becomes! an! outer! in! our! hands”! (Schopenhauer,!WWR! 2,! 1958,! pp.! 273X4).! ! Now,! if! we!
138!
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return! to!Kant’s!view!on!the!unknowability!of! the! thingXinXitself,!we! find! that!Kant!would!
not!have!claimed!that!knowing!the!thingXinXitself!is!impossible!per2se,!but!rather!that!this!is!
the! case! for! a! subject!who! depends! for! the!material! of! experience! on! the! receptivity! of!
sensibility.! Thus,! if! Nietzsche! wants! to! claim! that! the! thingXinXitself! is! necessarily!
unknowable,!he!must!accept!that!our!intuitions!are!sensible!and!that!sensibility!is!receptive!
in!nature.!
!To! claim! that! the! thingXinXitself! is! unknowable,! is! not,! however,! a! particularly!
controversial! claim! in! the! transcendental! tradition!–! indeed!both!Kant!and!Schopenhauer!
would! agree! with! this! (though! they! would! both! in! one! way! or! another! transgress! this!
restriction).! More! controversially,! however,! Nietzsche! mentions! the! possibility! of! the!
viability!of!Trendelenburg’s!neglected!alternative.!He!claims!that!“Against!Kant!we!can!still!
object,!even!if!we!accept!all!of!his!propositions,!that!it!is!still!possible!that!the!world!is!as!it!
appears! to! us”! (Nietzsche,! 1995,! §19! [125],! p.! 42).! The! claim! echoes! Trendelenburg’s!
formulation!of!the!“third!possibility”!which!Kant!had!allegedly!overlooked.!Nietzsche!makes!
a!similar!criticism!of!Schopenhauer’s!account!of!the!Will!as!thingXinXitself!as!early!as!1868,!
in! a! paper! entitled! On2 Schopenhauer.! Here! one! of! Nietzsche’s! main! arguments! against!
Schopenhauer’s! conception! of! the! Will! is! the! latter’s! ascription! of! a! series! of! negative!
properties! to! the!Will.! “We! are! compelled”,! he! claims,! “to! guard! against! the! predicates!
which! Schopenhauer! ascribes! to! his! will,! which! for! something! simply! unthinkable! sound!
much! too! certain! and! all! stem! from! the! contradiction! to! the! world! as! representation”!
(AnsellXPearson! &! Large,! 2006,! p.! 26).! To! demonstrate! his! point,! Nietzsche! quotes! a!
passage! from!WWR!where!Schopenhauer!excludes! the! forms!of! appearance! (his! concern!
being!primarily!with!the!principium2individuationis)!from!the!will.!“‘The!will!as!thing!in!itself!
[…]! is!quite!different! from! its!phenomenon,!and! is!entirely! free! from!all! the! forms!of! the!
phenomenon!into!which!it!first!passes!when!it!appears,!and!which!therefore!concern!only!




subordinate! to! this! and! collectively! have! their! common! expression! in! the! principle! of!
sufficient! reason.!As!we! know! time!and! space!belong! to! this! principle,! and! consequently!
plurality!as!well![…]’”!(Ibid.).111!Nietzsche!comments!on!this!passage,!that!what!surprises!us!
about! it! is! its! “dictatorial! tone,!which!asserts!a!number!of!negative2characteristics!of! the!
thing! in! itself!which! lies! completely! outside! the! sphere! of! knowledge”! (AnsellXPearson!&!
Large,! 2006,! pp.! 26X7).! Nietzsche’s! point,! both! against! Kant! and! Schopenhauer,! is!
essentially!the!same!as!Pistorius!and!Trendelenburg’s!charges!against!Kant.!Most!likely,!it!is!
Nietzsche’s! lack! of! familiarity! with! CPR,! and! particularly! the!Aesthetic,! which! led! him! to!
overlook!why!Kant!and!Schopenhauer!believed!they!were!justified!in!specifically!excluding!
certain! phenomenal! properties! from! thingsXinXthemselves.! However,! for! our! purposes,!
what!matters!more! is!Nietzsche’s!awareness! that! the!acknowledgment!of!our! inability! to!
deny! certain! properties! regarding! thingsXinXthemselves,! has! implications! for! the! type! of!





be!proposing! a! form!of! scepticism! regarding!our! ability! to!know!whether! our!metaphors!
correspond! to! thingsXinXthemselves! or! not;! that! is,! Nietzsche! is! not,! yet,! proposing! an!
argument!which!he!believes!will!show!that!our!truths!are!illusions;!in!fact,!at!this!point!in!TL!
he! has! not! yet! ventured! to!make! this! claim! –! a! claim!which! he! only!makes! after! having!
considered!the!role!of!the!concept.!What!he!is!doing!here,!is!to!undermine!the!justifiability!
of!congruence!between!our!representations!and!thingsXinXthemselves.!By!arguing!that!the!
X! of! the! thing! in! itself,! in! order! for! it! to! become!an!object! of! knowledge,!must!make! its!
appearance! first! as! nerve! stimuli,! then! as! an! image,! and! finally! as! a! word,! he! has!





object! of! knowledge!and!experience.!But!he! then!acknowledges! that!he!has!not! thereby!
proven!that! these! forms! in!which! the!object! is! represented!by!us!must!be! fundamentally!
different! from!the!object!as! it! is! in! itself;! the!possibility!of!congruence! is! left!open.!Thus,!
Nietzsche’s!acceptance!of!the!possibility!of!the!neglected!alternative!has!a!bearing!on!the!
type!of!argument!which!he! is!proposing!regarding!the!status!of!our!truths.! If2Nietzsche! is!
adopting! a!metaphysical! correspondence! view,! his! acknowledgment! of! the! possibility! of!
the!neglected!alternative!must!mean! that!he! is! attacking! the! recognisable! justifiability2of!
our! putative! knowledge,! and! not! its! truth.! His! recognition! of! the! neglected! alternative,!
which! itself! is! a! result!of!his!belief! in! the!absolute!unknowability!of! things!as! they!are! in!
themselves! (note! that! in!order! to!subscribe! to!Trendelenburg’s!alternative!we!must!even!











between! phenomena! and! thingsXinXthemselves! still! leaves! knowledge! –! on! the! classical!
definition! of! knowledge! as! recognisably! justified,! true,! belief! –! of! thingsXinXthemselves!
beyond! the! reach!of! our! cognitive! capacities.!We!may!make! a! claim!about! the! empirical!
world,!which!just!so!happens!to!be!true!of!the!noumenal!world!as!well,!but!this!would!not!
allow!us!to!claim!that!we!possess!knowledge!of!the! latter.!Thus,!despite!the!possibility!of!




certain! determinations! (e.g.! space! and! time)! to! be! a2 priori,! then! any!metaphysical! truth!
which!the!belief!that!there!are!spatioXtemporal!objects!possesses!would!have!to!depend!on!
the!mere! possibility,! which! Schopenhauer! doubted,! that! the!world! is! “governed! at! each!
step! by! the! law! of! causality! that! is! without! exception,! but! in! all! these! respects! merely!
observing!laws!that!we!are!able!to!state!prior!to!all!experience!thereof”!(Schopenhauer,!On!
the!Fourfold!Root!of!the!Principle!of!Sufficient!Reason,!1974,!§21,!p.!76).!That!Nietzsche’s!
point! is! a! sceptical! one! as! opposed! to! a! dogmatic! claim! that! our! truths! are! illusions,! is!
demonstrated! when! immediately! following! his! proposal! of! the! neglected! alternative! he!
continues!to!claim!that!“On!a!personal! level,!moreover,! this!entire!position! is!useless.!No!







is! important! to! separate! the! Kantian! from! the! Schopenhauerian! features! of! Nietzsche’s!
thought!because!in!so!doing!what!emerges!is!the!picture!of!someone!who!is!firmly!rooted!




proposing! his! argument! for! the! metaphorical! status! of! words! in! relation! to! thingsXinX
themselves! –! their! ontological! ground! –! he! claims! “But! the! further! inference! from! the!
nerve! stimulus! to! a! cause! outside! of! us! is! already! the! result! of! a! false! and! unjustifiable!




of! cognition! (Breazeale,! 1979,! p.! 81n).! Clark,! on! the! other! hand,! believes! that! Nietzsche!
agrees!with!Schopenhauer’s!account!of!cognition,!whereby!the!law!of!causality!is!applied!to!
our! sensations! to! give! us! cognition! of! objects.! Following! Breazeale,! I! believe! this! quote!
from!TL! demonstrates!Nietzsche’s! awareness! of! Schopenhauer’s! failure! to! overcome! the!
criticism!of!Kant!which!he!levelled!himself.!The!problem!with!Clark’s!interpretation!is!that!
she! seems! to! be! oblivious! to! the! problem! in! Schopenhauer’s! theory.! According! to! her!
reading,!Nietzsche!agrees!with!Schopenhauer!regarding!the!origin!of!experience,!but!simply!







in!5:!1,! is! that!by!claiming!that! that!which!grounds!the!phenomenon! is!empirical!physical!
bodies,! Schopenhauer! is! having! to! account! for! the! emergence! of! an! empirical! object! by!
positing! another! empirical! object! as! its! ground! –! a! position! which! was! revealed! to! be!
circular.! What! I! believe! Nietzsche! demonstrates! in! this! section! is! the! realisation! of! a!
necessary!problem!in!both!Kantian!and!Schopenhauerian!transcendental! idealism;!namely!
that!if!we!concede!that!we!do!not!possess!intellectual!intuition,!then!we!must!also!assume!









an! object.112! However,! I! do! not! believe! that! Nietzsche! is! merely! highlighting! an!




he! raises! the! Jacobian! problem,! he! seems! immediately! to! disregard! it! and! continues! to!
speak! about! the!metaphorical! status! of! words,! and! even! gives! the! example! of! Chladni’s!
sand! figures.! In! fact,! Nietzsche’s! talk! of! a! gap! between! our!metaphors! (representations)!
and!thingsXinXthemselves,!that! is,!Nietzsche’s!version!of!the!metaphysical!correspondence!
theory,!must! assume! a! causal! relation! of! some! sort! between! the! former! and! the! latter.!
Now! it! should! be! noted! that! a! correspondence! view! of! truth! does! not! of! itself! demand!
causation! between! some! thingXinXitself! and! its! representation! by! a! subject.! The!
correspondence!criterion!is!more!one!of!identity!than!one!of!causality;!that!is,!in!order!for!
my! representation! to! be! true! it! merely! has! to! correspond! to! the! facts! of! the! world! –!
regardless!of!whether! the! facts!of! the!world! caused!my! representation!or!not.! Thus,! the!
correspondence! theory!does!not!of! itself! demand!a! causal! relation!between! the! state!of!
affairs! in! the! world! and! my! representations,! it! rather! requires! a! relation! of! identity!
between! the! two.!Why! then! is! it! that! Nietzsche’s! version! of! the! correspondence! theory!
seems!to!entail!a!causal!relation?!The!answer!to!this!seems!to!be!Nietzsche’s!acceptance!of!
a! basic! proposition! in! transcendental! idealism! of! which,! as! we! saw,! both! Kant! and!
Schopenhauer!were! likewise!convinced!–!namely!that!our! intuitions!are!sensible!and!that!









to!–! including!his!own.!Yet,! interestingly,!he!seems!to!accept!this! limitation!as!something!
which! simply! cannot!be!overcome;! it! seems!an! inescapable!and! insurmountable!problem!
which!results!when!we!assume!that!our!sensibility!is!receptive!in!nature.!!
However,! as! we! saw! with! Kant,! one!may! assume! the! need! for! such! a! causal! or!
necessary! ground! of! phenomena! without! subscribing! to! a!metaphysical! correspondence!
view!of!truth.113!What!I!shall!argue!for!in!the!next!section!is!that!contrary!to!most!Nietzsche!
scholarship,! I!do!not!believe!that!Nietzsche!in!his!early!writings,!straightforwardly!accepts!













bring! attention! to! is! a! point! which! was! discussed! in! the! first! two! parts! of! our! study!
regarding!the!veridical!status!of!phenomena.!The!question!now!is!whether!the!fact!that!our!









illusoriness! of! the! phenomenal! world,! if! we! assume! that! the! properties! of! phenomena!
differ!from!those!of!things!as!they!are!in!themselves.!Nietzsche’s!position!on!this!issue!will!
determine!whether! he! is! in! fact! committed! to! the!metaphysical! correspondence! view!of!
truth.!
! We! saw! that! Kant! was! rather! unambiguous! regarding! the! type! of! reality! he!
assigned! to! phenomenal! truth.! Regarding! space! and! time,! he! claimed! that! they! were!












former! being! illusory;! he! would! thus! be! following! the! Schopenhauerian! line! of! thought.!
However,! to! our! surprise,! what! we! find! in! Nietzsche! is! an! awareness! of! the! fallacious!
assimilation! of! transcendental! ideality!with! illusoriness.!We! find! this! idea! expressed! very!
well! in! a! notebook! entry:! “We! far! too! easily! confuse! Kant’s2 thing! in! itself! with! the!
Buddhists’2true!essence!of!things:!that!is!reality!either!exhibits!nothing!but!semblance!or!an!
appearance!that2is2wholly2adequate2to2the2truth.!Semblance!as!nonbeing!is!confused!with!






too! much! of! a! stretch! to! think! that! what! Nietzsche! has! in! mind! here! is! precisely!
Schopenhauer’s! conflation! of! phenomena! with! empirical! illusion! because! of! the! veil! of!
Maya,!as!found!in!Hindu!philosophy.!This!quote!is!of!fundamental!importance!as!it!seems,!
in!many!respects,!to!counter!everything!which!has!been!argued!for!thus!far.!For,!even!the!
sceptical! line!of! thought! regarding!our! inability! to!know!whether!phenomena!correspond!
to! thingsXinXthemselves,! still! depends! on! a! metaphysical! correspondence! view! of! truth,!
whereby! the! criteria! for! truth! is! the! correspondence! between! the! thingXinXitself! and! our!
empirical! objects! of! cognition.115! But!what! this! quote!highlights! is! that!Nietzsche!did! not!
even!consider!the!fact!that!our!knowledge!is!inevitably!of!phenomena!as!implying!illusion,!
even! if!phenomena!were!known!to!be!different! from!things!as! they!are! in! themselves.116!
Nietzsche! does! still! seem! to! believe! that! we! lack! the! justification! to! believe! that! our!
phenomenal! truths! capture! the! thingXinXitself,! but! that! this! does! not!make! our! empirical!
truths! potentially! illusory.! What! he! seems! to! oppose! is! the! binary! view! that! either! our!




with! “sunlight! reflected! off! sand! that! a! distant! traveller! mistakes! for! water,! or! the!
discarded!rope!that!the!traveller!thinks! is!a!snake!(Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,!2010,!p.!28)!–!
that!is,!those!things!which!Kant!would!call!not!transcendentally,!but!empirically!ideal.!!

















then! the! sciences! are! incorrect”! (Nietzsche,! 1995,! §19! [125]).! The! two! positions! simply!
cannot! be! reconclied;! if! Nietzsche! believes! that! the! implication! of! Kant’s! philosophy,!
assuming! that! appearnces! are! qualitatively! different! from! thingsXinXthemselves,! is! that!
empirical!knowledge!is!rendered!illusory,!then!he!is!clearly!taking!up!a!position!contrary!to!
Kant,!and!similar!to!some!of!Schopenhauer’s!claims!in!WWR.!!!Given!the!presence!of!both!










as! they! are! in! themselves,! we! cannot! know,! but! the! possibility! remains! (Nietzsche’s!
acceptance!of!the!neglected!alternative).!This! led!us!to!the!conclusion!that! if2Nietzsche! is!
adopting!a!metaphysical!correspondence!view!of!truth,!then!his!arguments!must!be!aimed!
at! the! recognisable! justifiability! of! knowledge.!He! then! says! how! the! very! inference! to! a!
logical! ground! for! phenomena! is! an! invalid! inference,! but! one! which! any! form! of!
transcendental!idealism!(including!his!own)!must!presume.!Finally,!we!saw!that!despite!the!
arguments!above,!it!was!left!unclear!whether!Nietzsche!thought!that!phenomenal!reality!is!






In! the! next! chapter,! we! shall! see! how! Nietzsche! starts! to! launch! more! cogent!


































The! line! of! thought! governing! this! strand! of! Nietzsche’s! critique! is! that! concepts! falsify!
reality.!Through!this! line!of!argument,!therefore,!Nietzsche!is!not!merely!making!sceptical!
remarks!regarding!our!inability!to! justify!our!knowledge!claims;!he!is!rather!attempting!to!
undermine! the! truth,! or! veridical! status,! of! our! epistemological! claims! by! tracing! the!






more! precisely,! he!was! concerned!with! the! epistemological! implications! arising! from! the!
receptivity!of!sensibility!coupled!with!a2priori!determinations!of!experience.!His!critique!of!
the!role!of!the!concept!in!experience,!on!the!other!hand,!can!be!viewed!as!a!critique!of!our!
understanding! being! discursive! as! opposed! to! intuitive.! Thus,! it! is! the! discursivity! of! the!
understanding!–!the!fact!that!it!must!cognise!objects!through!concepts!–!which!Nietzsche!




criticises! the! role! of! the! concept.! Once! again,! I! believe! that! Nietzsche’s! thoughts! on! the!
topic!ultimately!seem!more!in!line!with!Kant!than!they!do!with!Schopenhauer.!As!a!result!
of!this,!we!will!also!see!how!the!most!serious!deficiency!in!Nietzsche’s!critique!is!one!which!














almost! solely! concerned! with! empirical! concepts;! they! are! furthermore! very! similar! to!
151!
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In! the! JL,!Kant!gives!a!description!of! the! logical! acts!of! the!understanding! through!which!
empirical! concepts! are! created.! These! acts! of! the! understanding! are:! “Comparison! of!
representations!among!one!another!in!relation!to!the!unity!of!consciousness;!reflection!as!
to! how! various! representations! can! be! conceived! in! one! consciousness;! and! finally!
abstraction!of!everything!else!in!which!the!given!representations!differ”!(Kant,!JL,!1992,!§6,2
p.!592).!What!Kant!means!by!this!is!that!concepts!are!formed!by!reflecting!on,!comparing,!




“I! see,! e.g.,! a! spruce,! a! willow,! and! a! linden.! By! first! comparing! these! objects! with! one!
another! I! note! that! they! are! different! from! one! another! in! regard! to! the! trunk,! the!
branches,! the! leaves,! etc.;! but! next! I! reflect! on! that!which! they!have! in! common!among!
themselves,!trunk,!branches,!and!leaves!themselves,!and!I!abstract!from!the!quantity,!the!
figure,!etc.,!of!these;!thus!I!acquire!a!concept!of!a!tree”!(Kant,!JL,!1992,!§6,2p.!592n).!!
! Let! us! now! turn! to! Nietzsche’s! account! of! concept! creation! to! see! the! striking!
semblance! between! his! and! Kant’s! accounts.! What! Nietzsche! identifies! as! guiding! the!
process!of!concept!formation!is!the!power!of!‘forgetfulness’!and!‘dissimulation’.!In!order!to!







illusion! that! there! is! something! identical,!by!means!of! the!presupposition!of! identities:! in!
other! words,! by! means! of! false! perceptions”! (Nietzsche,! 1995,§23! [11],! p.! 118).117! He!
makes!a!very!similar!point!in!TL!when!he!says!that!a!“word!becomes!a!concept!insofar!as!it!




universality! of! a! concept.! For! Kant,! an! intuition! is! a! repraesentatio2 singularis! whilst! a!
concept!is!a!repraesentatio2per2notas2communes;!or!again,!a!concept!is!a!“representation!of!
what!is!common!to!several!objects,!hence!a!representation!insofar2as2it2can2be2contained2in2
various2 ones”! (Kant,! JL,! 1992,2 p.! 589n).! The! problem! which! Nietzsche! identifies! with!
empirical! concepts! seems! to! be! that! since! they! must! subsume! countless! unequal! cases!
under! themselves,! insofar!as!we!use!concepts! to!cognise!an!object,!we!are!not!cognising!
the! object! in! all! its! specificity,! but! rather! cognising! it! through! a! universal! that! abstracts!
from! some! of! that! specificity.! This! problem! is! the! result! of! the! presumption! of! identity!
between! our! primary! impressions! (appearances)! in! concept! creation.119! But! without! the!
presumption! of! identity! by! us,! there! can! also! be! no! such! thing! as! a! ‘leaf’,! a! ‘tree’,! or! a!
‘rock’;!each!of!these!concepts!presume!some!‘essential’!qualities!which!constitute!the!thing!

























inXthemselves.! Thus,! the! thingXinXitself!was! seen! as! the! benchmark! of! truth,! or!what! the!
object! truly! is.! However,! the! problem!with! concepts! is! not! that! they! fail! to! capture! the!
thingXinXitself,!but!rather!that!through!the!employment!of!a!universal!(the!concept)!we!fail!
to!experience! the! singularity! and!particularity!of!our!primary! impressions.! Thus,! it!would!
seem! as! if! Nietzsche! is! now! considering! our! appearances! or! primary! impressions! as! the!







creation,! Nietzsche! carries! over! this! analysis! to! consider! how! this! manner! of! creating!
concepts,!combined!with!our!need!to!cognize!objects!through!concepts,!has!a!bearing!on!
what!we!consider! to!be!knowledge.!Nietzsche’s!view!seems!to!be!twofold:! the! first!claim!










of! thought! Nietzsche! would! be! arguing! that! the! object! as! it! is! experienced! by! us! is! an2
actively2 constructed! object.! The! second! level! to! his! analysis! is! that! this! very! mode! of!





Nietzsche! turns! from!his!discussion!on!concept!creation,! to!ask:!given! these! facts!
about!cognition,!what!does!our!knowledge!amount!to?!For!Nietzsche,!all!of!knowledge! is!
nothing! but! “classifying”! and! “establishing! species”! (Nietzsche,! 1995,§19! [236],! p.! 74)!





behind!a!bush!and! then!seeks!and! finds! it! in! the!same!place! (Nietzsche,!TL,!1979,!p.!85).!












systems,!bringing! them!under! concepts! that!make!possible! an!overview!and! cognition!of!
the!whole”! (Schopenhauer,!WWR!1,!2010,!p.!120).!As!he!continues!on! the!next!page,!he!
says! that!morphology!“presents!us!with!an! infinite!variety!of! innumerable! forms! that!are!
clearly! related! through! an! unmistakable! family! resemblance”! (Schopenhauer,! WWR! 1,!
2010,!p.!121).!Thus,!Schopenhauer!is!clearly!concerned!with!empirical!concepts,!and!as!we!
shall!see!when!we!consider!Nietzsche’s!example,!so!is!he.!!Nietzsche’s!point!is!that!because!
of! the! discursivity! of! our! understanding,!we!must! subsume! any! appearances! of! intuition!
under! concepts;! only! insofar! as! appearances! are! united! under! concepts! can! we! cognize!
them!as2objects.!As!Nietzsche!puts! it:!“Our!reason! is!a!surface! force,! is!superficial.!This! is!
also!called!‘subjective’.!It!arrives!at!knowledge!by!means!of!concepts:!which!means!that!our!
thought!consists!in!categorization,!nameXcalling.!Hence!something!that!comes!down!to!an!
arbitrary! human! convention! and!does!not! capture! the! thing! itself”! (Nietzsche,! 1995,! §19!
[66],!p.!24).!!











under! the! concept! we! created,! we! believe! that! we! have! attained! some! new! knowledge!
about!the!world!in!itself.!We!assume!that!this!third!thing!is,!and2has2always2been,!an!F,!and!
that!our! encountering! it! has!merely! revealed! to!us! its! nature! as! an! F.! But!what!we!have!
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!
forgotten! in!this!process! is!that!the!concept!of!F!was!nothing!which!we!discovered! in!the!
world.! ! In! the! world! we! were! never! confronted! with! either! the! perfect! F! or! any!
instantiations!of!F.!We!were!only!ever!confronted!with!a!wide!array!of! impressions!which!
we!proceeded!to!classify.!What!knowledge!essentially!amounts!to,!according!to!Nietzsche,!
is! creating! genera! and! being! amazed! and! proud! when! something! falls! into! one! of! the!
genera! we! have! created.! In! this! sense,! there! seems! to! be! some! plausibility! to! Clark’s!
reading! of! Nietzsche’s! view.! However,!pace2Clark,! Nietzsche! is! not! claiming! that!a2 priori2
truths!do!not!tell!us!anything!about!the!world,!but!rather!that!even!our!empirical!concepts!
fail! to! capture! the! world! as! it! is! presented! to! us! in! our! primary! impressions! because!
empirical! concepts!are!ways! in!which!we2unite!our! sensory! impressions!–! they!are! forms!
which!are!extraneous!and!alien!to!these!impressions!as!they!are!given!to!us.121!
We! should! note! at! this! stage! that! the! preceding! analysis! only! gives! a! partial!
account!of!what!Nietzsche!is!critiquing!with!the!concept.!The!second!strand!of!criticism!is!
about! our! belief2 in! the! kind! of! objectivity! which! our! conceptualised! empirical! objects!






























TL! to!be!concerned!with!not!our! failure! to!capture!the!thingXinXitself,!but! rather!with!our!
belief! that! we! have2 captured! the! thingXinXitself! in! our! representations.! Andresen’s!
argument! focuses! on! how,! through! the! subsumption! of! primary! impressions! under!
concepts,!we!come!to!believe!that!our!conceptualised!object!is!instantiated!in!the!world,!in!
and! of! itself.! In! the! remainder! of! this! section! I! shall! explore! this! line! of! thought,! and!
although!I!believe!that!there!is!some!textual!evidence!to!support!Andresen’s!claim,!I!do!not!





transferred,!and!embellished,!and!which,! after! long!usage,! seem! to!a!people! to!be! fixed,!
canonical,! and! binding.! Truths2 are2 illusions2 which2 we2 have2 forgotten2 are2 illusions”!
(Nietzsche,! TL,! 1979,! p.! 84,! my! italics).! We! have! now! reached! the! point! in! TL! where!
Nietzsche!believes! to!have!established! that!our!putative!knowledge! is! illusory,!and!as!we!
have!seen!this!is!not!through!an!argument!about!correspondence!to!thingsXinXthemselves,!
but! rather! through! an! argument! directed! at! alleged! problems! with! a! discursive!
understanding!–!namely!that!intuitions!must!be!cognized!through!concepts.!!!
According! to! Nietzsche! this! mode! of! classifying! primary! impressions! has!









TL,! 1979,! p.! 83).! We! forget! that! what! made! us! see! a! leaf! was! the! creative! and! artistic!
creation!of!the!concept!by2us,!resulting!from!a!process!of!abstraction!of!specificities!from!
our! primary! impressions.! The! cause! of! our! experiencing! our! primary! impression! as! the!
object!–!this!leaf!–!therefore,!essentially!involves!our!own!artistic!input!in!concept!creation.!
According!to!Andresen,!the!point!Nietzsche!is!making!in!his!discussion!on!concept!creation!







on! our! creation! of! concepts! in! the! first! place! and! then! reversing! cause! and! effect.! It! is!
through! our! ‘forgetfulness’! of! the! fact! that! “the! original! perceptual! metaphors! are!
metaphors”! (Nietzsche,! TL,! 1979,! p.! 86)! that!we! take! these!metaphors! to! refer! to! some!
essence! instantiated! in! the! world! in! and! of! itself! which! causally! relates! to! our!
representation! and!which! our! representation! correctly! represents.! Nietzsche’s! critique! is!








We!do! find!some!evidence! in! the!notebook!writings! to!support!Andresen’s!claim,!
although!it!must!be!noted!that!this!evidence!is!limited.!For!example,!at!one!point!Nietzsche!
claims!that!“Without!a!certain!amount!of!delusion,!no!one!can!firmly!believe!that!he!is! in!




! Although! Andresen’s! reading! has! some! plausibility,! and! some! textual! support!
(more!so!in!TL!than!in!the!notebook!fragments)!I!do!not!believe!that!it!is!the!only,!or!even!
the!main!sense! in!which!Nietzsche!wishes! to! raise!sceptical!doubts!about!our! truths.!The!
main!reason!for!this,!once!again,!is!textual!and!goes!back!to!the!very!passage!from!TL!which!
Andresen! quotes,! where! Nietzsche! says! that! our! “truths! are! illusions! which! we! have!
forgotten! are! illusions”! (Nietzsche,! TL,! 1979,! p.! 84).! What! we! must! note! here! is! that!





sees! us! as! deluding! ourselves.! I! believe! that! Nietzsche! realises! that! this! argument!














were! raised! in! the! previous! section! regarding! what! exactly! Nietzsche! is! critiquing! in! his!
discussion!of! the!concept!–!both!of!which!were! left!unresolved.!The! first!was!Andresen’s!
claim! that! what! Nietzsche! is! primarily! critiquing! in! TL! is! the! belief! in! the! metaphysical!
reality!of!the!properties!objects!appear!to!have!in!virtue!of!our!application!of!concepts!to!
primary! impressions.!Our! argument!contra! Andresen!was! that!Nietzsche!must!have!prior!
reasons!for!maintaining!the!illusoriness!of!our!‘truths’,!to!which!Andresen’s!arguments!are!
only! secondary.!We!will!now!consider!problems!which!arise! for!Nietzsche! if!he!wishes! to!
hold!onto!the!position!that!it!is!the!concept!which!is!responsible!for!the!error;!I!will!argue!
that!Nietzsche!does!not!succeed! in! isolating!the!concept!as!the!origin!of!our!belief! in!the!
metaphysical!validity!of!empirical!knowledge.!
The! second! issue! mentioned! in! the! previous! section! was! the! claim! that! in! his!
discussion! on! concept! creation,! Nietzsche! is! seemingly! taking! a! world! of! primary!
impressions!(appearances)!as!constituting!the!criterion!for!truth.!As!a!philosopher!writing!
either! within,! or! at! least! against! the! backdrop! of,! transcendental! idealism,! a! major!
objection! from! within! this! tradition! Nietzsche! would! face! in! trying! to! posit! a! world! of!
primary!impressions!as!the!benchmark!for!truth,!is!Kant’s!transcendental!deduction!of!the!
categories.! That! is,! if! Nietzsche! wishes! to! claim! that! a! world! of! primary! impressions!
constitutes! the! world! as! it! really! is! for2 us! and! that! the! application! of! the! concept,! by!
conflating! similarity! with! identity,! somehow! gives! us! an! object! which! is! merely! an!
approximation!of!what!the!object!truly!is!phenomenally,!then!he!must!surely!subscribe!to!
and!justify!the!claim!that!we!can!have!cognitive!access!to!the!world!as!it!is!independently!












experience! is! that! through! the! subsumption! of! primary! impressions! under! conceptual!
forms,!we!come!to!believe!that!the!conceptual!object!exists!in!the!world!in!and!of!itself!just!
with!the!properties!our!concepts!ascribe!to!it.!We!thus!form!the!belief!that!this!object,! in!
and! of! itself,! causes! our! representation! which! captures! the! object! as! it! is! in! itself.! But,!
according! to! Nietzsche,! this! process! involves! a! reversal! of! cause! and! effect! because! the!
effect! is! really! the! conceptualised! object!which! has,! as! its! cause,! both! a! receptive! and! a!









not! only! be! inseparable! from! our! use! of! concepts,! but! it! must! also! arise! only! through!
concept!application.!The!question!is!therefore!whether!without!concept!creation!we!would!




One!of! the!ways! in!which!we!may!consider! the!structure!of!such!a!consciousness!
would!be!something!along!the!lines!of!a!Hegelian!description!of!senseXcertainty.!Here,!we!
may! concede! that! a! nonXconceptXusing! subject! still! experiences! objects! (in! some! loose!
sense)!in!the!world.122!However,!all!this!subject!could!ever!think!about!its!object!is!that!“the!
thing! is,! and! it! is,!merely! because! it! is”! (Hegel,! 1977,! §91,! p.! 58).! Its! object,! Hegel! says,!
would!only!ever!be!This,!Here,!Now.!But!how!and!why!could!such!subjects,!who!only!ever!
know! their! object! as! This,! Here,!Now,!without! ascribing! any! properties! to! it,! not! believe!
that!their!perceptions!correspond!to!the!essence!of!things?!Nothing!about!the!structure!of!
such! a! mode! of! perception! would! suggest! that! the! subject! would! take! his! object! to! be!
different!in!the!world!in!and!of!itself.!Such!a!subject!may!well!recognise!the!independence!
of! the! object! from!himself,!Hegel! believes.! SenseXcertainty! recognises! that! “the!object! is!
[…]! regardless! of! whether! it! is! known! or! not”! (Hegel,! 1977,! §93,! p.! 59)! by! ordinary!
consciousness.!The!nonXconceptXusing!subject,!therefore,!posits!a!“‘This’!as!‘I’,!and!‘This’!as!
object”! (Hegel,! 1977,! §92,!p.! 59).!However,! this!distinction!which!ordinary! consciousness!
draws! does! not! entail! a! perceived! difference! on! the! part! of! consciousness! between! the!
object! as! it! is! for! consciousness! and! the! object! as! it! is! in! itself.! That! is,! although!
consciousness! can! distinguish! its! object! from! itself,! this! distinction! does! not! create,!
according! to! Hegel,! a! sceptical! belief! by! consciousness! regarding! an! alleged! inability! of!
knowing! the! object! because! of! the!medium! of! cognition.! The! assumption,! or! in! Hegel’s!
word!the!presupposition,2that!cognition! is!either!an! instrument!or!a!medium!which!keeps!
us! from! knowing! the! object! in! itself,! is! an! assumption!made! by! philosophers! –! not! one!
drawn!by!ordinary!consciousness.123!!










other! arguments! through! which! he! believed! to! have! established! the! illusoriness! of! our!







In! this! final! section!of!Chapter!7,! I!will! revisit!what! I! take! to!be! the!kernel!of!Nietzsche’s!
early!error! theory,!namely,! that!cognition!of!objects! through!concepts! falsifies!a!world!of!
primary! impressions.! But! as! we! said,! if! Nietzsche! wishes! to! argue! for! this! point,! Kant’s!
transcendental!deduction!seems!to!stand! in!his!way!as!something!of!which!he!must! take!
account.! We,! thus,! need! to! look! at! Kant's! ‘Deduction’! to! gain! a! clearer! picture! of!
Nietzsche's! own! theory! of! cognition! and! establish! whether! he! subscribes! to! a! Kantian!
account!of! experience!as!necessarily! conceptual,! or!whether!he! follows! Schopenhauer! in!
allowing! for! the!possibility!of!nonXconceptual! experience.!Where!Nietzsche! stands! in! this!
debate!will!also!determine!to!a!great!extent!the!cogency!of!his!criticism.!
If!we!relate!Kant's!Deduction!to!Nietzsche's!criticism!of!concepts,!one!thing!should!
be! clear;! namely,! that! if!Nietzsche!wishes! to! insist! upon! the!possibility! of! complete!nonX
conceptual! experience,! as! a! philosopher! writing! within! the! transcendental! tradition,! his!
lack!of!attention!to!Kant's!Deduction!seriously!jeopardises!his!claim.!Nietzsche,!in!fact,!does!
not!even!mention!problems!and! issues!with!Kant's!Deduction! in!his!notebook!writings!of!











to! argue! in! favour! of! nonXconceptual! cognition! or! experience! of! objects,! then! the!
‘Deduction’! stands! in! his! way! as! something! which! though! not! free! of! problems,! is!





quasiXSchopenhauerian! in! nature,! still! rejects! the! Schopenhauerian! notion! of! nonX
conceptual! experience.! Furthermore,! Nietzsche! seems! to! completely! agree! with! Kant!
regarding!our!need!to!experience!the!world!categorially.!!
! If! we! turn! to! TL,! we! find! the! following! passage! by! Nietzsche! which! is,! in! some!
senses,!very!similar!to!claims!made!by!Kant!in!both!the!Aesthetic!and!the!Analytic!in!CPR.!!
"All!that!we!actually!know!about!these!laws!of!nature!is!what!we!ourselves!bring!to!them!–!
time! and! space,! and! therefore! relationships! of! succession! and! number.! But! everything!
marvellous!about!the!laws!of!nature,!everything!that!quite!astonishes!us!therein!and!seems!
to! demand! explanation,! everything! that! might! lead! us! to! distrust! idealism:! all! this! is!
completely!and!solely!contained!within!the!mathematical!strictness!and!inviolability!of!our!
representations! of! time! and! space.! But! we! produce! these! representations! in! and! from!
ourselves! with! the! same! necessity! with! which! the! spider! spins.! If! we! are! forced! to!
comprehend!under!these!forms,!then!it!ceases!to!be!amazing!that!in!all!things!we!actually!
comprehend!nothing!but!these!forms![...]!All!that!conformity!to!law,!which!impresses!us!so!










possibility! of! cognition.! The! most! important! claim! for! our! purposes! is! what! Nietzsche!
alludes! to! in! the! last! sentence,! namely,! the! dependence! of! empirical! concepts! upon! the!
categories.!Nietzsche!speaks!in!the!language!of!'metaphor!formation',!but!we!know!that,!by!
this,!he!means!our!construction!of!empirical!concepts.125!What!he! is! thus!claiming! is! that!
every! empirical! concept! must! contain! within! itself! these! forms! which! we! bring! to! our!
experience! of! any! object.! In! fact,! Nietzsche! is! not! here! merely! speaking! about! pure!
concepts,!but!also!of!the!forms!of!intuitions!of!space!and!time.!Thus,!what!he!is!essentially!
saying,!is!that,!regardless!of!their!content,!our!‘metaphors’!(empirical!concepts)!must!be!in!
accordance!with! the! transcendental!object!and! the! forms!of! space!and! time.!That! is,!our!
metaphors!must!always!be!of!spatioXtemporal!objects,!which!display!some!sort!of!quantity,!
quality,!which!act!as!subjects!of!which!things!are!predicated,!which!are!in!causal!relations!
with! other! objects,! etc.! Regardless! of! the! metaphor,! Nietzsche! believes,! these! are! the!
criteria! which! any! metaphor! must! satisfy.! Thus,! Nietzsche! is! clearly! not! wedded! to! the!















that! then! are! gradually! assimilated,! produce! inferential! operations,! that! is,! the! sense! of!
causality.! Space! and! time! are! dependent! upon! the! sensations! of! causality! [...]!
Consciousness!commences!with!the!sensation!of!causality"!(Nietzsche,!1995,!§19![161].!p.!
52).! Now,! although! this! account! sounds! very! Schopenhauerian! given! the! prominence!
attached! to! the! role! of! causality! in! experience,!unlike! Schopenhauer! Nietzsche! does! not!
believe!that!we!can!proceed!from!this!to!the!claim!that!we!have!experience!of!objects!from!
causality! alone.! In! fact,! Nietzsche! sees! the! belief! in! the! possibility! of! nonXconceptual!
cognition!as!a!kind!of!faith!retained!by!philosophers!and!nonXphilosophers!alike.!We!find!a!
notebook! entry! where! Nietzsche! expresses! his! belief! that! a! discursive! understanding! is!
simply!a!fact!of!our!intellect,!and!that!as!such,!cognition!must!necessarily!happen!through!
concepts,!or!metaphors.!He!claims!that!knowing!does!not!want!metaphors!for!things,!but!
wants! to! know! the! very! thing! itself,! as! an! appearance! given! to! us! in! intuition;! cognition!
"wants! to! hold! onto! the! impression! without!metaphor,! and! without! any! consequences"!
(Nietzsche,!1995,!§19! [228]!p.!71).!But,!he! then!acknowledges! that! there!can!be!"no2real2
knowing2without2metaphor.2But!the!deception!about!this!fact!remains,!that!is,!the!faith!in!a!
truth!of!sensory!impressions"!(Ibid.).!The!second!statement!makes!clear!that!Nietzsche!sees!
the! possibility! of! nonXconceptual! cognition! –! that! is,! knowing! a! world! of! primary!
impressions!–!as!impossible;!"Knowledge! is!nothing!but!operating!with!the!most!favoured!
metaphors"! (Ibid.).! Thus,! for! Nietzsche,! the! discursivity! of! our! understanding! is! an!
inescapable! fact! of! our! form! of! cognition,! and! experience! of! the! world! in! the! form! of!








falsity! and!error.126!We!also! saw! that!Nietzsche's! analysis!of! empirical! concepts!was! very!
similar!to!Kant's!account! in!his! JL.!But!the!question!which!faces!us!then! is!what!exactly! is!
Nietzsche! trying! to! achieve! in! TL! (and! notebook! writings)! by! criticising! the! process! of!
concept!formation?!
! Nietzsche! seems! to! vacillate! between! a! Kantian! and! a! Schopenhauerian! position!
when! highlighting! the! problem! with! empirical! concepts,! and! it! is! in! fact! this! vacillation!
which!ultimately!renders!his!position!obscure!to!the!point!of!almost!being!banal.!As!evident!
from!the!notebook!writings,!he!is!committed!to!the!discursivity!of!our!understanding!as!a!
matter! of! fact.! However,! it! is! equally! clear! from! his! discussion! in! TL! that! the! concept!
inevitably! falsifies! reality.!Now,! although!Nietzsche’s! position! is! not! contradictory!per2 se,!
there! is! a! sense! in!which!holding!onto!both!of! these!points! trivialises!his! criticism!of!our!
‘truths’!being!illusory.!If!we!consider!Nietzsche’s!claim!that!cognition!inevitably!falsifies!the!
world! (Nietzsche,! 1995,! §19! [228],! p.! 71),! and! if! we! accept! that! this! is! not! to! do! with!
mediation!of! the! thingXinXitself,! then! it! should!be! clear! that!Nietzsche’s! argument! in! fact!
demands!that!our!cognition!be!discursive;!for!only!in!this!way!is!the!falsification!of!reality!
by! cognition! inevitable.! Knowledge,! according! to! Nietzsche,! needs! and! requires!
conceptualisation;! it! cannot! know! the! world! as! it! appears! in! our! primary! impressions.!
Concepts,! on! the! other! hand,! according! to! Nietzsche’s! (and! Kant’s)! account! of! concept!
creation,! are! created! by! simultaneously! disregarding! the! specificities! between! primary!
impressions!and!only!considering!those!qualities!which!are!deemed!to!be!essential!in!some!
respect.!Thus,!when!something!is!cognised!(through!a!concept)! it! is!cognised!through!and!
as2a!universal.! This! is!not! to! say! that! the!object! is!assumed! to!be! identical!with!all!other!
instantiations! of! the! same! concept.! Green! poses! such! an! objection! to! this! reading! of!
Nietzsche’s! error! theory!when! he! says:! “When! I! judge! something! to! be! square,! I! do! not!








A! is!wooden!and!B! is!metallic.!Although!I!cognise!both!objects!as!tables,! I!do!not!thereby!
cognise!them!as!being!qualitatively! identical! in!every!respect;! that! is,! I! recognise!that!the!
tables! differ! with! respect! to! their! materials.! However,! this! difference! is! once! again!
understood!or!experienced!conceptually,!which!is!to!say,!that!the!concept!‘wooden’!is!itself!








must! be! done! through! another! concept,! which! once! again! is,! or! at! least! may! be,!
disregarding!aspects!of!the!primary!impression!from!which!it!arose.!In!fact,!we!should!recall!
that!Nietzsche’s!criticism!is!of!a!discursive2understanding.!His!point!is!not,!then,!that!with!a!





relevance! of! his! attack! on! cognition.! Although! we! may! agree! with! his! analysis! of! the!
inevitable!‘falsification’!of!a!world!of!primary!impressions!through!conceptual!thought,!it!is!
the!equation!of!primary!impressions!with!reality!which!I!do!not!believe!Nietzsche!manages!









whereby! he! endorses! the! discursivity! thesis.! Thus,! he! may! have! argued! himself! into! a!
position!whereby!he!may!claim!that!concepts!falsify!–!but!what!exactly!it!is!that!they!falsify!
cannot! be! called! reality.! We! should! also! question! the! relevance! of! arguing! for! the!
falsification!of!reality!from!an!unobtainable!perspective!on!‘reality’.!Is!there!any!warrant!for!
claiming!that!our!experience!always!falsifies!reality!as!it!presents!itself!to!us,!even!though!
we! never! have! any! access! or! experience! of! the! world! under! this! aspect?! This! question!
becomes!even!more!pressing!when!we!consider!that!the!aspect!of!cognition!responsible!for!
falsification,! namely! the! concept,! has!been! revealed! to!be! absolutely!necessary! for!us! to!
have!any!experience!of!either!an!object!or!a!self.!Of!course,!Nietzsche!would!undoubtedly!





the! alleged! illusoriness! of! our! empirical! knowledge! claims! in! the! process! of! concept!
formation!and!cognition!of!objects!through!concepts.!I!argued!that!Nietzsche’s!error!theory!
is! to! be! found! in! his! criticism! of! our! possession! of! a! discursive! understanding,! which!
somehow!removes!us!from!our!objects!as!they!are!originally!given!to!us!through!intuition.!
This! led! us! to! consider!where! Nietzsche! stood! on! the! possibility! vs! impossibility! of! nonX





endorses! the! discursivity! claim! –! a! fact! which! I! argued! diminishes! the! strength! of! his!
argument.! Interestingly,! however,! we! find! that! Nietzsche’s! epistemology! in! this! early!
period!seems!to!be!far!more!Kantian!than!Schopenhauerian!–!a!perhaps!unexpected!result.!
What!we!will!see!in!the!final!chapter!of!this!section!(Chapter!8)!is!that!perhaps!the!biggest!
















































a! sceptical! argument! regarding! the! objective! validity! of! our! empirical! concepts.! I! believe!







Nietzsche’s! own! epistemology! suffers;! it! is! rather! presented! as! a! critique! of! both!
philosophers’!accounts!of!empirical!concept!formation.!!




“Let! us! now! think! in! particular! of! how! concepts! are! formed:! every! word! immediately!
becomes! a! concept! precisely! because! it! is! not! intended! to! serve! as! a! reminder! of! the!
unique,! entirely! individualised! primal! experience! to! which! it! owes! its! existence,! but!
because!it!has!to!fit!at!one!and!the!same!time!countless!more!or!less!similar!cases!which,!
strictly! speaking,! are! never! equal! or,! in! other!words,! are! always! unequal.! Every! concept!
comes!into!being!through!the!equation!of!nonXequal!things.!As2certainly2as2no2leaf2 is2ever2
completely2 identical2 to2 another,2 so2 certainly2 the2 concept2 of2 leaf2 is2 formed2 by2 arbitrarily2
shelving2 these2 individual2 differences2 or2 forgetting2 the2 distinguishing2 features”! (Nietzsche,!
TL,! 1979,! p.83,! my! emphases).127! ! However,! since! this! account! of! empirical! concept!
formation!has!been!addressed!more!in!Kant!studies!than!it!has!in!Nietzsche!studies,!I!shall!









which! he! labels! the! apperceptive! and! phenomenalist! approaches.! The! apperceptive!
approach!tries!to!secure!a!necessary!unity!of!appearances!through!the!spontaneity!of!the!
understanding.!This,!Kant!(arguably)!achieves!for!the!categories!through!them!having!their!










a!necessary!unity,!and!yet! this!necessary!unity! is!of!quite!a!peculiar!kind! for! it! is!not! the!
necessity!which!a2priori!concepts!have!by!virtue!of!being!prescribed!by!the!subject!to!the!
synthesis! of!whatever2 intuitions! he! may! have.! And! yet,! despite! this,! when! I! cognise! an!
object! through,! for! example,! the! concept! ‘body’,! I! do! not! represent! those! ‘marks’!which!
make!up!the!concept!body,!such!as!heaviness,! impenetrability,!or!shape,!as!merely!being!
associated!with!the!concept!body,!but!rather!I!represent!them!as!“necessarily2belonging!to!
the! singular! objects! cognized! under! the! concept! of! body! […]! This! means! that! they! are!






We! saw! in! Ch.! 7.1,! that! Kant! gives! (in! JL)! a! description! of! the! logical! acts! of! the!
understanding! through! which! empirical! concepts! are! created.! These! acts! of! the!
understanding!are:!comparison,!reflection,!and!abstraction.129!What!Kant!means!by!this! is!
that!empirical!concepts!are!formed!by!reflecting!on,!comparing,!and!abstracting!from!our!
particular! representations! in! order! to! see! similarity! between! them! in! what! we! consider!
essential! and! omitting! all! the! differences! which! we! believe! to! be! inessential! in! some!
respect.! It! is! worth! mentioning! here! again! the! passage! from! JL! where! Kant! gives! the!
example!of!how!we!form!the!empirical!concept!of!a!tree:!
“I! see,! e.g.,! a! spruce,! a! willow,! and! a! linden.! By! first! comparing! these! objects! with! one!
another! I! note! that! they! are! different! from! one! another! in! regard! to! the! trunk,! the!
branches,! the! leaves,! etc.;! but! next! I! reflect! on! that!which! they!have! in! common!among!
themselves,!trunk,!branches,!and!leaves!themselves,!and!I!abstract!from!the!quantity,!the!
figure,!etc.,!of!these;!thus!I!acquire!a!concept!of!a!tree”!(Kant,!JL,!1992,!§6,2p.!592n).!!
But! this! account! implies! that! exactly!which! empirical! concept! should! be! used! to!
unite!appearances!depends,!in!one!respect,!on!the!material!that!is!given,!not!merely!upon!
some!spontaneity!of! the!understanding.! It! is! true!that! it! is! the! intellect,!broadly,!which! is!
responsible! for! subsuming! appearances! under! intuitions! and! that! this! is! an! activity,! but!












being! 'similar'! in! some! fundamental! respects! to! another! appearance,! and!which!we! then!
proceed! to! consider! an! instantiation! of! the! same! concept.! Our! concern,! then,! is! the!
presence! or! absence! of! a! form! of! ruleXgovernedness! for! the! subsumption! of! our!
appearances!under!empirical!concepts.!!
! Kant!would! claim! that! concepts! act! as! rules! for! the! subsumption!of! appearances!
under! themselves.!At!A106,! for!example,!Kant!gives! the!example!of!an!empirical! concept!
such! as! ‘body’! and! says! “The! concept!of! body,! for! instance,! as! the!unity!of! the!manifold!
which!is!thought!through!it,!serves!as!a!rule!in!our!cognition!of!outer!appearances”!(A!106).!
The!way! that! intuitions!are! related! to!concepts! is! through,!what!Kant! calls,! their! ‘marks’.!
The!empirical!concept!is!created!by!comparing!our!sensible!representations!and!searching!
for! these! common! marks! (Longuenesse,! 1998,! p.! 115).! We! then! require! a! ‘rule! of!
apprehension’! instructing! us! which! marks! we! are! to! privilege! in! our! logical! acts! of!




on! certain! universal! marks! which! we! recognise! amongst! these! intuitions.! Through! the!
relevant! schema,! we! then! obtain! the! rule! as! to! which!marks! we! ought! to! privilege! and!
which! we! ought! to! disregard.! Longuenesse! summarizes! this! point! when! she! says! that!
“These!two!operations!of!comparison!and!reflection,!being!the!search!for!what!is!different!
and! common! (qualitatively2 identical),! exhibit! the! first! aspect! of! the! ‘silent! judgment’!
presiding!over!the!genesis!of!empirical!concepts”!(Longuenesse,!1998,!p.!134).!!
! As! we! have! seen! therefore,! Kant! is! committed! to! there! being! a! form! of! ruleX







against! Kant’s! account! of! concept! formation.! The! first! strand! focuses! on! the! problem! of!
possessing! the! rule! of! apprehension! prior! to! the! concept.! The! argument!which!was! first!
introduced!by!Allison,! and!which!has! received!more!attention! recently!by!Ginsborg,! runs!
along!the!lines!that!to!have!the!rule!of!apprehension!instructing!us!which!marks!to!favour!
and!which! to!disregard!must! imply!already!possessing! the!concept.!The!second!strand!of!
criticism,! which! I! shall! invoke,! and! to! which! I! believe! Ginsborg’s! arguments! are! also!
susceptible,!is!that!regardless!of!whether!we!have!the!rule!of!apprehension!or!not,!the!very!
use!of!marks!as!a!basis!for!discrimination!of!features!is!itself!a!conceptual!mode!of!relating!










the! issue! as:! "The!basic! problem! [...]! is! that! Kant's! official! account! of! how!we! form! such!
concepts,!namely,!by!noting!common!features!shared!by!diverse!particulars!and!abstracting!
from! the!differences,! seems! to!presuppose!what! it!purports! to!explain.! For!how!can!one!
recognize!such!commonality!without!in!a!sense!already!having!the!concept?!(Allison,!2004,!






possess! the! concepts! leaf,!branch,! trunk.! So!we! need! to! explain! the! acquisition! of! these!
concepts!on!the!basis!of!further!concepts,!and!a!regress!threatens"!(Ginsborg,!2006,!p.!39).!
Although! Ginsborg! seems! to! be! bringing! attention! to! the! problem! of! the!marks! already!














Thus,! there! seems! to! be! something! more! to! representing! a! general! property!
common!to!several!objects!than!to!merely!have!the!disposition!to!associate!the!two!ideas.!
Ginsborg! proposes! that! what! is! missing! from! Hume's! account! is! a! notion! of!










tendency! that!everyone2ought2 to! feel!when!entertaining! the! idea!of! a! linden"! (Ginsborg,!
2006,! p.! 49).! Ginsborg! tries! to! ascribe! a! similar! account! to! Kant! and! she! invokes! Kant's!
account! of! reproductive! synthesis! in! support! of! her! reading.! According! to! her,! Kant's!
account! of! reproductive! synthesis,! which! is! twoXfold,! requires! firstly! that! we! reproduce!
previous!perceptions!"that! immediately!preceded!a!current!perception! in!order!to!form!a!








of! it! is!what!Ginsborg!refers! to!as! the!normative!significance!of! the!reproduction;! that! is,!
the!belief!that!everyone2ought2to!associate!the!ideas!under!consideration!the!way!I!do.!As!
















again! that! "the! very! idea! that! my! mental! activity! is! as! it! ought! to! be! presupposes! the!
antecedent!idea!of!a!rule!or!concept!that!dictates!how!it!ought!to!be"!(Ginsborg,!2006,!p.!
55).!
!In! response! to! this,! she! gives! the! example! of! how! children! ordinarily! come! to!
acquire!new!concepts!by!being!presented!with!different!objects!and!being!asked!to! ‘sort’!
these!together.!Thus,!she!give!the!example!of!how!a!child!comes!to!learn!the!concepts!of!
'solid',! 'liquid',! and! 'gas'! by! being! presented! with! objects! and! being! asked! whether! the!
'chalk'!goes!with!(or!belongs!to)!the!stone,!the!bottle!of!water,!or!the!balloon!(Ibid.).!The!
child!will! then,!most! likely! (or!eventually),! sort! the!chalk! together!with!the!stone!without!
already! knowing! that! the! stone! and! the! chalk! are! both! 'solid'.! Ginsborg's! point! is! that!
although!the!child!does!not!have!a!prior!conception!of!the!concept!'solid',!he!nonetheless!
takes! his! sorting! to! be! appropriate! X! that! is,! how! the! object!ought2 to2be! sorted.! Now,! a!
counter! argument! to! this! would! be! that! if! we! take! the! activity! of! the! child! to! be! ruleX
governed,!then!the!child!must!at! least!be!able!to!consider!the!possibility!that!her!activity!
fails!to!accord!with!the!rule.!But,!the!question!is:!how!could!the!child!ever!see!this,! if!the!




contravening! the! rule! and! likewise! to! take! herself! as! having! contravened! the! rule! in! the!
past!when!her!activity!was!different!(Ginsborg,!2006,!p.!56).!!
Ginsborg!realises!two!objections!to!this!point.!The!first,!which!she!merely!glosses,!is!
that! surely! the! subject! would! recognise! that! whatever! she! does! will! always! be! in!
accordance!with!a!rule!(Ibid.).!But!there!is!more!to!this!point!than!Ginsborg!seems!to!allow!




We! cannot,! of! course,! preclude! the! possibility! of! sorting! objects! ‘inappropriately’133,! and!
therefore!it!is!certainly!at!least!possible!that!the!child!fails!to!sort!the!chalk!with!the!stone,!
and!rather!sorts! it!with!the!balloon.!On!this!occasion,!the!child!would!still!believe!that! its!
activity! is! rule! governed,! and! surely! on! Ginsborg's! account! its! activity! would2 be! ruleX
governed.! Sometime! later,! the! child! comes! to! realise! that! the! chalk! 'ought! to'! be! sorted!
with! the! stone,! and! proceeds! to! do! so.! Once! again,! we! must! conclude,! on! Ginsborg's!
account,!that!the!child!both!thought!that!he!was,!and!that!he!indeed2was,!acting!in!a!ruleX
governed! manner.! But! the! trouble! now! is! that! the! word! ruleXgovernedness! seems! to!
preclude!that!both!activities!of!sorting!are!rule!governed!(if!the!sorting!is!being!done!with!
respect! to! states! of!matter! and! not,! say,!with! respect! to! colour).! Surely,! if! concepts! are!









surely! recognise! that! "others! who! act! differently! are! according! with! rules! that! are!
exemplified!by!what!they2are!doing.!So!it!would!seem!that!she!is!not!in!a!position!to!make!
sense!of!anyone's!ever!failing!to!act!as!they!ought"!(Ibid.).!Ginsborg's!reply!to!the!second!
objection! is! that! if!a!subject! takes!his!own!activity! to!be!ruleXgoverned,!he!will!not,!upon!










governed! too;! in! fact! he! will! deny! that! the! latter! is! acting! in! any! rule! governed! fashion!




that! A! has! no! basis! for! believing! that! his! activity! is! ruleXgoverned! and! that! B's! is! not.!
Likewise,! B! can! press! the! same! point! against! A! in! believing! that! he! is! acting! in! a! ruleX
governed! manner! and! that! A! is! not.! Ginsborg! replies! to! this! that! the! two! subjects! can!
"disagree!about!what!is!appropriate!in!a!given!case![...]!without!a!criterion's!being!available!
to!resolve!that!disagreement"!(Ginsborg,!2006,!p.!57).!Although!this!may!be!true!insofar!as!






that! A! is! in! fact! correct! and! B! is! wrong;! nothing! about! her! reading! can! vindicate! one!
position! over! another.! In! fact,! her! reading! seems! to! reduce! the! necessary! unity!which! a!
concept!is!meant!to!possess!to!an!arbitrary2unity;!a!unity!which!is!correct!by!virtue!of!the!
fact! that! the! subject! united! it! in! that! way! –! with! the! rule! being! supplemented! simply!
through! the! activity! of! the! subject;! and! regardless! of! whether! the! subject! sorts! objects!
differently!at!t1!than!it!does!at!t2,!or!if!subject!A!sorts!objects!differently!from!subject!B!X!in!
all! instances! the! activity! is! ruleXgoverned.! It! seems! to! me! that! on! such! a! reading,! we!
completely!lose!the!meaning!of!ruleXgoverned!synthesis.!!
There!is!one!more!generic!issue!with!Ginsborg’s!reading!that!I!would!like!to!simply!











linden! leads! my! mind! to! the! idea! of! the! sycamore.! But! a! very! basic! question! which!
confronts!her!is:!As2what!is!the!thought!or!idea!of!the!sycamore!brought!before!our!‘mind’s!
eye’?!When!I!have!a!perception!of!a!linden!tree,!which!in!turn!gives!rise!to!the!idea!of!the!
sycamore,! the! sycamore! is! surely! brought! before! my! mind! either! as! intuition! or! as! a!
concept?!But! if!we!agree!with!Kant! that! thought!can!only!occur! in!concepts!and!never! in!
intuitions!(a!claim!which!does!not!seem!particularly!controversial,!and!with!which!Ginsborg!
must!agree!herself),134!then!we!must!conclude!that!my!perception!of!the!linden!gives!rise!
















question! to! pose! Kant! is:! how,! at! the! preXconceptual! level,! may! we! spot! marks! of! an!




are! all!marks! conceptual?! If! Kant! affirms! the! second! claim,! then!his! position! is! of! course!
circular;! however,! even! if! he!does!not! affirm! that! all!marks! are! grasped!via! concepts,! he!
must!yet!nonetheless!demonstrate!how!we!can!spot!a!mark!amongst!our!representations!
when!the!mark! is!not!meant! to!be! recognised!conceptually.! !How!can!a!subject!compare!
any! two!appearances!without! thinking!of! the!appearances'! ‘characteristics’! conceptually?!
If,! as! according! to! Hegel,! thinking! of! ‘something’135! nonXconceptually,! at! most,! means!
thinking!of! it! as!nothing!more! than!a!universal! 'this,!here,!now',! it! is!difficult! to! see!how!
such! a! way! of! relating! to! a! thing! may! provide! the! basis! for! comparing! ‘characteristics’!
between!the!thing!under!consideration!and!some!other!thing.!The!problem!becomes!more!
evident!when!we!consider!the!example!of!the!concept!tree!that!Kant!gives!us! in!JL!about!
empirical! concept! creation.! Kant! speaks! about! us! noting! differences! in! the! trunks,!
branches,! leaves,! etc.! of! our! different! representations! of! trees,! and! how,! through!
abstracting!what!is!different!and!noting!what!is!similar,!we!come!to!form!the!concept.!But!
the! problem! with! Kant’s! example! is! that! it! is,! inevitably,! one! which! presumes! that!
discrimination! is! done! conceptually.! Thus,! if! we! think! of! categorisation! at! two! different!
levels,! the! general! and! the! transcendental,! we! may! call! Kant’s! account! one! of! general!
categorisation! for! it! assumes! that!we! are! categorising! something! according! to! concepts.!
But! what!we! are! dealing!with! here! is! categorisation! at! the! transcendental! level,! that! is,!












formation!must! not! only! presuppose! some! preXfigurative! level! of! conceptual! experience!
(N.B.! the! sycamore! is! brought! before! the! mind! as! a! concept),! but! also! that! her! idea! of!
concept!creation! is! still!one!which! relies!on! looking! for! similarity!and!difference!between!
our!perceptual!objects.!To!see!why!this!is!so,!we!may!once!again!return!to!the!example!of!A!
























which!x!differs! from!y,!or! something!on! the!basis!of!which!x! is! similar! to!y.137!Now,!Kant!
may! reply! that! this! ‘something’! on! the! basis! of! which! similarity! and! difference! is!
represented!is!the!mark,!but!to!this!we!may!reply!that!the!mark!already!presupposes!that!
the!manifold!of!intuition!is!delineated!and!that!amongst!it!we!spot!difference.!The!reason!
for! this! is! that! the!mark! is2 itself2 a2 representation! from! the!manifold! of! intuition;! indeed!
“every!mark!‘can!be!considered!as!a!representation!in!itself’”!(Smit,!2000,!p.!248).138!But,!in!
order! for! the! representation! to! act! as! a! mark! it! must! stand! out! from! the! manifold! of!
intuition,! as! something! which! can! be! related! to! other! representations.! Thus,! the! very!
possession! of! marks! presumes! that! we! can! see! difference! and! similarity! amongst! the!
manifold!of!intuition.!This,!in!turn,!means!that!the!marks!cannot!be!used!as!that2upon2the2

































and! delineation! of! the! intuitive! manifold! simply! means! synthesis! of! the!manifold! under!




of! green! (say! a!brown!bench! in! front!of! the! linden! tree)! are!not!part! of! the!perception?!
Surely,! in! order! for! any! association! to! occur! between! the! linden! and! our! idea! of! the!
sycamore,2 we2 must2 first2 have2 picked2 out2 the2 linden2 from! our! manifold! of! intuition.!
Otherwise! it! would! be! the! entire! sensible! manifold! for! which! we! would! search! an!
association!(if!this!is!even!possible).!Thus,!we!find!with!Ginsborg’s!account!that!not!only!is!
that!which!is!associated!with!the!perception!a!concept,!but!the!perception!itself!seems!to!














We!must!now! relate! this! to!our!discussion!on!objective! validity.!We! saw!earlier! that! the!
problem!with!the!objective!validity!of!empirical!concepts!was!that!empirical!concepts!have!
a! receptive! element.! This! means! that! there! is! something! about! the! very! sensations!




be! a! recognition! of! similarity! or! difference! because! these! can! only! be! recognised!












without!an!account!of!how! the! subsumption!of! appearances!under! concepts! is!meant! to!
express!a!necessary2unity;!and!without!such!an!account!the!certainty!with!which!I!can!know!
that!my!object!is!in2fact!an!X!and!not!a!Y!seems!to!be!diminished.!!
We! should! also! note! that! this! problem! is! precisely! the! result! of! the! receptive!
component! of! cognition.! These! were! problems! which! we! did! not! encounter! in! the!
188!
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transcendental! deduction,! that! is,! in! an! area! where! Kant! could! use! the! apperceptive!
approach! for!explaining! the!combination!of! intuitions.!There,! it!was!merely!a!question!of!
the! selfXascription! of! representations,! regardless! of! their! character.! But! the! receptive!
element!of!empirical!concepts!means!that!the!apperceptive!approach!is!not!available!to!us!
when! dealing! with! the! necessary! unity! of! these! concepts.! Because,! if! the! unification! of!
appearances!is!done!regardless!of!the!character!of!these!appearances,!whatever!object!we!




of! its! specific! character.!When!we! deal!with! empirical! concepts,! on! the! other! hand,! and!
therefore!have! to! account! for! the! receptive! element!of! our! representation,!we!have! this!
seemingly! unbridgeable! gap!whereby!we! have! to!move! from! the! nonXconceptual! to! the!
conceptual! which! also! means! that! we! have! to! presume! some! form! of! recognition! of!
particulars! amongst! our! representations! without! these! particulars! being! particulars! of! a!
universal.!The!threat!to!objective!validity!results!because!objective!validity!requires!a!rule!




the! world.! But! if! we! lose! that! upon! which! the! rule! depends! for! its! subsumption! of!

















of! reality! we! ought! to! assign! appearances! displayed! an! ambivalence! in! his! attitude!
regarding!whether!the!reality!of!appearances!is!undermined!because!of!a!lack!of!guarantee!
of!correspondence! to! the! thingXinXitself.!This! led!us! to!Chapter!7,!where! I! considered! the!






the! discursivity! thesis! –! a! fact!which! I! argued! undermines! the! strength! of! his! argument.!
What! emerges! from! this! part! of! our! study! is! a! picture! of! Nietzsche! as! someone! whose!
epistemological!concerns!in!his!early!period!are!firmly!rooted!in!Kant’s!philosophy!and!that!


































Nietzsche!rejects!–!as! incoherent!–!the!very! idea!of!an!object!existing! in!and!of! itself.!His!
attacks! on! this! concept,! from! epistemological! considerations,140! are! launched! from! a!
variety!of!different! angles;! at! times!Nietzsche! rejects! the! idea!of! something!possessing!a!
constitution! in! itself,141! at! other! times! he! attacks! the! idea! of! an! object! existing! without!
being! in! (causal)! interaction! with! other! objects,142! and! lastly,! he! sometimes! rejects,! as!
unintelligible,!the!idea!that!there!could!be!any!such!thing!as!an!object!without!some!kind!of!
perspective! on! it.143! It! is! beyond! the! scope! and! intention! of! this! chapter! to! consider! the!
nuances!of!each!position!and!how!they!relate!to!each!other.!Rather,!I!wish!to!focus!on!the!
last! of! the! aforementioned! lines! of! criticism,! in! which! we! also! find! Nietzsche's! own!
epistemology!of!perspectivism.!Its!claim!is,!in!essence,!very!similar!to!the!Schopenhauerian!
one!which!avers!that!to!be!an!object!is!to!be!an!object!for!a!subject.!We!shall!explore!this!
line! of! argument! to! see! firstly,! why! Nietzsche! identifies! the! thingXinXitself! with! a! nonX
perspectival! object! and! secondly,! why! nonGperspectival2 object! is,! according! to! him,! an!




















crucial! blow! to! Kant's! thingXinXitself.! To! consider! the! success! of! Nietzsche’s! arguments!
requires! us! to! reXvisit! Kant! on! the! issue! of! the! possibility! of! thinking! the! concept! of! the!
thingXinXitself.!We!will!then!turn!to!consider,!and!defend!our!position!against,!a!certain!line!
of! argument! through! which! it! may! appear! as! if! our! proposed! reading! of! Nietzsche’s!
rejection! of! the! thingXinXitself! rests! on! a! conflation! between! epistemological! and!
ontological!claims.!Having!defended!Nietzsche’s!rejection!of!the!thingXinXitself!through!his!
perspectivism,! I! will! finally! consider! whether! his! perspectivism! does! not! itself,! in! fact,!
presuppose! the! need! and! ability! to! refer! to,! and!make! sense! of,! the! idea! of! a! reality! ‘in!
itself’.! Specifically,!we!will! see! that!Nietzsche’s!equation!of! the! thingXinXitself!with!a!nonX
perspectival!object!presupposes!the!receptivity!thesis!with!regard!to!our!intuitions;!and!this2
thesis,!we!will! demonstrate,! requires! and! presupposes! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself.!
Ultimately! we! will! find,! as! we! did! in! Chapter! 5! on! Schopenhauer’s! critique! of! Kant’s!



































question! 'what! is! that?'! is! an! imposition!of!meaning! from! some!other! viewpoint.!
'Essence',! the! 'essential! nature',! is! something! perspectiv[al]! and! already!
presupposes! a!multiplicity.!At! the!bottom!of! it! there! always! lies! 'what! is! that! for!
me?'!(for!us,!for!all!that!lives,!etc.)!A!thing!would!be!defined!once!all!creatures!had!
asked! 'what! is! that?'! and! had! answered! their! question.! Supposing! one! single!





(2) "That! things!possess! a! constitution! in! themselves!quite! apart! from! interpretation!




(3) "To!think!away!the!subject!X! that! is!to!represent!the!world!without!a!subject:! is!a!





(4) “But! I! will! say! this! a! hundred! times:! ‘immediate! certainty,’! like! ‘absolute!
knowledge’!and!the!‘thing!in!itself’!contains!a!contradictio2in2adjecto”!(BGE!16).!!
Nietzsche's! claim! in! these! passages! is! twoXfold:! firstly,! that! the! thingXinXitself! must! be!
thought!of! as! a!nonXperspectival!object,! and! secondly,! that! the! 'perspectival'! property!of!
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that! nonXperspectival! objects! are! impossible,! a! prior! task! is! to! determine! on! what! basis!
Nietzsche! equates! the! thingXinXitself!with! a! nonXperspectival! object.! Kant! himself! did! not!
formulate!the!concept! in! these!terms,!so! it!would!seem!reasonable!to!ask!why!Nietzsche!
formulates!it!as!such.!!
We!may! recall! from! chapter! 2:! 5! that,! in! the! Transcendental! Aesthetic,! Kant! defined!
thingsXinXthemselves! as! “things!when! they! are! considered! in! themselves! through! reason,!
i.e.,! without! taking! account! of! the! constitution! of! our! sensibility”! (A28/B44).! We! find,!
towards!the!end!of!the!Transcendental!Analytic,!a!similar!formulation!of!the!concept!of!a!
noumenon! in! the! negative! sense,! where! Kant! says! “If! by! a! noumenon!we! understand! a!
thing!insofar!as!it!is!not!an!object!of!our!sensible!intuition,!because!we!abstract!from!the!
manner!of!our!intuition!of!it,!then!this!is!a!noumenon!in!the!negative!sense”!(B!307).145!The!
thingXinXitself,! then,! is! the!object!as! it! is! independently!of! the!contribution!of!our!a2priori!
forms! of! intuition.! But,! as! we! saw! in! Ch.! 2.3,! this! raises! the! question! of! whether!
‘independently! of! the! contribution!of! our!a2priori! forms’! ought! to! be! read! as!definitively!
lacking! those! forms! or! merely! as! expressing! an! impossibility! regarding! our! ability! to!
justifiably!ascribe!our!a2priori!forms!to!reality!in!itself!not;!in!short,!the!question!is!whether!
Kant! is! justified! in! claiming! that! thingsXinXthemselves! are! necessarily!nonXspatiotemporal!
(Kant’s! ontological! denial! of! space).! As! we! argued,! Kant! believed! that! we! can! justifiably!
deny! spatioXtemporality! of! reality! in! itself.! Kant’s! reasoning! for! this! was! an! alleged!












that! which! remains! once! we! abstract! our! contribution! to! objects?! Presumably! we!must!
think!of!it!as!devoid!of!that!which!we!bring!to!experience,!even!if!it!is!logically!possible!for!
that! thing! to!possess,! in!and!of! itself,! the!determinations!which!we!bring.!Or!again,! if!we!
wish! to! consider! the! object! as! it! is! in! itself,! and! we! know! at! the! same! time! that! our!
cognition/perspective!brings!certain!determinations!to!experience,!then!we!must!abstract!
the! contribution!of!our! cognition/perspective! from!objects.! The! thingXinXitself! is!precisely!
the! thing!as! it! is!when! it! is!not!mediated!by! the!subject’s! cognition.!Thus,! the!viability!of!
Trendelenburg’s!neglected!alternative!does!not!change!our!conception!of!the!thingXinXitself!
insofar!as!we!are!giving!an!account!of!the!emergence!of!objective!experience.!In!order!for!
us! to! justifiably! think! the! thingXinXitself! through! space! and! time,!we!must! either! possess!
intellectual!intuition147!or!we!must!be!able,!through!the!neglected!alternative,!to!establish!



















space! and! time! are! the! forms!which! our! perspective! brings! to! objects;! indeed,! they! are!
what! constitute2 our! perspective.! Therefore,! to! abstract! space! and! time! is! precisely! to!






must! think!of! it!as! independent!of! the! forms!of!our!cognition!–!that! is,!we!must!subtract!




cannot! be! abstracted! from! our! conception! of! perspective! whilst! still! leaving! us! with! a!
determinate!thought!of!the!concept!of!‘perspective’.!That!is,!we!find!the!concepts!of!space!
and!time!to!be!essential!to!the!concept!of!perspective,!to!the!extent!that!the!latter!cannot!
be! thought! without! the! former.! In! abstracting! spatioXtemporality,! we! abstract! our!
perspective.!!
We! can! see! that! Nietzsche’s! equation! of! the! thingXinXitself! with! a! nonXperspectival!
object! is! argued! for! in! two! steps:! firstly,! the! thingXinXitself,! as! that! which! grounds! our!
phenomenal! objects,! must! be! thought! of! as! independent! of! the! contribution! of! our!
cognition! to!objects.!This! contribution! (of! sensibility)! is! the! forms!of! space!and! time.!The!













! As! is! not! uncharacteristic! of! Nietzsche,! we! find! his! claims! regarding! the! alleged!





object! of! representation! for! a! subject.! To! claim! that! "'all! truth! about! the! world! is!
perspectival'! would! [...]! amount! to! the! claim! that,! necessarily,! all! true! thoughts! (beliefs,!
etc.)! about! the!world! represent! it!as! represented"! (Poellner,! Perspectival! Truth,! 2001,! p.!
90);!meaning!that!implicit!in!the!content!of!every!claim!about!the!world!is!that!that!claim!is!
being!made! from! a! certain! perspective;! or,! phrased! differently,! that! the! content! of! any!
judgment! about! the!world! implies! a! subject!who! is!making! the! judgment,! and! thus,! that!
even!the!very2conception2of2an2object! is!subjectXimplying.!Whenever!we!perceive,!or!even!
conceive!of,!an!object,!we!necessarily!assume!a!certain!point!of!view!or!perspective!on!it.!
In! cases! of! perception! this! is! clearer! and!more! obvious,! but! even!when!we! consider! an!




entertaining! the! thought! of! the! object! at2 all,! we! are! assuming! a! perspective! on! it.!
Therefore,! to! think!of! the!object!without!a! subject! is! something! that!Nietzsche! sees!as!a!
contradictory!demand.148!!
But,!we!may!ask,!on!what!basis!should!we!accept!this!claim?!In!what!way!are!we!to!
understand! the! claim! that! the! subject! resists! any! attempts! at! being! abstracted! from!our!
conception!of!an!object?!!








or! it! at! least! does! not! seem! to! tackle! the! same! issue! to! which! Nietzsche! is! drawing!
attention.!Nietzsche's!point! is! rather! that! in!any! representation! (visual!or!otherwise),! the2
content2 of! my! representation! (of! an! object)! "implies! a! subject! while! not! necessarily! coG
representing2 it"! (Ibid.).! This! becomes! evident! when! we! try! to! perceive! or! imagine! any!
object.!We! find! that!our!object! is! always! represented! from!a!certain!perspective;! that! is,!
the! content! of! my! representation! has! characteristics! which! mark! it! as! represented!
(Poellner,! Perspectival! Truth,! 2001,! p.! 91).! Thus,! if! I! am! (visually)! imagining! a! building,! I!







Perspectival! Truth,! 2001,! p.! 94).! The! point! is! that,! regardless! of! the! specific! sensory!
modality,!at!any!given!time!that!I!am!representing!the!object,!I!do!so!from!a!certain!point!of!
view/perspective,!even!though!I!can!continually!change!my!standpoint!and!experience!the!
object! from!more! perspectives.! Thus,! Nietzsche’s! claim! is! not! the! uncontroversially! true!
claim!that!every! representation!must! imply!a!subject!–!a!claim!which! is! straightforwardly!
true.! His! claim! is! rather! that! through! the! necessarily! perspectival! mode! in! which! any!
content! of! my! representations! appears! to! me,! this! content! is! marked! out! as! being! a!
representation;! that! is,! the! fact! that! I! always! find! the! content! of! my! representation!
presented!from!a!certain!perspective!means!that!the!content2itself!is!subjectXimplying!(not!
merely! that! the! concept! of! a! representation! is! subjectXimplying).!
! It! would! seem,! however,! that! the! argument! above! is! open! to! an! intuitive! and!




temporal! perspective! on! it.! For! example,! if! I! am! looking! down! at! the! ground! from! an!
airplane,!I!visually!experience!cars!as!appearing!to!be!extremely!small!–!they!may!appear!to!
be! a! mere! fraction! of! the! size! of! my! own! body.! However,! I! do! not! proceed! from! this!
observation!to!conclude!that!the!cars!which!I!am!observing!are,!in2fact,!miniscule.!Rather,!I!
attribute!the!appearance!to!this!effect!to!my!spatioXtemporal!location!with!respect!to!the!
cars! and! conclude! that! the! appearance! of! ‘relative! smallness’! is! not! a! property! of! the!
objects!as!such,!but!rather!pertains!to!my!current!perspective!on!them.!Now,!although!it!is!
true! that! in!our!experience!of!objects,!we!constantly!discount! certain! subjective! features!
which!we!(for!the!most!part!correctly)!assign!to!our!specific!perspective,!we!only!ever!do!
this!on!the!basis!of!the!availability!of!another2perspective;!that! is,! in!discounting!a!certain!
property! from! an! object! as! such,! we! do! so! because! we! know! that! through2 another2




objects!which,!as!we!continually!move!and!shift!our!perspective,!we! find! to!be! lacking! in!
our!more!adequate! representations!of! the!object.! It! is!precisely!because!of! this!ability! to!
continually! shift! my! perspective! that! I! can! eventually! judge! which! features! I! should!
attribute!to!the!object!as!such,!and!which!features!I!should!recognise!to!be!dependent!on!











impossibly!of! thinking,!which!might! suggest! an!equation!of! the! two! terms!–! an!equation!
which!could!be!objected!to.!The!question! is!whether!all! thought!must!necessarily! involve!
imagining.!Of!course,! in!one!respect,!thinking!and!imagining!are!different!and!I!may!think!



















claims! that! “all! nonXlogical,! objectXreferring! terms! are! dependent,! either! immediately! or!
indirectly,! on! a! sensory! or! quasiXsensory! acquaintance! with! particulars”! (Poellner,!
Perspectival!Truth,!2001,!p.!92).!According!to!Poellner,!for!Nietzsche,!in!order!for!us!to!be!
able! to! think! a! particular! object! means! that! we! must! ultimately! be! able! to! think! an!
instantiation!of! the!object! in! imagination!and!that!without!such!an!ability!our! ‘terms’!are!
empty! (Poellner,! Perspectival! Truth,! 2001,! p.! 93).151! Indeed,! Nietzsche’s! claim! seems!
intuitively!both!plausible!and!convincing!insofar!as!we!may!feel!a!sense!of!puzzlement!over!
what! it! would! mean! to! think! an! outer! object! without,! however! minimally,! imagining! a!
specific!instantiation!of!that!object.!Moreover,!it!should!be!clear!that!the!nonXperspectival!



























as! it! is! in! and! of! itself.! Kant,! however,! would! disagree! with! this.! It! is! therefore! worth!
considering! Kant's! position! on! this! to! see! whether! or! not! Kant! has! an! argument! which!
Nietzsche!may!have!overlooked.!
Kant!would!claim!that!there!is!no!conceptual!contradiction!in!thinking!the!concept!
of! the! thingXinXitself.! As! Allen! Wood! notes,! "[Kant]! seems! to! regard! it! as! entirely!
permissible!and!even! inevitable! that!we! should!be!able! to! think! the!phenomenal!objects!
around! us! solely! through! pure! concepts! of! the! understanding,! hence! as! they! are! in!
themselves.! If! I! arrive! at! the! concept! of! the! chair! in! the! corner! first! by! cognizing! it!
empirically! and! then! abstracting! from! those! conditions! of! cognition,! so! that! I! think! of! it!
existing!in!itself!outside!those!conditions,!then!it!is!obvious!that!I!am!thinking!of!the!same!
object,! not! of! two! different! objects"! (Wood,! 2005,! p.! 70).! Wood! is,! in! this! passage,!
discussing! a! specific! difference! between! the! oneXworld! and! twoXworld! interpretations! of!
the!relation!between!thingsXinXthemselves!and!phenomena,!but!what!is!interesting!for!our!
purposes!is!that!he!lays!out,!correctly!I!believe,!what!Kant!saw!as!the!possibility!of!thought!
about! thingsXinXthemselves.! Henry! Allison,! in! making! a! similar! point,! claims! that! "the!
cognitive!vacuity!of!a!consideration!of!things!as!they!are!in!themselves!does!not!amount!to!
incoherence.!That!would!only!be!the!case!if!the!understanding!could!not!even!think!things!
apart! from! the! conditions! of! sensibility,! which! Kant! repeatedly! affirms! we! can"! (Allison,!
2004,! p.! 56).! In! fact,! Kant! seems! to! think! that! the! thought! of! thingsXinXthemselves! is! a!
necessary! thought! which! we! are! led! to! when! we! consider! objects! of! experience! as!





appearances.! “In! fact,! if! we! view! the! objects! of! the! senses! as! mere! appearances,! as! is!
fitting,!then!we!thereby!admit!at!the!very!same!time!that!a!thing!in! itself!underlies!them,!
although!we!are!not!acquainted!with!this!thing!as! it!may!be!constituted!in! itself,!but!only!
with! its!appearance,! i.e.,!with! the!way! in!which!our! senses!are!affected!by! this!unknown!
something.!Therefore!the!understanding,!just!by!the!fact!that!it!accepts!appearances,!also!
admits! to! the! existence! of! things! in! themselves,! and! to! that! extent!we! can! say! that! the!
representation! of! such! beings! as! underlie! the! appearances,! hence! of! mere! intelligible!
beings,! is! not!merely! permitted! but! is! unavoidable”! (Prolegomena! 4:315).154Kant’s! point!
seems!to!be!that!the!thought!of!an!object,!as!it!is!in!itself,!is!a!necessary!thought!insofar!as!
we! recognise! that! our! cognition! has! certain! forms! which! it! brings! to! objects.! The!
acceptance!of!our!possession!of!a2priori!determinations!which!we!bring!to!objects,! leaves!
us,! Kant! believes,! necessarily! with! the! thought! of! these! objects! as! abstracted! from! our!
contributions!to!them.!Thus,!the!thought!of!the!thingXinXitself,!far!from!being!an!impossible!
thought,!is,!for!Kant,!a!necessary2one.!!
But! what! we! have! argued! so! far! does! not! seem! in! any! way! to! prove! that! the!
thought!of! such!objects! is!possible.!By!analogy,!we!may! think!of! the! tendency!of! reason,!



















that! “it! is! also! a! requisite! for! one! to!make! an! abstract! concept! sensible,! i.e.,! display! the!
object!that!corresponds!to!it! in!intuition,!since!without!this!the!concept!would!remain!(as!
one! says)! without! sense,! i.e.,! without! significance”! (A240/B299).! Thus,! we! ought! to! ask,!
does! this!not,!as!suggested!by!Gardner,!“[rule]!out!as!strictly!meaningless!his!own!claims!
that! things! in! themselves! exist”?! (Gardner,! 1999,! p.! 281).! On! Gardner’s! reading,! Kant’s!
claim!that!the!categories,!void!of!intuitive!content,!are!without!sense!(or!empty!of!content)!
does!not!amount!to!the!claim!that!we!cannot!think2objects!merely!through!the!categories,!
but! rather! that! in! isolation! from! sensibility,! the! categories! cannot! be! used! to! give! us!






sensibility,! through! pure! concepts! alone.! It! would! therefore! seem! apposite! to! consider!
Kant’s!own!distinction!between!thought!and!cognition.!We!will!then!be!in!a!better!position!
to!consider!whether!the!demand!to!think!the!thingXinXitself!is!a!contradictory!one!or!not.!
Kant! states! in! the! preface! to! CPR! that! "even! if! we! cannot! cognize! these! same!
objects! [appearances]!as! things! in! themselves,!we!at! least!must!be!able!to!think!them!as!
things! in! themselves"! (B! xxvi).! To! this,! Kant! adds! the! following! footnote! to! clarify! the!
difference!between!cognizing!and!thinking!an!object.!He!says:!"To!cognize!an!object,! it! is!






total! of! all! possibilities"! (B! xxvi! footnote).155!His! point! seems! to! be! that! in! order! to! have!
cognition!of!a!real!object!my!concept!must!be!capable!of!being!met!with!in!intuition!X!that!
is,! it!must! be! possible! that! something! given! to!me! in! intuition! can! be! objectively! united!
under! the! concept! in! question.! However,! in! order! to! think! about! an! object,! all! that! is!
required! is! that!my!concept!not!be!a!contradictory!one.!Thus,! for!example,!although! I!do!
not!have!cognition!of!a!unicorn,!I!may!very!well!entertain!the!idea!of!such!a!being,!because!
there!is!nothing!contradictory!about!combining!the!concepts!of!'horse'!with!that!of!'horn',!
whereas! in! the! case! of! a! 'square! triangle'! I! cannot! even! think! the! object,! for! I! cannot!
imagine!any!way!in!which!the!two!concepts!may!be!combined!in!one!concept.!The!question!
then! is!whether!Kant's! concept!of! a! thingXinXitself! is! like! that!of! a!unicorn!or!of! a! square!
triangle.!
We! know! that! Nietzsche! believes! the! very! thought! of! the! concept! of! a! thingXinX
itself! to! be! a! “contradiction! in! terms”,156! meaning! that! what! it! asks! for! cannot! be!
coherently!imagined.!Let!us!attempt!to!reXconstruct!Nietzsche’s!argument!so!that!it!tackles!
Kant’s!formulation!directly.!As!we!mentioned!earlier,! it! is!a!central!part!of!Kant's!doctrine!
of! transcendental! idealism! that! space! and! time! are! mere! forms! of! appearances.157!
Moreover,! we! should! recall! from! chapter! 2:! 2.1! that! the! nonXspatiotemporality! of! the!
thingXinXitself! is! also!necessary! for!Kant's! refutation!of! idealism! in! the!Fourth!Paralogism.!

















object,! abstract! from! it! whatever! secondary! qualities! it! may! possess! such! as! colour,!
hardness,!etc.,!and!then!abstract!from!it!its!extension!in!space!and!its!persistence!through!
time,! in! what! way! can! we! say! that! I! may! think! of! whatever! is! ‘left’! as! being! ‘causal’,!
‘substantial’,! and! ‘qualitative’?! That! is,! if! I! abstract! extension! in! space! and! persistence!
through!time!from!my!concept!of!any!object,!have!I!not!in!the!process!abstracted!the!most!
essential!components!of!the!object?!Does!any!meaning!attach!to!the!claim!that!whatever!I!
am! left! with! at! the! end! of! this! process! of! abstraction! can! be! thought! of! as! merely!
categorial?! How,! for! example,! can! the! concept! of! substance! be! thought! (not! merely!
cognised)!if!not!through!a!spatioXtemporal!‘something’!which!endures,!though!its!accidents!
may!change?!How!can!I!think2the!concept!of!causality,!unless!I!think!of!necessity!pertaining!


















When! discussing! the! differences! between! the! oneXworld! and! twoXworld! views,! Gardner!





be! considered.! Why! should! considering! empirical! objects! minus! cognition! be! any! more!
contentful!than!considering!them!minus!their!existence,!or!considering!the!number!2!with!
its! property! of! evenness! cancelled?”! (Gardner,! 1999,! p.! 293).! The! passage! highlights! an!
important!point!and!relates!back!to!our!question!whether!the!concept!of!the!thingXinXitself!
is! like! that! of! a! unicorn! or! of! a! square! triangle.! That! Gardner! gives! the! analogy! to! a!
consideration!of!the!number!‘2’!without!its!property!of!evenness!suggests!that!what!we!are!




whilst! denying! us! the! possibility! of! making! determinate! sense! of! the! concept! with! the!
other”!(Houlgate,!Kant,!Nietzsche!and!the!'Thing!in!Itself',!1993,!p.!124).161!For,!what!we!are!
being!asked!to!do!is!to!think!an!object,!while!at!the!same!time!being!told!that!we!cannot!
think! of! it! along! any! of! the! determinations! of! 'objecthood'.! By! objecthood!we!mean! the!
general! mark! of! truth,! which! is! to! say! the! transcendental! object! –! that! is,! a! wholly!
categorial! item! to! which! any! object! must! conform! insofar! as! it! is! to! be! an! object! of!
cognition.!But!we!know!from!Ch.!3.3!that!the!transcendental!object! is!a!wholly!categorial!
object!precisely2because!it!unites!spatioXtemporal!intuitions!under!apperception.!That!is,!it!
is!only!because!spatioXtemporal! intuitions!must!be!ascribed! to! the! same! identical! ‘I’,! and!





form!of! unification! is! a! categorial! one.162! Thus,! the! transcendental! object,! or! the! general!
mark!of! truth!or! ‘objecthood’! (these! terms!can!be!used! interchangeably)! requires! spatioX
temporal!intuitions!which!it!synthetically!unites!under!apperception.!163!
Thus,! the!more!we! consider! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself,! the!more!we! find!
that! we! cannot! in! fact! think! the! concept! at! all.! As! Poellner! notes! in! making! a! slightly!
different,!though!related,!point,!"we!cannot!even!think!of!the!thing!in!itself!as!a!something,!
an! 'object! in! general',! unless! we! are! prepared! to! consider! it! as! an! item! to! which! some!
predicates! and,! hence,! some! 'concepts! of! the! understanding'! apply"! (Poellner,! Nietzsche!
and!Metaphysics,!1995,!p.!291).164!The!question!facing!Kant,!as!pointed!out!by!Houlgate,!is!
the!following:!“is!it!actually!legitimate!to!use!a!concept,!but!to!declare!in!the!same!breath!
that! one! does! not! intend! that! concept! to! be! understood! in! any! ordinary! sense?!
Furthermore,!is!it!legitimate!to!leave!the!sense!in!which!such!a!concept!is2to!be!understood!
indeterminate!–!or,!at!least,!insufficiently!determinate!–!or!does!not!the!ordinary!sense!of!
the! concept! constantly! reassert! itself! in! the! absence! of! any! determinate! alternative?”!
(Houlgate,!Kant,!Nietzsche!and!the!'Thing!in!Itself',!1993,!p.!126).!Does!not!the!very!process!
of! arriving! at! the! thought! of! a! thingXinXitself! leave! us! without! any! object! to! consider?!
Despite!Kant’s! insistence! that!we! can! think! thingsXinXthemselves,! I! believe! that!Nietzsche!
has! latched! onto! a! contradictory! demand! by! Kant;! namely,! that! at! the! outset! of! Kant's!
theory,!we!are!asked! to!entertain!and!make!use!of!a! concept!which!we!are! incapable!of!
thinking;!moreover,! that! the! impossibility! of! thinking! this! is! something!with!which! Kant,!




















of! Nietzsche’s! rejection! of! the! thingXinXitself! through! a! claim! about! the! necessary!
perspectival! feature! of! objects.!We!may! recall! that! Nietzsche’s! rejection! of! the! thingXinX













from!an!epistemic! restriction! to!a! claim! regarding!ontology.!Could! it!not!be! the!case,! for!
example,!that!a!nonXperspectival!object!reflects!merely!an!inability!by!us!to!imagine!such!a!
thing,! but! that! this! must! not! be! taken! to! imply! an! ontological! impossibility! in! a!




know!whether! there!are! thingsXinXthemselves,! and,!moreover,! that!we!cannot!determine!
what!is!possible!in!a!metaphysical!sense!based!on!our!finite!form!of!cognition.!Thus,!so!the!
argument! goes,! what! Nietzsche’s! argument! really! highlights! is! a! necessary! epistemic!
condition,!required!by!us,!for!the!imagining!of!any!object.!However,!it!does!not!follow!from!




cognitive!power! to!do!so,!and!yet! I!do!not,! in! these! instances,! take! the! limitations!of!my!
cognition! to! imply! that! the! content! of! the! judgment! under! consideration! expresses! an!





indicate!a!metaphysical! impossibility,!but! rather!a! limitation!of!my! imagination! (Poellner,!
Perspectival!Truth,!2001,!p.!97).!!
But! a! more! careful! attentiveness! to! the! argument! should! reveal! that! there! is! a!
crucial! asymmetry! between! the! counterXexamples! provided! and! the! case! under!
consideration!(the!subjectXimplying!aspect!of!objects).!The!difference!is!that!whereas!in!the!




the! thingXinXitself,!which!he!equates!with!a!nonXperspectival! object,! as! a! contradiction! in!
terms! is! of! utmost! importance! in! understanding! the! distinction! between! the! examples!
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However,! in!the!case!of!a! judgment!such!as! ‘there!are!nonXperspectival!objects’! (or!there!
are!thingsXinXthemselves)!there!is,!according!to!Nietzsche,!a!contradiction!in!the2very2terms!
of! the! judgment.! Presumably,! then,! Nietzsche! wants! to! claim! that! if! we! consider! the!
concept!of!an!object!closely,!we!find!that!it! includes!in!it,!the!property/concept!of!‘beingX





(A151/B190)!and! it! is! this!principle,!according! to!Kant,!which!governs!analytic! judgments.!
The!proposition!‘nonXperspectival!objects!are!possible’!is!necessarily!false!on!this!construal!
because! the! predicate! of! nonXperspectivalness,! putatively,! contradicts! the! concept! of! an!
object,! for! implicitly! contained! in! the! latter! is! the! concept! of! perspectivalness.! Thus,!we!
may!say!that!for!Nietzsche!the!concept!of!a!nonXperspectival!object!is!implicitly!analytically!
impossible;165! or! to! put! it! differently,! that! the! judgment! ‘all! objects! are!
perspectival/subjectXimplying’,!is!implicitly!analytically!true.166!!
! In!light!of!these!discussions,!let!us!return!to!the!objection!posed!against!Nietzsche.!

















amount! to! if!he!wished! to! remain!wedded!to!his!objection! that!nonXperspectival!objects,!
though!unimaginable!by!us,!can!exist.!It!would!amount!to!nothing!less!than!the!claim!that!
analytic! judgments! do! not! express! a! necessary! unity! of! the! subject! and! predicate,! in! all!
possible!worlds;! or! to! phrase! it!more! intuitively,! the! realist!must! be! claiming! that! there!
could!be!a!world!wherein!the!proposition!‘Fx!and!notXFx’’!can!represent!a!state!of!affairs.!
The!problem!with!this!position!is!that!it!seems!to!strip!the!concept!of!impossibility!from!any!
application! to! the! world.! We! may! ask,! is! it! not! precisely! in! cases! of! conceptual!
contradiction!that!we!correctly!believe!the!demand!under!consideration!to!be!impossible?!
Poellner! explains! this! point! well! when! he! says:! “Does! not! the! only! ground! we! have! for!
regarding!some!proposition!which!purports!to!describe!a!state!of!affairs!in!the!actual!world!
and! which! is! of! the! form! ‘p2 and! notXp’! as! necessarily! false,! and! the! state! of! affairs! it!
purportedly!represents!as!impossible,!lie!in!the!fact!that!we!find!it!‘subjectively’!more!and!
more! difficult! and! puzzling! to! combine! its! component!meanings,! the! better!we! come! to!
understand!them,!in!the!manner!we!are!asked!to!combine!them?”!(Poellner,!Nietzsche!and!
Metaphysics,! 1995,! p.! 85).! To! what! can! the! term! ‘impossible’! be! applied! if! not! to!
logical/conceptual! impossibilities?! It! would! appear! that! if! we! wish! to! continue! making!
sense!of!the!idea!that!the!term!‘impossible’!has!any!application!to!the!world!whatsoever,!
then! the! strongest! candidates! for!what!we! consider! to!be! impossible! are!precisely! those!








Let! us! now! turn! to! a! separate,! though! related,! objection! to! the! reading! of! Nietzsche’s!
perspectivism!we!have!presented.!The!argument!currently!under!consideration,!as!posed!
by! Brian! Leiter,! although! not! coined! in! these! terms,! avers! that! Poellner’s! account! of!
Nietzsche’s! perspectivism! rests! on! a! conflation! between! epistemology! and!metaphysics.!
Leiter! focuses!on!OGM! III;! 12!–!one!of! the! few!passages! in! the!published!writings!where!
Nietzsche!refers!to!his!perspectivism.!There!Nietzsche!says:!
“From!now!on,!my!dear!philosophers,!let!us!beware!of!the!dangerous!old!conceptual!fable!
which!posited! a! ‘pure,!willXless,! painless,! timeless! knowing! subject’,! let! us!beware!of! the!
tentacles! of! such! contradictory! concepts! as! ‘pure! reason’,! ‘absolute! spirituality’,!
‘knowledge! in! itself’;! X! for! these! always! ask! us! to! imagine! an! eye!which! is! impossible! to!
imagine,! an! eye! which! supposedly! looks! out! in! no! particular! direction,! an! eye! which!
supposedly! either! restrains! or! altogether! lacks! the! active!powers! of! interpretation!which!
first!make! seeing! into! seeing! something!–! for!here,! then,!a!nonsense!and!nonXconcept! is!
demanded!of! the!eye.!Perspectival! seeing! is! the!only! kind!of! seeing! there! is,!perspectival!
‘knowing’!the!only!kind!of!‘knowing’;!and!the!more!feelings!about!a!matter!which!we!allow!
to!come! to!expression,! the!more! eyes,!different!eyes! through!which!we!are!able! to!view!
this!same!matter,!the!more!complete!our!‘conception’!of!it,!our!‘objectivity’,!will!be.!But!to!
eliminate! the!will! completely,! to! suspend! the! feelings!altogether,!even!assuming! that!we!
could!do!so:!what?!Would!this!not!amount!to!the!castration!of!the! intellect?...”!(OGM!III;!
12).!!
Leiter! reads! this! passage,! and! Nietzsche’s! perspectivism! through! it,! as! making! a!
claim! regarding! the! impossibility! of! knowledge! of! the! thingXinXitself,! not! regarding! the!




in!OGM!III;!12,!Nietzsche! is! juxtaposing!himself! to!Schopenhauer,! for!whom,!according!to!
Leiter,!knowledge! is!not!necessarily!perspectival! (Leiter,!2002,!p.!271).!Of!course,!we!saw!
earlier! that!Schopenhauer,! in! fact,!makes!a!claim! to! the!necessity!of! the!subject! in!much!
the!same!way!as!Nietzsche!does,!but!–!as!is!rather!common!with!Schopenhauer!–!he!often!
oversteps! limitations! he! lays! down! himself!when! speaking! about!ways! in!which!we!may!
come!to!experience!the!world!in!its!noumenal!character.!In!the!current!context,!Leiter!is,!I!
believe!correctly,!highlighting!what!Nietzsche!sees!as!an! inconsistency!on!Schopenhauer’s!
part! regarding! the! need! for! the! subject! in! aesthetic! experience.! As! Janaway! puts! it,!
Nietzsche! is,! in! this! passage,! trying! to! show! that! “Schopenhauer’s! last! (Platonic)! refuge!
from!the!will! is!here!explicitly!blocked”! (Janaway,!Nietzsche,! the! self,! and!Schopenhauer,!
1991,!p.!127).!But!if!we!turn!to!Leiter’s!original!point,!is!it!true!that!on!our!reading,!we!have!
misinterpreted!a!rather!modest!and!seemingly!uncontroversial!claim!regarding!the!inability!
to! have! nonXperspectival! knowledge! (knowledge! of! thingsXinXthemselves)! in! terms! of! a!
much!more!controversial!claim!regarding!the!impossibility!of!such!objects!existing!at!all?!!
Although! it! is! certainly! true! that! in! OGM! III;12,! Nietzsche! is! making! a! claim!
regarding!the!impossibility!of!nonXperspectival!knowledge,!the!belief!that!the!implications!
of! this! claim! are! restricted! to! epistemological! ones! seems! to! overlook! what! I! believe!
Nietzsche!sees!as!a!necessary!consequence!of!the!Kantian!philosophy.!Indeed,!we!can!say!
that!Nietzsche!is!in!fact!involved!in!collapsing!ontology!into!epistemology!and!that!he!is,!at!
least! in! this! respect,! taking! the! results! of! Kant’s! philosophy! more! seriously! than! Kant!
himself.!For!Nietzsche,! the!subjectXimplying!nature!of!objects! is!what!collapses! truth! into!
knowledge,!or!more!specifically,!it!collapses!being!into!beingXforXaXsubject.!We!can!see!this!
in! quote! (4)! provided! earlier! from! BGE! 16.! There! Nietzsche! claims! that! ‘absolute!
knowledge’! (which!we!may!equate!with!knowledge2of2 the2thingGinGitself)! like2 ‘the2thing2 in2






the! very! link! between! epistemology! and! ontology!which! perspectivism! is! trying! to!make!






were! an! inXitself,! an! unconditioned! thing,! it! would! for! that! very! reason! be! unknowable!!
Something! unconditioned! cannot! be! known;! otherwise! it! would! not! be! unconditioned!!
Coming!to!know,!however,!is!always!‘placing!oneself!in!a!conditional!relation!to!something’!



















is,! “if! none!of!our! concepts! could!be!appropriately! applied! to! reality! in! itself,! none!of!us!
could! have! any! idea!what!we! are! speaking! of!when! uttering! the! sounds! ‘thing! in! itself’”!
(Poellner,! Nietzsche! and!Metaphysics,! 1995,! p.! 291).! Leiter’s! formulation! of! a! distinction!
between!epistemology! and!ontology! rests!on! the!presupposition! that!we!may! intelligibly!
refer!to!a!‘reality!in!itself’!or!an!‘object!in!itself’!–!which!is!to!say!a!reality!lacking!precisely!
those!features!which!make!it!real,!or!an!object!which!lacks!the!very!features!of!objecthood.!
What!Nietzsche’s! perspectivism! is! attempting! to!highlight! is! the! subjectXimplying,! that! is,!
the! cognizerXimplying,! nature! of! what! it! means! to! be! an! object.! This! is! also! why! the!
passages!quoted!above!WP!556,!WP!560,!and!KGW!V.1.10,!make!a!claim!to!the!perspectival!
nature!of!not!merely!knowing,!but!also!of!being.!It!should!be!noted!that!Leiter’s!reading!of!
Nietzsche’s!perspectivism!as!attacking!our!ability! to!know! the! thingXinXitself,! is! a!position!
which! does! find! support! in! Nietzsche’s!middle! period!writings.! In! an! oftXquoted! passage!







of! Kant’s! critical! philosophy! even! further,! and!much! like! other! postXKantians! before! him!
(Fichte,! Hegel,! Schopenhauer),! he! proceeds! to! criticize! what! he! calls! “The! sore! spot! in!
Kant’s!philosophy! [which]!has!gradually!become!visible!even! to!dull! eyes:!Kant!no! longer!
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has! a! right! to! his! distinction! ‘appearance’! and! ‘thingXinXitself’! (WP! 553).167! Note! that!
Nietzsche’s! attack! here! is! not!merely! directed! at! any! alleged! knowledge! of! the! thingXinX
itself.! Rather,! we! find! that! Nietzsche! is,! in! following! Jacobi,! questioning! our! ability! to!
legitimately!make!use!of!the!very! idea!of!the!thingXinXitself! in!accounting!for!the!origin!of!
cognition.! In! this! respect,! Nietzsche! places! himself! on! similar! ground! as! the! prominent!
postXKantians!mentioned!above,!and!especially!Schopenhauer,!who!–!as!we!saw!–!criticized!
Kant! on! this! very! same! point.! But! importantly,! we! found! that! although! Schopenhauer,!
following!Jacobi,!had!picked!up!on!a!tension!in!Kant’s!philosophy,!his!own!account!failed!to!
engender! a! viable! alternative! theory! of! the! emergence! of! objective! experience.! The!
question!facing!us!now!is:!does!Nietzsche!succeed!in!giving!an!account!of!cognition!which!






now!make!more!explicit.! In!our! account,!Nietzsche!has! equated! the! thingXinXitself!with! a!
nonXperspectival!object!–!that!is,!with!an!object!as!it!is!abstracted!from!and!independently!
of,! any! subject! of! knowledge.! Although! such! an! equation! may! seem! natural,! a! closer!

















We! saw! in! Section! 2! that! Nietzsche's! equation! of! the! thingXinXitself! with! a! nonX
perspectival!object!was!down!to!a!belief!that!our!form!of!cognition/perspective!has!certain!
a2priori!determinations!which!it!brings!to!experience.!To!think!of!the!object!as!it!is!in!itself,!
therefore,! requires! us! to! abstract! the! contribution! of! our! cognition,! that! is! to! say,! to!
abstract!our!perspective.! If! the! thingXinXitself! is! that! ‘thing’!which!exists! independently!of!
our!cognition!and!grounds!our!cognition!of!objects,!then!we!must!conclude!that!this!‘thing’!
exists! independently!of!our! forms!of! cognition,!and! indeed!of! the!whole!of!our! cognitive!






us,! it! is! tempting! to! equate! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself!with! the! concept! of! a! nonX
perspectival! object! (which! then! Nietzsche! shows! to! be! a! contradiction,! because! of! the!
subjectXimplying!property!of!every!object).!However,!what!if!we!consider!a!subject!whose!
form!of! cognition! is! fundamentally!different! from!the!one!which!we!possess;! specifically,!
what! if! we! entertain! the! idea! of! a! being! with! intellectual/original! intuition?!We! saw! in!
chapter!3:!5!that!for!such!a!being,!the!acts!of!thinking!and!intuiting!would!be!one!and!the!
same! and! that! such! a! subject!would!give2 itself! objects! through! the!mere! act! of! thinking!






it! is! an! object! for! a! subject! with! intellectual! intuition,168! and! for! such! a! subject! the!
appearance! vs.! inXitself! dichotomy! vanishes;! the! object! is! only! inXitself! insofar! as! it! is! an!
appearance!for!the!subject.!Thus,!in!this!case!we!find!that!the!perspective!of!the!subject!is!




concerns.! For,! regardless! of! whether! for! a! being! whose! intuitions! are! intellectual,!






would! be! like! for! beings! like! ourselves,! namely! for! beings!who! possess!a2 priori! forms! of!
cognition! to! which! the! ontologically! independent! ‘given’! component! of! experience!
(receptive!intuitions)!must!conform.!Thus,!in!order!to!be!claiming!that!the!thingXinXitself!is!a!
nonXperspectival! object,! Nietzsche! must! be! assuming! that! all! possible! intuitions! are!
sensible! and! therefore! receptive,! and! that! the! forms2 of! intuition! bring! something! to!
experience! which,! in! some! sense,! 'mediate'! reality! in! itself.! But,! we! ought! to! ask,! what!
precisely! does! it!mean! to! claim! that! or! intuitions! are! receptive?! Or! rather,! and! perhaps!
more!accurately!and!to!the!point,!what!does!the!thesis!of!the!receptivity!of!our!intuitions!






assume! that! some! x! exists!mindXindependently! of! us! and! grounds! our! intuitions! that!we!
can!say!that!our!intuitions!are!receptive.!Moreover,!it!is!only!on!the!basis!of!the!receptivity!
thesis! that! we! can! claim! that! the! thingXinXitself! must! be! a! nonXperspectival! object,! and!
lastly,!it!is!on!the!basis!of!this!that!Nietzsche!claims!that!the!concept!of!the!thingXinXitself!is!
a! contradictory! one! (because! of! the! subjectXimplying! property! of! any! object).! Thus,!
Nietzsche’s! problem! eventually! faces! us! as! the! following! paradox:! that! it! is! on! the!
presupposition! that! there! is! some! mindXindependent! reality! (in2 itself)! that! we! find! the!
concept!of!mindXindependent!reality!to!be!an!incoherent!one.!
It! might! be! objected! that,! strictly! speaking,! Nietzsche’s! and! Kant’s! theories! do! not!
require! the! thing! which! grounds! our! cognition! to! be! mindXindependent! tout2 court,! but!
rather!that!it!must!only!be!independent!of!our!minds.!On!such!a!construal,!it!would!seem!
as! if! the! two! senses! of!mindXindependent! used! in! the! above! passage! are! not! congruent!
with!each!other.!For,! in!the!first! instance! ‘mindXindependent’! is!being!used!to!refer!to!an!
object!existing!independently!of!our2minds!(but!which!could!nonetheless!be!in!God’s!mind,!
as!Berkeley!would!argue),!whereas! in! the!second! instance! the!mindXindependent! thing! is!
meant! to! be! independent! of! all! possible! minds.! Thus,! Nietzsche’s! argument! does! not!
involve! a! straightforward! contradiction.! However,! a! serious! textual! problem! faces! this!
interpretation.!The!difficulty!is!that!neither!Kant!nor!Nietzsche!would!venture!to!claim!that!
the! thingXinXitself!as! the!ground!of!cognition!exists!because! it! is!perceived!by!God!or!any!
other!possible!subject.!Both!would!undoubtedly!claim!that!the!thingXinXitself!as!the!ground!





is! to! be! understood! as! independent! of! all! possible!minds,! as! is! the! object! as! considered!
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I! now! wish! to! draw! out! the! position! which! I! have! attributed! to! Nietzsche! regarding! his!









of! Kant's! idea! that! the! forms! generated! by! human! thought! and! perception! are! quite!
different! from! the! things! they! are! put! into,! whilst,! at! the! same! time,! he! rejects! the!
corresponding!Kantian!idea!that!the!things!into!which!we!put!those!forms!must!be!thought!
to!have!a!nature!and!constitution!of! their!own! in2 themselves"! (Houlgate,!Kant,!Nietzsche!
and! the! 'Thing! in! Itself',! 1993,! p.! 118).! Although! Houlgate! focuses! on! Nietzsche's! claims!
regarding!our! falsification!of! reality! through! imposition!of!a2priori! forms,! the! same! claim!
can!be!drawn!out!with!respect!to!Nietzsche's!perspectivism.!Once!again,!does!it!not!seem!
not!merely!natural,! but! also!necessary,! to!assume! that! if! our!object! is! perspectival,! then!








! The! answer! is:! not! necessarily.! There! is! a! way! through! which! the! two! positions!
could! be! reconciled,! but! it! is! a! route!which!Nietzsche,! like! Schopenhauer,! is! unwilling! to!
take.!For,!the!idea!that!our!object!is!merely!perspectival,!that!what!we!place!our!forms!into!
is!not! somethingXinXitself,! could!be! reconciled!on!an! idealist! interpretation;!or!one!which!
claimed! that!our! intuitions! are! intellectual! and! spontaneous.! Poellner! considers!precisely!
such! a! possible! reading! of! Nietzsche's! claim! that! we! somehow! 'create'! our! objects! of!
experience.170! On! this! point,! Poellner! asks:! are! we! to! interpret! individuals! as! "agents! or!
quasiXmonadic!entities!who!are!not!acted!on!at!all!by!anything!ontologically!independent!of!
them,! but! some! of! whose! autoXproduced! representational! contents! appear! to! them! as!
ontologically!independent!objects!acting!on!them?"!(Poellner,!Nietzsche!and!Metaphysics,!
1995,!p.!192).!The!question,! reXphrased! in!our!terms!may!simply!be!stated!as:!Should!we!
assume! that! we,! as! subjects,! possess! intellectual! intuition! as! opposed! to! sensible!
intuitions?!Not!only!do!we!find!no!claims!to!this!effect!by!Nietzsche,!but!as!pointed!out!by!
Poellner,!any!such!ascription!to!Nietzsche!contradicts!numerous!passages!where!Nietzsche!
is! intimating! that! our! forms! of! experience! order! or! structure! something! which! is! not!
supplied! by! us! (Poellner,! Nietzsche! and! Metaphysics,! 1995,! pp.! 193X4).! In! WP! 515,! for!
example,!Nietzsche!says!"Not!'to!know'!but!to!schematize!X!to!impose!upon!chaos!as!much!
regularity!and!form!as!our!practical!needs!require"!(WP!515),!a!formulation!which!suggests!
that! some!mindXindependent! reality! in! itself! affects!or!provides!us!with! the! raw!material!
which!we!schematize!through!our!forms!of!intuition!and!thought.!We!find!similar!claims!in!
WP!520!and!GS!111,!where!the!principle!of!identity!and!the!process!of!concept!formation!
are! traced! to! their! practical! utility! in! assisting! the! species.! Elsewhere,! Poellner! claims,!
regarding!the!link!between!Nietzsche’s!epistemology!and!idealism,!that!although!the!term!
'idealism'!is!a!bit!ambivalent,!because!of!the!various!ways!in!which!the!term!has!been!used,!
he! believes! it! is! clear! that!Nietzsche! certainly! is! not! an! idealist! in! the! sense! of! Fichte! or!






objects! but! find! themselves! passive! in! relation! to! their! recalcitrant! presence! in! senseX
experience"! (Ibid.).! Houlgate! makes! a! claim! to! the! same! effect! when! he! says! that!




Taking! Poellner! and! Houlgate's! readings! together,! which! I! believe! (at! least! in! this!
respect)! are! making! the! same! point,! it! seems! clear! that! Nietzsche! certainly! remains!
wedded!to!the!receptivity!thesis;!which!is!to!say!that!he!relies,!in!one!form!or!another,!on!
the!idea!that!we!must!make!use!of!the!concept!of!a!reality!in!itself,!independent!from!our!
perspective!and!interests,!which!somehow!exists! in! itself,!and!which!through!its! 'affective!
powers'! (however! we! are! to! understand! these! terms)! on! us,! provides! us! with! the! raw!








of! nonXperspectival! objects.! Furthermore,! this! assimilation! is! only! possible! on! the!


















presented!may!be! to!wonder:!how! is! it! that!Nietzsche's!position!makes!use!of!a! concept!








to!what!we!ordinarily!do! think!when!we!are! considering! the! thingXinXitself! X!which! is,!we!
think!of!the!transcendental2object.172!We!think!of!the!concept!of!an!indeterminate!object!as!
such,! a! something! in! general! =! x.! But,! we! know! from! our! discussion! in! Ch.! 3.3! that! the!
transcendental!object,!as!the!general!mark!of!truth,!is!precisely!that!to!which!every!object!
must!conform!in!order!to!be!a!possible!object!of!cognition.!Furthermore,!as!we!argued!in!
Ch.! 3.3! and! in! Section! 4! of! the! present! chapter,! the! wholly! categorial! nature! of! the!












substantial! (insofar!as!properties!can! inhere! in! it),! is!causal! (in! that! it!has!a! reason! for! its!
being!and!necessarily!acts!on,!and!is!acted!upon!by,!other!objects),!has!some!quality,!has!
unity,! and! X! most! importantly! (and! as! presupposed! by! all! the! previous! properties)! X! is!
extended!in!space!and!persists!through!time.173!
Thus,! when! considering! the! role! of! the! thingXinXitself! in! any! receptivity! thesis,!
whether! it! be! Kant’s,! Schopenhauer’s,! or! Nietzsche's,! we! may! say! that! we! are! really!
considering!the!concept!of!an!object!or!a!something!in!general!=!x,!viz.!the!transcendental!
object.!It!is!only!on!this!basis!that!we!so!much!as!even!make!any!inXroad!into!either!theory!
of! cognition.!Where! we! are! meant! to! use! the! concept! of! that! thing! which! lacks! all! the!
marks!of!objecthood,!we! instead!employ! the! concept!of! that!which!bears!all! the!general!
marks! of! objecthood.! This! leap! of! reason! seems! to! be! necessitated! by! any! form! of!
transcendental! idealism! which! on! the! one! hand! remains! committed! to! the! receptivity!




















reality.! If! the! positing! of! mindXindependent! ‘things’! as! the! grounds! of! phenomena! is,!
furthermore,! to! be! distinguished! from! common! sense! realism! whereby! spatioXtemporal!
objects! produce! sensations! in! us! which! are! qualitatively! identical! with! those! entities!
themselves,!then!we!must!assume!that!those!entities!are!either!(a)!nonXspatiotemporal!or,!
more!modestly,! (b)! that!we!do!not!know!how!we!are!to!think!of!them,!but!certainly!that!
they! are! in! some! respect! 'different'! from! those! items! to! which! we! refer! in! everyday!
experience.! The! first! of! these! positions! is! Kant's! and! Schopenhauer's,! the! second! one!
Nietzsche's.!What!should!be!clear! is!that!on!either!construal!we!are!forced!to!rely!on!the!
concept!of!a!thingXinXitself!as!an!object!as!it!is!independently!of!our!cognitive!perspective’s!
contribution! –! a! demand! which! upon! reflection! we! find! to! be! an! unintelligible! one.!
Moreover,!in!place!of!the!thingXinXitself!(which!we!cannot!think)!we!use!the!concept!of!the!
transcendental!object.!
!In! fact,! it! is! worth! turning! to!CPR! to! see! exactly! when! Kant! first! introduces! the!
thought!of!thingsXinXthemselves!as!the!ground!of!appearances.!We!find!this!commitment!in!
the!very!opening!passage!of!the!BXIntroduction.!Kant!begins:!
"There! is! no! doubt!whatever! that! all! our! cognition! begins!with! experience;! for! how! else!
should!the!cognitive!faculty!be!awakened!into!exercise!if!not!through!objects!that!stimulate!
our!senses!and!in!part!themselves!produce!representations,!in!part!bring!the!activity!of!our!




Kant! sets! out! his! commitment! to! the! receptivity! thesis! without! any! argumentation!




sense,!affect!us.!Thus,! the! reader!who! is! confronted!with! this!claim!at! the!very!outset!of!
Kant’s!theory,!cannot!but!think!of!thingsXinXthemselves!as!a!something!in!general!=!x,!that!
is,!an!empirically! indeterminate!transcendental!object.!But,!by!the!time!the!reader! learns!
that! the! thingXinXitself,! namely! that! thing! which! “stimulate[s]! our! senses”,! “produce[s]!
sensations”! and! “bring[s]! the! activity! of! our! understanding! into! motion”! (B1),! is! to! be!
thought! of! as! being! nonXspatiotemporal,175! the! spatioXtemporal! replacement! which! has!
been! used! up! to! this! point! has! already! done! most! of! the! work! for! Kant.! Thus,! after!
considering!an!indeterminate!spatioXtemporal!object!which!grounds!our!intuitions,!we!are!
then! told! that! this! ‘thing’! must,! in! fact,! be! nonXspatiotemporal.! Of! course,! Nietzsche’s!








I! have! attempted,! in! this! final! chapter! of! the! study,! to! reveal! Nietzsche’s! ongoing!
involvement! with! epistemological! concerns! arising! out! of! the! Kantian! philosophy.! The!
objective! of! Chapter! 9! was! to! demonstrate! how! Nietzsche,! in! following! Schopenhauer,!
attempts!to!reject!the!‘sore!spot’!in!Kant’s!philosophy,!namely!the!problematic!concept!of!
the!thingXinXitself,!and!in!so!doing!places!his!own!epistemology!firmly!within!the!bounds!of!






the! reliance! on! the! thingXinXitself,! seems! to! be! an! insurmountable! problem.! As!we! have!
seen,! the! commitment! by! both! Schopenhauer! and! Nietzsche! to! the! receptivity! thesis!
together! with! their! commitment! to! the! idea! that! our! cognitive! perspective! has! a2 priori!
forms!which!we!bring!to!experience,!meant!that!their!accounts,!too,!had!to!presuppose!the!
ability!to!refer!to!and!make!use!of!the!idea!of!a!reality!in!itself;!that!is,!their!commitments!
made! the! impossible! thought! of! the! thingXinXitself,! an! inevitable! one,! and! although! they!















We!have! now! reached! the! end! of! our! study.! In! the! course! of! this! thesis! I! hope! to! have!
demonstrated! and! brought! to! light! Nietzsche’s! continual! involvement! and! concern! with!
epistemological! issues! arising! from! the! Kantian! philosophy.! Through! a! reading! of,! firstly,!




! I!would! finally! like! to!note! that! I!have!not!attempted!nor! intended! to!provide!an!
exhaustive! account! of! either! Nietzsche’s! error! theory! or! Nietzsche’s! criticisms! of!
metaphysical! truth.! Regarding! the! error! theory,! Nietzsche! formulates! it! in! various! ways!
throughout!his!intellectual!career!and!it!is!doubtful!that!all!of!his!formulations!can!be!read!
according! to! the! interpretation! provided! here.! However,! I! believe! that! the! account!
presented! in! this! study! offers! enough! textual! and! argumentative! support! to! justify! our!
reading! of! the! early! error! theory.! Regarding! Nietzsche’s! criticism! of! the! thingXinXitself,! I!
concede! that! Nietzsche’s! position! is! more! multiXfaceted! than! our! account! has,! perhaps,!
suggested.!Nietzsche’s! attacks! on! notions! such! as!metaphysical! truth! are! often! launched!
from!nonXepistemological! considerations! such! as! scrutinising! the! type!of! valuation!of! life!
that! belief! in! a!metaphysical!world! is! indicative! of.! At! other! times,! Nietzsche! rejects! the!
thingXinXitself! through! a! form! of! indifferentism! towards! that! which! must! lie! beyond! the!
realm! of! possible! experience.! And! even! from! epistemological! considerations,! as! we!






strand! of! thought! to! focus! on.! I! believe,! however,! that! an! examination! of! these! other!
arguments! can!also! reveal! interesting!continuities!between!Nietzsche’s!epistemology!and!
his!philosophical!predecessors.!
Finally,! I! hope! that! my! study! has,! more! than! merely! locating! Nietzsche’s!
epistemology!within!the!Kantian!system,!also!vindicated!Kant’s!philosophical!position!over!
those! of! Schopenhauer! and!Nietzsche.! This! is! not,! of! course,! to! say! that! I! believe! Kant’s!
critical! system! to! be! void! of! problems! –! far! from! it.! It! also! does! not! mean! that! I! view!
Schopenhauer’s!and!Nietzsche’s! criticisms!as! completely!misplaced.! In! fact,! I! believe! that!
many!of!the!criticisms!highlighted!by!the!latter!two!are!legitimate!concerns!about!genuine!


















Regarding! the! criticism! of! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself,! I! believe! that! both!




and! therefore! take! a! most! basic! assumption! of! this! theory! for! granted! –! namely! the!
receptivity! thesis! –! they! require! the! concept! of! the! thingXinXitself.! Thus,!we! find! that!we!
have!come!full!circle!once!again!to!Jacobi’s! incisive!criticism!levelled!against!Kant,!but!we!
can!now!see!that!it!applies!equally!to!both!Schopenhauer!and!Nietzsche!as!well.!!And!this!
criticism,!which!highlights!both!the!need!for!the!thingXinXitself!and!its!illegitimate!use!given!
the!strictures!laid!down!by!the!Kantian!philosophy,!is!summarized!by!Jacobi!in!the!simplest!
of!terms,!namely,!that:!“Without!this!presupposition!I!could!not!enter!the!system,!and!with!
this!presupposition!I!could!not!remain!in!it”!(Jacobi!quoted!in!Janaway,!1989,!p.!70).!
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